From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
To: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>,
Matthew Bobrowski <repnop@google.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] fanotify: avoid/silence premature LSM capability checks
Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2026 16:06:24 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260216150625.793013-2-omosnace@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260216150625.793013-1-omosnace@redhat.com>
Make sure calling capable()/ns_capable() actually leads to access denied
when false is returned, because these functions emit an audit record
when a Linux Security Module denies the capability, which makes it
difficult to avoid allowing/silencing unnecessary permissions in
security policies (namely with SELinux).
Where the return value just used to set a flag, use the non-auditing
ns_capable_noaudit() instead.
Fixes: 7cea2a3c505e ("fanotify: support limited functionality for unprivileged users")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
---
fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c | 25 +++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
index d0b9b984002fe..9c9fca2976d2b 100644
--- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
+++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
@@ -1615,17 +1615,18 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fanotify_init, unsigned int, flags, unsigned int, event_f_flags)
pr_debug("%s: flags=%x event_f_flags=%x\n",
__func__, flags, event_f_flags);
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
- /*
- * An unprivileged user can setup an fanotify group with
- * limited functionality - an unprivileged group is limited to
- * notification events with file handles or mount ids and it
- * cannot use unlimited queue/marks.
- */
- if ((flags & FANOTIFY_ADMIN_INIT_FLAGS) ||
- !(flags & (FANOTIFY_FID_BITS | FAN_REPORT_MNT)))
- return -EPERM;
+ /*
+ * An unprivileged user can setup an fanotify group with
+ * limited functionality - an unprivileged group is limited to
+ * notification events with file handles or mount ids and it
+ * cannot use unlimited queue/marks.
+ */
+ if (((flags & FANOTIFY_ADMIN_INIT_FLAGS) ||
+ !(flags & (FANOTIFY_FID_BITS | FAN_REPORT_MNT))) &&
+ !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (!ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
/*
* Setting the internal flag FANOTIFY_UNPRIV on the group
* prevents setting mount/filesystem marks on this group and
@@ -1990,8 +1991,8 @@ static int do_fanotify_mark(int fanotify_fd, unsigned int flags, __u64 mask,
* A user is allowed to setup sb/mount/mntns marks only if it is
* capable in the user ns where the group was created.
*/
- if (!ns_capable(group->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
- mark_type != FAN_MARK_INODE)
+ if (mark_type != FAN_MARK_INODE &&
+ !ns_capable(group->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
/*
--
2.53.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-16 15:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-16 15:06 [PATCH 0/2] fanotify: avid some premature LSM checks Ondrej Mosnacek
2026-02-16 15:06 ` Ondrej Mosnacek [this message]
2026-02-16 15:25 ` [PATCH 1/2] fanotify: avoid/silence premature LSM capability checks Amir Goldstein
2026-02-20 22:15 ` Paul Moore
2026-02-16 15:06 ` [PATCH 2/2] fanotify: call fanotify_events_supported() before path_permission() and security_path_notify() Ondrej Mosnacek
2026-02-16 15:46 ` Amir Goldstein
2026-02-20 22:16 ` Paul Moore
2026-02-17 11:09 ` [PATCH 0/2] fanotify: avid some premature LSM checks Jan Kara
2026-02-18 12:36 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2026-02-26 14:19 ` Jan Kara
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