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From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	 linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>,
	 Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>,
	Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com>,
	 Matthieu Buffet <matthieu@buffet.re>,
	Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
	 konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com,
	Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>,
	 Alyssa Ross <hi@alyssa.is>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	 Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 6/9] landlock/selftests: Check that coredump sockets stay unrestricted
Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2026 21:05:46 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260218.ohth8theu8Yi@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260215105158.28132-7-gnoack3000@gmail.com>

On Sun, Feb 15, 2026 at 11:51:54AM +0100, Günther Noack wrote:
> Even when a process is restricted with the new
> LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_SOCKET right, the kernel can continue
> writing its coredump to the configured coredump socket.
> 
> In the test, we create a local server and rewire the system to write
> coredumps into it.  We then create a child process within a Landlock
> domain where LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_SOCKET is restricted and make
> the process crash.  The test uses SO_PEERCRED to check that the
> connecting client process is the expected one.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
> ---
>  tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 122 +++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 122 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> index 8fa9d7c49ac3..705d8a13d2e0 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
>  #include <sys/ioctl.h>
>  #include <sys/mount.h>
>  #include <sys/prctl.h>
> +#include <sys/resource.h>
>  #include <sys/sendfile.h>
>  #include <sys/socket.h>
>  #include <sys/stat.h>
> @@ -4922,6 +4923,127 @@ TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_seqpacket_connect_to_child_full)
>  #undef USE_SENDTO
>  #undef ENFORCE_ALL
>  
> +static void read_core_pattern(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
> +			      char *buf, size_t buf_size)
> +{
> +	int fd;
> +	ssize_t ret;
> +
> +	fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
> +	ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
> +
> +	ret = read(fd, buf, buf_size - 1);
> +	ASSERT_LE(0, ret);
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
> +
> +	buf[ret] = '\0';
> +}
> +
> +static void set_core_pattern(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
> +			     const char *pattern)
> +{
> +	int fd;
> +	size_t len = strlen(pattern);
> +
> +	fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern", O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
> +	ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
> +
> +	ASSERT_EQ(len, write(fd, pattern, len));
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
> +}

I had to fix this helper to make it work with check-linux.sh:

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index ae32513fb54b..64887d34079a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -4659,11 +4659,34 @@ static void set_core_pattern(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
 	int fd;
 	size_t len = strlen(pattern);
 
+	/*
+	 * Writing to /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern requires EUID 0 because
+	 * sysctl_perm() checks that, ignoring capabilities like
+	 * CAP_SYS_ADMIN or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE.
+	 *
+	 * Switching EUID clears the dumpable flag, which must be restored
+	 * afterwards to allow coredumps.
+	 */
+	set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETUID);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, seteuid(0));
+	clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETUID);
+
 	fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern", O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
-	ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, fd)
+	{
+		TH_LOG("Failed to open core_pattern for writing: %s",
+		       strerror(errno));
+	}
 
 	ASSERT_EQ(len, write(fd, pattern, len));
 	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+
+	set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETUID);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, seteuid(getuid()));
+	clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETUID);
+
+	/* Restore dumpable flag cleared by seteuid(). */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 1 , 0, 0, 0));
 }
 
 FIXTURE(coredump)
@@ -4680,9 +4703,7 @@ FIXTURE_SETUP(coredump)
 
 FIXTURE_TEARDOWN_PARENT(coredump)
 {
-	set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
 	set_core_pattern(_metadata, self->original_core_pattern);
-	clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -4705,9 +4726,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(coredump, socket_not_restricted)
 	srv_fd = set_up_named_unix_server(_metadata, SOCK_STREAM, sock_path);
 
 	/* Point coredumps at our socket. */
-	set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
 	set_core_pattern(_metadata, core_pattern);
-	clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
 
 	/* Restrict LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX. */
 	enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, NULL);


Please run tests in this (minimal) environment.

> +
> +FIXTURE(coredump)
> +{
> +	char original_core_pattern[256];
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_SETUP(coredump)
> +{
> +	disable_caps(_metadata);
> +	read_core_pattern(_metadata, self->original_core_pattern,
> +			  sizeof(self->original_core_pattern));
> +}
> +
> +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN_PARENT(coredump)
> +{
> +	set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> +	set_core_pattern(_metadata, self->original_core_pattern);
> +	clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Test that even when a process is restricted with
> + * LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, the kernel can still initiate a connection
> + * to the coredump socket on the processes' behalf.
> + */
> +TEST_F_FORK(coredump, socket_not_restricted)
> +{
> +	static const char core_pattern[] = "@/tmp/landlock_coredump_test.sock";
> +	const char *const sock_path = core_pattern + 1;
> +	int srv_fd, conn_fd, status;
> +	pid_t child_pid;
> +	struct ucred cred;
> +	socklen_t cred_len = sizeof(cred);
> +	char buf[4096];
> +
> +	/* Set up the coredump server socket. */
> +	unlink(sock_path);
> +	srv_fd = set_up_named_unix_server(_metadata, SOCK_STREAM, sock_path);
> +
> +	/* Point coredumps at our socket. */
> +	set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> +	set_core_pattern(_metadata, core_pattern);
> +	clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> +
> +	/* Restrict LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX. */
> +	drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
> +		.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
> +	});
> +
> +	/* Fork a child that crashes. */
> +	child_pid = fork();
> +	ASSERT_LE(0, child_pid);
> +	if (child_pid == 0) {
> +		struct rlimit rl = {
> +			.rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY,
> +			.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY,
> +		};
> +
> +		ASSERT_EQ(0, setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rl));
> +
> +		/* Crash on purpose. */
> +		kill(getpid(), SIGSEGV);
> +		_exit(1);
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Accept the coredump connection.  If Landlock incorrectly denies the
> +	 * kernel's coredump connect, accept() will block forever, so the test
> +	 * would time out.
> +	 */
> +	conn_fd = accept(srv_fd, NULL, NULL);
> +	ASSERT_LE(0, conn_fd);
> +
> +	/* Check that the connection came from the crashing child. */
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, getsockopt(conn_fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cred,
> +				&cred_len));
> +	EXPECT_EQ(child_pid, cred.pid);
> +
> +	/* Drain the coredump data so the kernel can finish. */
> +	while (read(conn_fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) > 0)
> +		;
> +
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(conn_fd));
> +
> +	/* Wait for the child and verify it coredumped. */
> +	ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
> +	ASSERT_TRUE(WIFSIGNALED(status));
> +	ASSERT_TRUE(WCOREDUMP(status));
> +
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(srv_fd));
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(sock_path));
> +}
> +
>  /* clang-format off */
>  FIXTURE(layout1_bind) {};
>  /* clang-format on */
> -- 
> 2.52.0
> 
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2026-02-18 20:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-02-15 10:51 [PATCH v5 0/9] landlock: UNIX connect() control by pathname and scope Günther Noack
2026-02-15 10:51 ` [PATCH v5 1/9] lsm: Add LSM hook security_unix_find Günther Noack
2026-02-18  9:36   ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-02-19 13:26     ` Justin Suess
2026-02-19 20:04       ` [PATCH v6] " Justin Suess
2026-02-19 20:26         ` Günther Noack
2026-03-10 22:39           ` Paul Moore
2026-03-11 12:34             ` Justin Suess
2026-03-11 16:08               ` Paul Moore
2026-03-12 11:57                 ` Günther Noack
2026-02-20 15:49         ` Günther Noack
2026-02-21 13:22           ` Justin Suess
2026-02-23 16:09             ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-02-15 10:51 ` [PATCH v5 2/9] landlock: Control pathname UNIX domain socket resolution by path Günther Noack
2026-02-18  9:37   ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-02-19  9:45     ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-02-19 13:59       ` Günther Noack
2026-03-08  9:09         ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-08 11:50           ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-14 23:15             ` Günther Noack
2026-03-17 21:14               ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-02-20 14:33     ` Günther Noack
2026-03-08  9:18       ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-10 15:19         ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2026-03-11  4:46         ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-03-08  9:09   ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-15 20:58     ` Günther Noack
2026-02-15 10:51 ` [PATCH v5 3/9] samples/landlock: Add support for named UNIX domain socket restrictions Günther Noack
2026-02-18  9:37   ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-02-20 16:08     ` Günther Noack
2026-02-15 10:51 ` [PATCH v5 4/9] landlock/selftests: Test LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX Günther Noack
2026-02-18 19:11   ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-02-20 16:27     ` Günther Noack
2026-02-20 17:04       ` Günther Noack
2026-02-15 10:51 ` [PATCH v5 5/9] landlock/selftests: Audit test for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX Günther Noack
2026-02-15 10:51 ` [PATCH v5 6/9] landlock/selftests: Check that coredump sockets stay unrestricted Günther Noack
2026-02-18 20:05   ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2026-02-15 10:51 ` [PATCH v5 7/9] landlock/selftests: fs_test: Simplify ruleset creation and enforcement Günther Noack
2026-02-15 10:51 ` [PATCH v5 8/9] landlock: Document FS access right for pathname UNIX sockets Günther Noack
2026-02-18  9:39   ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-14 21:16     ` Günther Noack
2026-02-15 10:51 ` [PATCH v5 9/9] landlock: Document design rationale for scoped access rights Günther Noack
2026-02-15 18:09   ` Alyssa Ross

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