[PATCH v2 1/5] rust: bindings: include lsm_hooks.h to expose LSM types to bindgen

[PATCH v2 1/5] rust: bindings: include lsm_hooks.h to expose LSM types to bindgen

[Jamie Lindsey]

Add lsm_hooks.h to bindings_helper.h so that bindgen generates Rust
bindings for lsm_id, lsm_info, security_hook_list, and LSM_ID_*
constants.  These are required by the Rust LSM abstraction layer
introduced in subsequent patches.

Placed alphabetically between jump_label.h and mdio.h.

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-4-6
Signed-off-by: Jamie Lindsey <jamie@matrixforgelabs.com>
---
 rust/bindings/bindings_helper.h | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/rust/bindings/bindings_helper.h b/rust/bindings/bindings_helper.h
index 083cc44aa952..b819592868e3 100644
--- a/rust/bindings/bindings_helper.h
+++ b/rust/bindings/bindings_helper.h
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
 #include <linux/ioport.h>
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
 #include <linux/jump_label.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/mdio.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/miscdevice.h>
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH v2 2/5] rust: helpers: add C shims for LSM hook initialisation

[Jamie Lindsey]

struct security_hook_list carries __randomize_layout, making its fields
inaccessible to Rust code (bindgen sees the natural field order, which
may differ when CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT is active).  Add thin C wrapper
functions that call LSM_HOOK_INIT() — the existing C macro that handles
the randomised layout correctly — so that Rust can populate hook slots
without touching struct fields directly.

Three hook shims are provided (file_open, task_alloc, task_free) plus a
wrapper for security_add_hooks() which is __init and must carry that
annotation to ensure correct placement in the init text section.

Hook signatures verified against union security_list_options generated
from lsm_hook_defs.h: all three match exactly, including u64 for
task_alloc's clone_flags parameter (not unsigned long).

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-4-6
Signed-off-by: Jamie Lindsey <jamie@matrixforgelabs.com>
---
 rust/helpers/helpers.c |  1 +
 rust/helpers/lsm.c     | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 rust/helpers/lsm.c

diff --git a/rust/helpers/helpers.c b/rust/helpers/helpers.c
index a3c42e51f00a..c496917be073 100644
--- a/rust/helpers/helpers.c
+++ b/rust/helpers/helpers.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include "io.c"
 #include "jump_label.c"
 #include "kunit.c"
+#include "lsm.c"
 #include "maple_tree.c"
 #include "mm.c"
 #include "mutex.c"
diff --git a/rust/helpers/lsm.c b/rust/helpers/lsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fb475428fd0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rust/helpers/lsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+
+/*
+ * Hook list initializers.
+ *
+ * struct security_hook_list carries __randomize_layout, so its fields must
+ * never be set by Rust code directly (bindgen sees only the "natural" field
+ * order, which may differ when CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT is enabled).  These helpers
+ * wrap LSM_HOOK_INIT(), the C macro the kernel already uses for this purpose,
+ * so that Rust can safely obtain an initialised security_hook_list without
+ * ever touching the struct's fields directly.
+ */
+
+__rust_helper void
+rust_helper_lsm_hook_init_file_open(struct security_hook_list *hl,
+				    int (*fn)(struct file *))
+{
+	*hl = (struct security_hook_list)LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, fn);
+}
+
+__rust_helper void
+rust_helper_lsm_hook_init_task_alloc(struct security_hook_list *hl,
+				     int (*fn)(struct task_struct *, u64))
+{
+	*hl = (struct security_hook_list)LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, fn);
+}
+
+__rust_helper void
+rust_helper_lsm_hook_init_task_free(struct security_hook_list *hl,
+				    void (*fn)(struct task_struct *))
+{
+	*hl = (struct security_hook_list)LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, fn);
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_add_hooks() is __init — it installs callbacks into the static-call
+ * table and must only be called during kernel initialisation.  This wrapper
+ * keeps the __init annotation so the linker places it alongside the rest of
+ * the init text, and Rust callers invoke it only from their own __init path
+ * (the lsm_info.init callback).
+ */
+void __init
+rust_helper_security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
+			       const struct lsm_id *lsmid)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(hooks, count, lsmid);
+}
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH v2 3/5] rust: kernel: add LSM abstraction layer

[Jamie Lindsey]

Introduce kernel::lsm, a safe Rust interface for writing Linux Security
Modules:

- Hooks trait: one method per LSM hook, all defaulting to no-op allow.
  Sync + Send + 'static bounds are required because hooks may be called
  concurrently from any CPU.

- Adapter<T>: zero-cost monomorphised bridge converting unsafe extern "C"
  callbacks (required by the hook ABI) to safe Rust.  No vtable; each
  hook is a standalone function pointer.

- LsmId / LsmInfo: #[repr(transparent)] wrappers with unsafe impl Sync
  around lsm_id and lsm_info.  Both types contain *const c_char pointers
  to 'static string literals which are never mutated, making the Sync
  impl sound.

- define_lsm! macro: generates the static __LSM_ID, the MaybeUninit hook
  array __LSM_HOOKS, the __lsm_init() init function that fills hook slots
  via the C shims and calls security_add_hooks(), and the __LSM_INFO
  descriptor placed in .lsm_info.init so that security_init() discovers
  and calls the init function at boot.

The static mut __LSM_HOOKS array is intentionally mutable: it is written
exactly once by __lsm_init() in the single-threaded boot context before
security_add_hooks() copies the entries into the static-call table.  No
access occurs after that point.  UnsafeCell or a lock would add overhead
with no safety benefit in this init-only path.

Gated on CONFIG_SECURITY via #[cfg(CONFIG_SECURITY)] in lib.rs.

This is v1.  Planned follow-ups: SecurityBlob<T> for per-inode/per-task
state, proc-macro support for multiple concurrent Rust LSMs, and
additional hook wrappers as safe Rust types for their arguments land
upstream.

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-4-6
Signed-off-by: Jamie Lindsey <jamie@matrixforgelabs.com>
---
 rust/kernel/lib.rs |   2 +
 rust/kernel/lsm.rs | 295 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 297 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 rust/kernel/lsm.rs

diff --git a/rust/kernel/lib.rs b/rust/kernel/lib.rs
index 3da92f18f4ee..af3e2416a581 100644
--- a/rust/kernel/lib.rs
+++ b/rust/kernel/lib.rs
@@ -112,6 +112,8 @@
 #[cfg(CONFIG_KUNIT)]
 pub mod kunit;
 pub mod list;
+#[cfg(CONFIG_SECURITY)]
+pub mod lsm;
 pub mod maple_tree;
 pub mod miscdevice;
 pub mod mm;
diff --git a/rust/kernel/lsm.rs b/rust/kernel/lsm.rs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bdd3ba4f72ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rust/kernel/lsm.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+//! Linux Security Module (LSM) abstractions.
+//!
+//! This module provides safe Rust abstractions for implementing Linux Security
+//! Modules.  An LSM written in Rust implements the [`Hooks`] trait, then
+//! registers itself at boot time with the [`define_lsm!`] macro.
+//!
+//! # Minimal example
+//!
+//! ```no_run
+//! use kernel::lsm;
+//! use kernel::prelude::*;
+//!
+//! struct MyLsm;
+//!
+//! impl lsm::Hooks for MyLsm {
+//!     fn file_open(file: &kernel::fs::File) -> Result {
+//!         pr_info!("file_open: flags={:#x}\n", file.flags());
+//!         Ok(())
+//!     }
+//! }
+//!
+//! kernel::define_lsm!(MyLsm, "my_lsm\0", bindings::LSM_ID_UNDEF as u64);
+//! ```
+//!
+//! C headers: [`include/linux/lsm_hooks.h`](srctree/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h),
+//!            [`include/linux/security.h`](srctree/include/linux/security.h)
+
+use crate::{bindings, fs::File, task::Task};
+use core::marker::PhantomData;
+use core::mem::MaybeUninit;
+
+/// Wrapper around [`bindings::lsm_id`] that implements [`Sync`].
+///
+/// `lsm_id` contains a `*const c_char` name pointer (not `Sync` by default).
+/// The pointer always points to a string literal in static storage and is
+/// never mutated after construction, so sharing across threads is safe.
+#[repr(transparent)]
+pub struct LsmId(pub bindings::lsm_id);
+
+// SAFETY: `lsm_id` holds only a static string pointer and a numeric ID.
+// Both are immutable after construction.
+unsafe impl Sync for LsmId {}
+
+/// Wrapper around [`bindings::lsm_info`] that implements [`Sync`].
+///
+/// `lsm_info` contains several raw pointer fields.  All are set to static
+/// addresses during `define_lsm!` macro expansion and are never mutated
+/// after that, so sharing across threads is safe.
+#[repr(transparent)]
+pub struct LsmInfo(pub bindings::lsm_info);
+
+// SAFETY: `lsm_info` is initialised once (at compile time via const fn)
+// with pointers to static data, then placed in `.lsm_info.init` as a
+// read-only descriptor.
+unsafe impl Sync for LsmInfo {}
+
+/// The trait that a Rust LSM must implement.
+///
+/// Each method corresponds to a kernel LSM hook.  Methods have default
+/// no-op implementations so you only need to override the hooks you care
+/// about.
+///
+/// # Safety contract for implementors
+///
+/// All methods are called from kernel context and may be called concurrently.
+/// Implementors must ensure their implementations are:
+///
+/// - **Thread-safe** — multiple CPUs may call the same hook simultaneously.
+/// - **Non-sleeping where required** — [`Hooks::task_free`] runs in a context
+///   that must not sleep; see its documentation.
+///
+/// The `Sync + Send + 'static` bounds enforce these requirements at the
+/// type level.
+pub trait Hooks: Sync + Send + 'static {
+    /// Called when a file is being opened.
+    ///
+    /// Return `Ok(())` to allow the open, or an `Err` to deny it.
+    /// Common denial codes: [`EACCES`](crate::error::code::EACCES),
+    /// [`EPERM`](crate::error::code::EPERM).
+    fn file_open(_file: &File) -> crate::error::Result {
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Called when a new task (thread or process) is being created.
+    ///
+    /// `clone_flags` contains the `CLONE_*` flags passed to `clone(2)`.
+    ///
+    /// Return `Ok(())` to allow creation, or an `Err` to deny it.
+    fn task_alloc(_task: &Task, _clone_flags: u64) -> crate::error::Result {
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Called when a task is being freed.
+    ///
+    /// This hook runs during task teardown.  **Must not sleep.**  Any
+    /// per-task state stored in a security blob should be cleaned up here.
+    fn task_free(_task: &Task) {}
+}
+
+/// C-callable adapter functions that bridge the LSM framework to [`Hooks`].
+///
+/// This type is never instantiated.  Its associated functions serve as the
+/// `unsafe extern "C" fn` pointers registered with the kernel's LSM
+/// static-call infrastructure.
+///
+/// # Invariants
+///
+/// Each adapter function is called only from the LSM framework in the
+/// appropriate hook context, with valid, non-null pointer arguments.
+#[doc(hidden)]
+pub struct Adapter<T: Hooks>(PhantomData<T>);
+
+impl<T: Hooks> Adapter<T> {
+    /// Adapter for the `file_open` LSM hook.
+    ///
+    /// # Safety
+    ///
+    /// `file` must be a valid, non-null pointer to a `struct file` that
+    /// remains valid for the duration of this call.  Called only by the
+    /// LSM framework.
+    pub unsafe extern "C" fn file_open(
+        file: *mut bindings::file,
+    ) -> core::ffi::c_int {
+        // SAFETY: The LSM framework guarantees `file` is valid and non-null
+        // for the duration of this call.
+        let file_ref = unsafe { File::from_raw_file(file.cast_const()) };
+        match T::file_open(file_ref) {
+            Ok(()) => 0,
+            Err(e) => e.to_errno(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Adapter for the `task_alloc` LSM hook.
+    ///
+    /// # Safety
+    ///
+    /// `task` must be a valid, non-null pointer to a newly-allocated
+    /// `task_struct`.  `clone_flags` are the flags passed to `clone(2)`.
+    /// Called only by the LSM framework.
+    pub unsafe extern "C" fn task_alloc(
+        task: *mut bindings::task_struct,
+        clone_flags: u64,
+    ) -> core::ffi::c_int {
+        // SAFETY: The LSM framework guarantees `task` is valid, non-null,
+        // and exclusively owned by the framework for the duration of this
+        // call.  `Task` is `#[repr(transparent)]` over
+        // `Opaque<task_struct>`, which is `#[repr(transparent)]` over
+        // `UnsafeCell<MaybeUninit<task_struct>>`, giving the same layout.
+        let task_ref = unsafe { &*(task as *const Task) };
+        match T::task_alloc(task_ref, clone_flags) {
+            Ok(()) => 0,
+            Err(e) => e.to_errno(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Adapter for the `task_free` LSM hook.
+    ///
+    /// # Safety
+    ///
+    /// `task` must be a valid, non-null pointer to a `task_struct` that
+    /// is being freed.  Must not sleep.  Called only by the LSM framework.
+    pub unsafe extern "C" fn task_free(task: *mut bindings::task_struct) {
+        // SAFETY: Same layout argument as `task_alloc`.
+        let task_ref = unsafe { &*(task as *const Task) };
+        T::task_free(task_ref);
+    }
+}
+
+/// Constructs a [`bindings::lsm_info`] value for use by [`define_lsm!`].
+///
+/// All fields not explicitly set are zero-initialised, which the kernel
+/// interprets as:
+/// - `order`: `LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE` (0)
+/// - `flags`: none
+/// - `blobs`: no security blobs requested
+/// - `enabled`: use the default (always enabled)
+/// - `initcall_*`: no additional initcalls
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// - `id` must point to a `lsm_id` with `'static` lifetime.
+/// - `init` must be a valid init function called once during `security_init()`.
+#[doc(hidden)]
+pub const unsafe fn new_lsm_info(
+    id: *const bindings::lsm_id,
+    init: Option<unsafe extern "C" fn() -> core::ffi::c_int>,
+) -> LsmInfo {
+    // SAFETY: `bindings::lsm_info` is a C struct.  Zero-initialisation
+    // gives valid zero/null values for every optional field.  The caller
+    // is responsible for providing a valid `id` and `init`.
+    let mut info: bindings::lsm_info =
+        unsafe { MaybeUninit::zeroed().assume_init() };
+    info.id = id;
+    info.init = init;
+    LsmInfo(info)
+}
+
+/// Registers a Rust LSM implementation with the kernel at boot time.
+///
+/// # Usage
+///
+/// ```no_run
+/// kernel::define_lsm!(MyLsmType, "my_lsm\0", bindings::LSM_ID_UNDEF as u64);
+/// ```
+///
+/// The macro generates:
+/// - A `static lsm_id` identifying this LSM to the kernel.
+/// - A static array of `security_hook_list` entries (initialised via C shims
+///   to avoid `__randomize_layout` pitfalls).
+/// - An `unsafe extern "C"` init function that populates the hook list and
+///   calls `security_add_hooks()`.
+/// - A `static lsm_info` placed in the `.lsm_info.init` linker section so
+///   the kernel discovers and calls the init function during `security_init()`.
+///
+/// # Limitations (v1)
+///
+/// - Only the `file_open`, `task_alloc`, and `task_free` hooks are registered.
+///   Additional hooks will be added in follow-up patches as safe Rust wrappers
+///   for the argument types are contributed upstream.
+/// - At most one Rust LSM can be registered per kernel build.  Unique name
+///   generation for multiple LSMs requires a proc-macro (planned for v2).
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! define_lsm {
+    ($T:ty, $name:expr, $id:expr) => {
+        mod __rust_lsm_registration {
+            use super::*;
+
+            // The LSM identity — must be 'static because the static-call
+            // table holds a back-pointer to it via security_hook_list.lsmid.
+            // LsmId wraps lsm_id with `unsafe impl Sync` so it can be `static`.
+            static __LSM_ID: $crate::lsm::LsmId =
+                $crate::lsm::LsmId($crate::bindings::lsm_id {
+                    name: $name.as_ptr().cast(),
+                    id: $id,
+                });
+
+            // The hook list array.  MaybeUninit avoids needing security_hook_list
+            // to implement a const-initialiser; the C shims fill each slot in
+            // __lsm_init() below before any hook can fire.
+            //
+            // SAFETY: This array must be 'static — the static-call table holds
+            // back-pointers (scall->hl) into it after registration.
+            static mut __LSM_HOOKS: [
+                ::core::mem::MaybeUninit<$crate::bindings::security_hook_list>;
+                3
+            ] = [::core::mem::MaybeUninit::zeroed(); 3];
+
+            // The init function stored in lsm_info.init.  Called once by
+            // security_init() in single-threaded boot context.
+            unsafe extern "C" fn __lsm_init() -> ::core::ffi::c_int {
+                // SAFETY: Called once, single-threaded, during security_init().
+                // __LSM_HOOKS is exclusively owned here.
+                unsafe {
+                    // bindgen strips the rust_helper_ prefix from helper names.
+                    $crate::bindings::lsm_hook_init_file_open(
+                        __LSM_HOOKS[0].as_mut_ptr(),
+                        Some($crate::lsm::Adapter::<$T>::file_open),
+                    );
+                    $crate::bindings::lsm_hook_init_task_alloc(
+                        __LSM_HOOKS[1].as_mut_ptr(),
+                        Some($crate::lsm::Adapter::<$T>::task_alloc),
+                    );
+                    $crate::bindings::lsm_hook_init_task_free(
+                        __LSM_HOOKS[2].as_mut_ptr(),
+                        Some($crate::lsm::Adapter::<$T>::task_free),
+                    );
+                    $crate::bindings::security_add_hooks(
+                        __LSM_HOOKS[0].as_mut_ptr(),
+                        __LSM_HOOKS.len() as ::core::ffi::c_int,
+                        &raw const __LSM_ID.0,
+                    );
+                }
+                0
+            }
+
+            // The lsm_info descriptor placed in the .lsm_info.init ELF section.
+            // The kernel's security_init() iterates this section to discover and
+            // call the init function of every compiled-in LSM.
+            // LsmInfo wraps lsm_info with `unsafe impl Sync` so it can be `static`.
+            #[used]
+            #[link_section = ".lsm_info.init"]
+            static __LSM_INFO: $crate::lsm::LsmInfo = {
+                // SAFETY: __LSM_ID and __lsm_init have 'static lifetime.
+                unsafe {
+                    $crate::lsm::new_lsm_info(
+                        &raw const __LSM_ID.0,
+                        Some(__lsm_init),
+                    )
+                }
+            };
+        }
+    };
+}
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH v2 4/5] security: add Rust LSM sample (CONFIG_SECURITY_RUST_LSM)

[Jamie Lindsey]

Add a minimal reference LSM written in Rust using the kernel::lsm
abstraction layer introduced in the preceding patch.  The module:

- Implements all three v1 hooks (file_open, task_alloc, task_free).
- Logs each invocation via pr_info() and returns 0 (allow) for every
  operation.  It enforces no policy.

Purposes:
1. Compile-test vehicle for kernel::lsm.
2. API demonstration: shows exactly what an LSM author writes.
3. Boot-test reference: if /sys/kernel/security/lsm lists
   "rust_lsm_sample" after boot, hook registration works end-to-end.

LSM_ID_UNDEF is used as the identity constant; a permanent LSM_ID_*
value from include/uapi/linux/lsm.h will be requested as part of the
upstream patch series.

Activated via lsm= kernel command-line parameter or CONFIG_LSM Kconfig
string.  Requires CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y for /sys/kernel/security/lsm to
be visible.

Compiled and boot-tested on Linux 7.0-rc2 (commit 4ae12d8bd9a8).

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-4-6
Signed-off-by: Jamie Lindsey <jamie@matrixforgelabs.com>
---
 security/Kconfig              |  2 ++
 security/Makefile             |  1 +
 security/rust_lsm/Kconfig     | 14 ++++++++
 security/rust_lsm/Makefile    |  2 ++
 security/rust_lsm/rust_lsm.rs | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 85 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 security/rust_lsm/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/rust_lsm/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/rust_lsm/rust_lsm.rs

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 6a4393fce9a1..fbd1ad4d36e8 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -301,6 +301,8 @@ config SECURITY_COMMONCAP_KUNIT_TEST
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+source "security/rust_lsm/Kconfig"
+
 source "security/Kconfig.hardening"
 
 endmenu
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index 4601230ba442..f04f10a1592f 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS)			+= device_cgroup.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM)			+= bpf/
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK)		+= landlock/
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE)		+= ipe/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_RUST_LSM)		+= rust_lsm/
 
 # Object integrity file lists
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY)			+= integrity/
diff --git a/security/rust_lsm/Kconfig b/security/rust_lsm/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e2c3c45b9f7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/rust_lsm/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+config SECURITY_RUST_LSM
+	bool "Rust LSM sample"
+	depends on SECURITY && RUST
+	help
+	  A minimal Linux Security Module written in Rust that demonstrates
+	  the kernel::lsm abstractions.  It logs file_open, task_alloc, and
+	  task_free events via pr_info().
+
+	  This module serves as a reference implementation and compile-test
+	  vehicle for the Rust LSM abstraction layer.  It imposes no policy
+	  — all hook implementations return 0 (allow) after logging.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
diff --git a/security/rust_lsm/Makefile b/security/rust_lsm/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..26a2319da08e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/rust_lsm/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_RUST_LSM) += rust_lsm.o
diff --git a/security/rust_lsm/rust_lsm.rs b/security/rust_lsm/rust_lsm.rs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3afba383ef65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/rust_lsm/rust_lsm.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+//! Rust LSM sample — reference implementation of the kernel::lsm abstractions.
+//!
+//! This module demonstrates how a Linux Security Module is written in Rust.
+//! It registers three hooks (file_open, task_alloc, task_free), logs each
+//! invocation via pr_info!(), and allows every operation.
+//!
+//! It is not a policy module — it enforces nothing.  Its purpose is to:
+//!
+//! 1. Serve as a compile-test vehicle for the kernel::lsm abstraction layer.
+//! 2. Demonstrate the API surface that upstream-bound LSMs should target.
+//! 3. Provide a boot-test reference: if the kernel boots with this LSM
+//!    enabled and /sys/kernel/security/lsm lists "rust_lsm_sample", the
+//!    hook registration machinery is working end-to-end.
+//!
+//! Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-4-6
+
+// The build system injects #![no_std] for all kernel Rust objects; do not repeat it.
+
+// Required by pr_info! and other kernel logging macros.
+const __LOG_PREFIX: &[u8] = b"rust_lsm_sample\0";
+
+use kernel::bindings;
+use kernel::lsm;
+use kernel::prelude::*;
+
+/// The Rust LSM sample implementation.
+struct RustLsmSample;
+
+impl lsm::Hooks for RustLsmSample {
+    fn file_open(file: &kernel::fs::File) -> Result {
+        pr_info!("rust_lsm: file_open flags={:#x}\n", file.flags());
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn task_alloc(task: &kernel::task::Task, clone_flags: u64) -> Result {
+        pr_info!(
+            "rust_lsm: task_alloc pid={} clone_flags={:#x}\n",
+            task.pid(),
+            clone_flags
+        );
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn task_free(task: &kernel::task::Task) {
+        pr_info!("rust_lsm: task_free pid={}\n", task.pid());
+    }
+}
+
+// Register RustLsmSample with the kernel LSM framework.
+//
+// This macro generates:
+//   - A static `lsm_id` identifying this module as "rust_lsm_sample".
+//   - A static `security_hook_list[3]` array (filled by C shims via LSM_HOOK_INIT).
+//   - An `unsafe extern "C"` init function that calls security_add_hooks().
+//   - A static `lsm_info` in the `.lsm_info.init` ELF section so that
+//     security_init() discovers and calls the init function at boot.
+//
+// LSM_ID_UNDEF is used during development.  A permanent LSM_ID_* value from
+// include/uapi/linux/lsm.h will be requested as part of the upstream patch series.
+kernel::define_lsm!(
+    RustLsmSample,
+    "rust_lsm_sample\0",
+    bindings::LSM_ID_UNDEF as u64
+);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH v2 5/5] Documentation: rust: add LSM abstraction guide; update MAINTAINERS

[Jamie Lindsey]

Add Documentation/rust/lsm.rst, a developer guide for writing Linux
Security Modules in Rust using the kernel::lsm abstraction layer.

Covers:
- The Hooks trait: per-hook semantics, return values, sleeping rules.
- The define_lsm! macro: arguments and what it generates.
- Kconfig and Makefile wiring patterns.
- lsm_count.h: how to update MAX_LSM_COUNT for new built-in LSMs.
- A complete minimal example.
- Boot activation via lsm= and CONFIG_LSM.
- v1 limitations (three hooks, one Rust LSM per build, no blob support).
- C headers of interest for LSM authors.

Link the new document from Documentation/rust/index.rst.

Add a MAINTAINERS entry (RUST LSM ABSTRACTIONS) covering:
  rust/helpers/lsm.c, rust/kernel/lsm.rs, security/rust_lsm/
Listed on both rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org and
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org.

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-4-6
Signed-off-by: Jamie Lindsey <jamie@matrixforgelabs.com>
---
 Documentation/rust/index.rst |   1 +
 Documentation/rust/lsm.rst   | 246 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 MAINTAINERS                  |   9 ++
 3 files changed, 256 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/rust/lsm.rst

diff --git a/Documentation/rust/index.rst b/Documentation/rust/index.rst
index b78ed0efa784..a4cb4bf8faf2 100644
--- a/Documentation/rust/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/rust/index.rst
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ more details.
     coding-guidelines
     arch-support
     testing
+    lsm
 
 You can also find learning materials for Rust in its section in
 :doc:`../process/kernel-docs`.
diff --git a/Documentation/rust/lsm.rst b/Documentation/rust/lsm.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c4e16e7d2be5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/rust/lsm.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+Linux Security Modules in Rust
+================================
+
+This document describes how to write a Linux Security Module (LSM) using
+the Rust abstractions provided in ``rust/kernel/lsm.rs``.
+
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+The LSM framework allows security policies to be implemented as kernel
+modules that register hooks into security-sensitive operations.  Traditionally
+these are written in C; the Rust abstraction layer provides a safe,
+trait-based interface that enforces correct hook registration at compile time.
+
+A Rust LSM:
+
+1. Implements the :ref:`Hooks trait <rust_lsm_hooks_trait>` for the subset
+   of hooks it cares about.
+2. Registers itself at boot time using the :ref:`define_lsm! macro
+   <rust_lsm_define_macro>`.
+
+No C code is required by the LSM author.  The abstraction layer generates
+the necessary C-callable adapter functions and places the ``lsm_info``
+descriptor in the ``.lsm_info.init`` ELF section, where
+``security_init()`` discovers it during boot.
+
+
+.. _rust_lsm_hooks_trait:
+
+The ``Hooks`` trait
+-------------------
+
+``kernel::lsm::Hooks`` is the central trait.  Each method corresponds to one
+LSM hook.  All methods have a default no-op implementation, so an implementor
+only needs to override the hooks it cares about::
+
+    pub trait Hooks: Sync + Send + 'static {
+        fn file_open(_file: &File) -> Result { Ok(()) }
+        fn task_alloc(_task: &Task, _clone_flags: u64) -> Result { Ok(()) }
+        fn task_free(_task: &Task) {}
+    }
+
+The ``Sync + Send + 'static`` bounds are required because hook functions may
+be called concurrently from any CPU.
+
+Return values
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Hooks that can deny an operation return ``kernel::error::Result``:
+
+- ``Ok(())`` — allow the operation.
+- ``Err(e)`` — deny the operation; ``e.to_errno()`` is returned to the caller.
+
+Common denial error codes:
+
+- ``EACCES`` — permission denied (policy decision).
+- ``EPERM`` — operation not permitted (capability check).
+
+The ``task_free`` hook cannot deny anything and has no return value.
+
+Sleeping
+~~~~~~~~
+
+``task_free`` is called in a non-sleeping context.  Implementations **must
+not** sleep or allocate memory with ``GFP_KERNEL`` inside ``task_free``.
+All other hooks may sleep unless the call site is documented otherwise.
+
+
+Available hooks (v1)
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+.. list-table::
+   :widths: 25 75
+   :header-rows: 1
+
+   * - Hook
+     - When called
+   * - ``file_open``
+     - A file is being opened.  Return ``Err`` to deny the open.
+   * - ``task_alloc``
+     - A new task (thread or process) is being created via ``clone(2)``
+       or ``fork(2)``.  ``clone_flags`` contains the ``CLONE_*`` flags.
+       Return ``Err`` to deny creation.
+   * - ``task_free``
+     - A task is being freed.  Must not sleep.  Use this to clean up any
+       per-task state associated with the LSM.
+
+
+.. _rust_lsm_define_macro:
+
+The ``define_lsm!`` macro
+--------------------------
+
+``kernel::define_lsm!`` registers a type implementing ``Hooks`` with the
+kernel LSM framework::
+
+    kernel::define_lsm!(MyLsmType, "my_lsm\0", bindings::LSM_ID_UNDEF as u64);
+
+Arguments:
+
+.. list-table::
+   :widths: 20 80
+   :header-rows: 1
+
+   * - Argument
+     - Description
+   * - ``$T``
+     - The type implementing ``Hooks``.  Must be ``Sync + Send + 'static``.
+   * - ``$name``
+     - A ``&str`` literal with a NUL terminator (``\0``).  This name is used
+       in ``/sys/kernel/security/lsm`` and in the ``lsm=`` kernel command-line
+       parameter.
+   * - ``$id``
+     - The LSM identity constant from ``include/uapi/linux/lsm.h``.  Use
+       ``bindings::LSM_ID_UNDEF as u64`` during development; request a
+       permanent value as part of the upstream patch series.
+
+The macro generates:
+
+- A ``static __LSM_ID: LsmId`` holding the LSM identity.
+- A ``static mut __LSM_HOOKS`` array of ``MaybeUninit<security_hook_list>``
+  entries, one per registered hook.
+- An ``unsafe extern "C" fn __lsm_init()`` that fills each hook slot using
+  the C ``LSM_HOOK_INIT`` shim (necessary because ``security_hook_list`` has
+  ``__randomize_layout``) and calls ``security_add_hooks()``.
+- A ``static __LSM_INFO: LsmInfo`` in the ``.lsm_info.init`` ELF section,
+  which ``security_init()`` iterates at boot to discover and call the init
+  function.
+
+
+Enabling in Kconfig
+-------------------
+
+To include a Rust LSM in the build, add a ``Kconfig`` entry that selects
+``RUST`` and depends on ``SECURITY``::
+
+    config SECURITY_MY_LSM
+        bool "My Rust LSM"
+        depends on SECURITY
+        select RUST
+        help
+          A minimal Rust LSM that ...
+
+Wire the object into the build in ``security/Makefile``::
+
+    obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MY_LSM) += my_lsm/
+
+And in ``security/my_lsm/Makefile``::
+
+    obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MY_LSM) += my_lsm.o
+
+The source file must **not** declare ``#![no_std]`` — the build system injects
+it automatically for all kernel Rust objects.
+
+Define ``__LOG_PREFIX`` at the top of the source file so that ``pr_info!`` and
+friends work correctly::
+
+    const __LOG_PREFIX: &[u8] = b"my_lsm\0";
+
+
+Minimal example
+---------------
+
+The following is a complete, minimal Rust LSM that logs every file open and
+allows all operations::
+
+    // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+    //! Minimal Rust LSM example.
+
+    const __LOG_PREFIX: &[u8] = b"my_lsm\0";
+
+    use kernel::bindings;
+    use kernel::lsm;
+    use kernel::prelude::*;
+
+    struct MyLsm;
+
+    impl lsm::Hooks for MyLsm {
+        fn file_open(file: &kernel::fs::File) -> Result {
+            pr_info!("file_open: flags={:#x}\n", file.flags());
+            Ok(())
+        }
+    }
+
+    kernel::define_lsm!(MyLsm, "my_lsm\0", bindings::LSM_ID_UNDEF as u64);
+
+The reference implementation is at ``security/rust_lsm/rust_lsm.rs``
+(``CONFIG_SECURITY_RUST_LSM``).
+
+
+Activating at boot
+------------------
+
+A Rust LSM compiled into the kernel is activated by listing its name in the
+``lsm=`` kernel command-line parameter or by adding it to the ``CONFIG_LSM``
+Kconfig string.
+
+The LSM name must also be counted in ``include/linux/lsm_count.h`` so that
+``MAX_LSM_COUNT`` is large enough to accommodate it alongside other compiled-in
+LSMs.  Add a ``CONFIG_SECURITY_MY_LSM``-guarded macro alongside the existing
+entries::
+
+    #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_MY_LSM
+    #define MY_LSM_ENABLED 1,
+    #else
+    #define MY_LSM_ENABLED
+    #endif
+
+    #define MAX_LSM_COUNT \
+        COUNT_LSMS( \
+            ...existing entries... \
+            MY_LSM_ENABLED)
+
+To verify the LSM is active after boot::
+
+    cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm
+
+
+Limitations (v1)
+-----------------
+
+- Only three hooks are available: ``file_open``, ``task_alloc``, and
+  ``task_free``.  Additional hooks will be added in follow-up patches as safe
+  Rust wrappers for their argument types are contributed upstream.
+
+- At most one Rust LSM can be registered per kernel build with the current
+  macro design.  Supporting multiple Rust LSMs requires unique static symbol
+  generation, planned for v2 using a proc-macro.
+
+- No security blob support.  Per-task or per-inode data associated with a
+  Rust LSM requires the ``SecurityBlob<T>`` abstraction planned for v2.
+
+
+C headers of interest
+---------------------
+
+- ``include/linux/lsm_hooks.h`` — ``lsm_info``, ``security_hook_list``,
+  ``LSM_HOOK_INIT``, ``LSM_ORDER_*``.
+- ``include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h`` — canonical hook signatures.
+- ``include/uapi/linux/lsm.h`` — ``LSM_ID_*`` constants.
+- ``include/linux/lsm_count.h`` — ``MAX_LSM_COUNT`` computation.
+- ``security/security.c`` — ``security_init()``, ``security_add_hooks()``.
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 89007f9ed35e..a23f5a15e038 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -23196,6 +23196,15 @@ S:	Maintained
 T:	git https://github.com/Rust-for-Linux/linux.git rust-analyzer-next
 F:	scripts/generate_rust_analyzer.py
 
+RUST LSM ABSTRACTIONS
+M:	Jamie Lindsey <jamie@matrixforgelabs.com>
+L:	rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org
+L:	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
+S:	Maintained
+F:	rust/helpers/lsm.c
+F:	rust/kernel/lsm.rs
+F:	security/rust_lsm/
+
 RXRPC SOCKETS (AF_RXRPC)
 M:	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 M:	Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
-- 
2.53.0

Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] rust: kernel: add LSM abstraction layer

[Miguel Ojeda]

On Wed, Mar 11, 2026 at 6:09 AM Jamie Lindsey <jamie@matrixforgelabs.com> wrote:
>
> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-4-6

Thanks for disclosing that (I think the cover letter was also written
by an LLM, right?).

Without taking a deep look, it seems heavily LLM generated (em dashes
and all), and it doesn't look like it was reviewed much after
generation (which probably led to the missing SoBs in v1).

For instance, without reading the code, just from scrolling through
the email, it is clear it doesn't follow the usual Linux conventions
(or our Rust kernel ones):

  - The cover letter lists the commits at the bottom, probably
generated by the LLM trying to be useful, but Git already does that
immediately after.

  - The commit message here mentions "This is v1", which isn't true.
Even if it were true, it is not something commit messages would
normally mention.

  - It also mentions v1 and things like "Planned for v2" in the code
itself, which even way more uncommon.

  - The docs use section more verbose, custom headers instead of the
standard `# Examples` and `# Safety`, and doesn't use intra-doc links
in the places we would normally do, and doesn't use Markdown
consistently.

  - The imports don't use the prelude nor the kernel imports style.

  - Some comments aren't true and they aren't needed anyway, like the
`bindgen` one.

In particular, since these are Rust abstractions, I would be wary of
the soundness of code an LLM generates. The latest models are very
powerful, but I have seen even better models that the one used here
generate unsound Rust code before that, and for easier code than this.

For instance, one of the non-standard `# Safety` sections here seems
to apply to a safe trait for some reason. And I wonder if the custom
header was used by the LLM to be able to keep its own explanations and
yet satisfy Clippy...

Anyway, the summary is that kernel code can be assisted by an LLM, but
the end result should be as-if you had written it.

I hope that helps.

Cheers,
Miguel

Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] rust: kernel: add LSM abstraction layer

[kernel test robot]

Hi Jamie,

kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:

[auto build test ERROR on rust/rust-next]
[also build test ERROR on linus/master v7.0-rc3 next-20260310]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Jamie-Lindsey/rust-helpers-add-C-shims-for-LSM-hook-initialisation/20260311-131258
base:   https://github.com/Rust-for-Linux/linux rust-next
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/0102019cdb4c705e-7d46b4f3-5cbb-4a6a-b315-e10f182fa987-000000%40eu-west-1.amazonses.com
patch subject: [PATCH v2 3/5] rust: kernel: add LSM abstraction layer
config: x86_64-rhel-9.4-rust (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260311/202603111327.ZxGK7MvE-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 20.1.8 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 87f0227cb60147a26a1eeb4fb06e3b505e9c7261)
rustc: rustc 1.88.0 (6b00bc388 2025-06-23)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260311/202603111327.ZxGK7MvE-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)

If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202603111327.ZxGK7MvE-lkp@intel.com/

All error/warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):

>> warning: unresolved link to `define_lsm`
   --> rust/kernel/lsm.rs:7:46
   |
   7 | //! registers itself at boot time with the [`define_lsm!`] macro.
   |                                              ^^^^^^^^^^^ no item named `define_lsm` in scope
   |
   = note: `macro_rules` named `define_lsm` exists in this crate, but it is not in scope at this link's location
   = note: `#[warn(rustdoc::broken_intra_doc_links)]` on by default
--
   PATH=/opt/cross/clang-20/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
   INFO PATH=/opt/cross/rustc-1.88.0-bindgen-0.72.1/cargo/bin:/opt/cross/clang-20/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
   /usr/bin/timeout -k 100 12h /usr/bin/make KCFLAGS=\ -fno-crash-diagnostics\ -Wno-error=return-type\ -Wreturn-type\ -funsigned-char\ -Wundef\ -falign-functions=64 W=1 --keep-going LLVM=1 -j32 -C source O=/kbuild/obj/consumer/x86_64-rhel-9.4-rust ARCH=x86_64 SHELL=/bin/bash rustfmtcheck 
   make: Entering directory '/kbuild/src/consumer'
   make[1]: Entering directory '/kbuild/obj/consumer/x86_64-rhel-9.4-rust'
>> Diff in rust/kernel/lsm.rs:120:
        /// `file` must be a valid, non-null pointer to a `struct file` that
        /// remains valid for the duration of this call.  Called only by the
        /// LSM framework.
   -    pub unsafe extern "C" fn file_open(
   -        file: *mut bindings::file,
   -    ) -> core::ffi::c_int {
   +    pub unsafe extern "C" fn file_open(file: *mut bindings::file) -> core::ffi::c_int {
            // SAFETY: The LSM framework guarantees `file` is valid and non-null
            // for the duration of this call.
            let file_ref = unsafe { File::from_raw_file(file.cast_const()) };
   Diff in rust/kernel/lsm.rs:190:
        // SAFETY: `bindings::lsm_info` is a C struct.  Zero-initialisation
        // gives valid zero/null values for every optional field.  The caller
        // is responsible for providing a valid `id` and `init`.
   -    let mut info: bindings::lsm_info =
   -        unsafe { MaybeUninit::zeroed().assume_init() };
   +    let mut info: bindings::lsm_info = unsafe { MaybeUninit::zeroed().assume_init() };
        info.id = id;
        info.init = init;
        LsmInfo(info)
   Diff in rust/kernel/lsm.rs:230:
                // The LSM identity — must be 'static because the static-call
                // table holds a back-pointer to it via security_hook_list.lsmid.
                // LsmId wraps lsm_id with `unsafe impl Sync` so it can be `static`.
   -            static __LSM_ID: $crate::lsm::LsmId =
   -                $crate::lsm::LsmId($crate::bindings::lsm_id {
   -                    name: $name.as_ptr().cast(),
   -                    id: $id,
   -                });
   +            static __LSM_ID: $crate::lsm::LsmId = $crate::lsm::LsmId($crate::bindings::lsm_id {
   +                name: $name.as_ptr().cast(),
   +                id: $id,
   +            });
    
                // The hook list array.  MaybeUninit avoids needing security_hook_list
                // to implement a const-initialiser; the C shims fill each slot in
   Diff in rust/kernel/lsm.rs:242:
                //
                // SAFETY: This array must be 'static — the static-call table holds
                // back-pointers (scall->hl) into it after registration.
   -            static mut __LSM_HOOKS: [
   -                ::core::mem::MaybeUninit<$crate::bindings::security_hook_list>;
   -                3
   -            ] = [::core::mem::MaybeUninit::zeroed(); 3];
   +            static mut __LSM_HOOKS: [::core::mem::MaybeUninit<
   +                $crate::bindings::security_hook_list,
   +            >; 3] = [::core::mem::MaybeUninit::zeroed(); 3];
    
                // The init function stored in lsm_info.init.  Called once by
                // security_init() in single-threaded boot context.
   Diff in rust/kernel/lsm.rs:283:
                #[link_section = ".lsm_info.init"]
                static __LSM_INFO: $crate::lsm::LsmInfo = {
                    // SAFETY: __LSM_ID and __lsm_init have 'static lifetime.
   -                unsafe {
   -                    $crate::lsm::new_lsm_info(
   -                        &raw const __LSM_ID.0,
   -                        Some(__lsm_init),
   -                    )
   -                }
   +                unsafe { $crate::lsm::new_lsm_info(&raw const __LSM_ID.0, Some(__lsm_init)) }
                };
            }
        };
>> Diff in rust/kernel/lsm.rs:120:
        /// `file` must be a valid, non-null pointer to a `struct file` that
        /// remains valid for the duration of this call.  Called only by the
        /// LSM framework.
   -    pub unsafe extern "C" fn file_open(
   -        file: *mut bindings::file,
   -    ) -> core::ffi::c_int {
   +    pub unsafe extern "C" fn file_open(file: *mut bindings::file) -> core::ffi::c_int {
            // SAFETY: The LSM framework guarantees `file` is valid and non-null
            // for the duration of this call.
            let file_ref = unsafe { File::from_raw_file(file.cast_const()) };
   Diff in rust/kernel/lsm.rs:190:
        // SAFETY: `bindings::lsm_info` is a C struct.  Zero-initialisation
        // gives valid zero/null values for every optional field.  The caller
        // is responsible for providing a valid `id` and `init`.
   -    let mut info: bindings::lsm_info =
   -        unsafe { MaybeUninit::zeroed().assume_init() };
   +    let mut info: bindings::lsm_info = unsafe { MaybeUninit::zeroed().assume_init() };
        info.id = id;
        info.init = init;
        LsmInfo(info)
   Diff in rust/kernel/lsm.rs:230:
                // The LSM identity — must be 'static because the static-call
                // table holds a back-pointer to it via security_hook_list.lsmid.
                // LsmId wraps lsm_id with `unsafe impl Sync` so it can be `static`.
   -            static __LSM_ID: $crate::lsm::LsmId =
   -                $crate::lsm::LsmId($crate::bindings::lsm_id {
   -                    name: $name.as_ptr().cast(),
   -                    id: $id,
   -                });
   +            static __LSM_ID: $crate::lsm::LsmId = $crate::lsm::LsmId($crate::bindings::lsm_id {
   +                name: $name.as_ptr().cast(),
   +                id: $id,
   +            });
    
                // The hook list array.  MaybeUninit avoids needing security_hook_list
                // to implement a const-initialiser; the C shims fill each slot in
   Diff in rust/kernel/lsm.rs:242:
                //
                // SAFETY: This array must be 'static — the static-call table holds
                // back-pointers (scall->hl) into it after registration.
   -            static mut __LSM_HOOKS: [
   -                ::core::mem::MaybeUninit<$crate::bindings::security_hook_list>;
   -                3
   -            ] = [::core::mem::MaybeUninit::zeroed(); 3];
   +            static mut __LSM_HOOKS: [::core::mem::MaybeUninit<
   +                $crate::bindings::security_hook_list,
   +            >; 3] = [::core::mem::MaybeUninit::zeroed(); 3];
    
                // The init function stored in lsm_info.init.  Called once by
                // security_init() in single-threaded boot context.
   Diff in rust/kernel/lsm.rs:283:
                #[link_section = ".lsm_info.init"]
                static __LSM_INFO: $crate::lsm::LsmInfo = {
                    // SAFETY: __LSM_ID and __lsm_init have 'static lifetime.
   -                unsafe {
   -                    $crate::lsm::new_lsm_info(
   -                        &raw const __LSM_ID.0,
   -                        Some(__lsm_init),
   -                    )
   -                }
   +                unsafe { $crate::lsm::new_lsm_info(&raw const __LSM_ID.0, Some(__lsm_init)) }
                };
            }
        };
   make[1]: Leaving directory '/kbuild/obj/consumer/x86_64-rhel-9.4-rust'
   make[1]: *** [Makefile:248: __sub-make] Error 2
   make[1]: Target 'rustfmtcheck' not remade because of errors.
   make: *** [Makefile:248: __sub-make] Error 2
   make[2]: *** [Makefile:1912: rustfmt] Error 123
   make: Target 'rustfmtcheck' not remade because of errors.
   make[2]: Target 'rustfmtcheck' not remade because of errors.
   make: Leaving directory '/kbuild/src/consumer'

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0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] rust: kernel: add LSM abstraction layer

[kernel test robot]

Hi Jamie,

kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:

[auto build test ERROR on rust/rust-next]
[also build test ERROR on linus/master v7.0-rc3 next-20260311]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Jamie-Lindsey/rust-helpers-add-C-shims-for-LSM-hook-initialisation/20260311-131258
base:   https://github.com/Rust-for-Linux/linux rust-next
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/0102019cdb4c705e-7d46b4f3-5cbb-4a6a-b315-e10f182fa987-000000%40eu-west-1.amazonses.com
patch subject: [PATCH v2 3/5] rust: kernel: add LSM abstraction layer
config: x86_64-rhel-9.4-rust (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260312/202603120654.DWidINbR-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 20.1.8 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 87f0227cb60147a26a1eeb4fb06e3b505e9c7261)
rustc: rustc 1.88.0 (6b00bc388 2025-06-23)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260312/202603120654.DWidINbR-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)

If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202603120654.DWidINbR-lkp@intel.com/

All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):

>> error[E0433]: failed to resolve: use of unresolved module or unlinked crate `bindings`
   --> rust/doctests_kernel_generated.rs:8845:40
   |
   8845 | kernel::define_lsm!(MyLsm, "my_lsm\0", bindings::LSM_ID_UNDEF as u64);
   |                                        ^^^^^^^^ use of unresolved module or unlinked crate `bindings`
   |
   = help: you might be missing a crate named `bindings`
   = help: consider importing this crate:
   kernel::bindings
--
>> error[E0412]: cannot find type `MyLsm` in this scope
   --> rust/doctests_kernel_generated.rs:8845:21
   |
   8845 | kernel::define_lsm!(MyLsm, "my_lsm\0", bindings::LSM_ID_UNDEF as u64);
   |                     ^^^^^ not found in this scope
--
>> error[E0433]: failed to resolve: use of unresolved module or unlinked crate `bindings`
   --> rust/doctests_kernel_generated.rs:8898:44
   |
   8898 | kernel::define_lsm!(MyLsmType, "my_lsm\0", bindings::LSM_ID_UNDEF as u64);
   |                                            ^^^^^^^^ use of unresolved module or unlinked crate `bindings`
   |
   = help: you might be missing a crate named `bindings`
   = help: consider importing this crate:
   kernel::bindings
--
>> error[E0412]: cannot find type `MyLsmType` in this scope
   --> rust/doctests_kernel_generated.rs:8898:21
   |
   8898 | kernel::define_lsm!(MyLsmType, "my_lsm\0", bindings::LSM_ID_UNDEF as u64);
   |                     ^^^^^^^^^ not found in this scope

-- 
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
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Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] rust: helpers: add C shims for LSM hook initialisation

[kernel test robot]

Hi Jamie,

kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:

[auto build test WARNING on rust/rust-next]
[also build test WARNING on linus/master v7.0-rc3]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Jamie-Lindsey/rust-helpers-add-C-shims-for-LSM-hook-initialisation/20260311-131258
base:   https://github.com/Rust-for-Linux/linux rust-next
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/0102019cdb4c6a42-a28bbebb-3664-4792-966f-4036c94ac19c-000000%40eu-west-1.amazonses.com
patch subject: [PATCH v2 2/5] rust: helpers: add C shims for LSM hook initialisation
config: um-randconfig-002-20260311 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260312/202603120739.yWj1J5Hv-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 18.1.8 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 3b5b5c1ec4a3095ab096dd780e84d7ab81f3d7ff)
rustc: rustc 1.88.0 (6b00bc388 2025-06-23)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260312/202603120739.yWj1J5Hv-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)

If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202603120739.yWj1J5Hv-lkp@intel.com/

All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>, old ones prefixed by <<):

>> WARNING: modpost: vmlinux: rust_helper_security_add_hooks: EXPORT_SYMBOL used for init symbol. Remove __init or EXPORT_SYMBOL.

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0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
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