From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>,
Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY
SUBSYSTEM), linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list)
Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: Protocol debugging as a feature
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2026 11:00:46 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260323090047.632499-1-jarkko@kernel.org> (raw)
TPM_DEBUG is a non-standard way to specify a feature in Linux kernel.
Introduce CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG, and use it to replace TPM_DEBUG in
TPM 1.x trusted keys.
Given that protocol bus could contain sensitive data, harden the feature as
follows:
1. In the Kconfig description postulate that pr_debug() statements must be
used.
2. Use pr_debug() statements in TPM 1.x driver to print the protocol dump.
Traces can be enabled e.g., by providing trusted.dyndbg='+p' for the kernel
command-line.
Cc: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/7f8b8478-5cd8-4d97-bfd0-341fd5cf10f9@linux.ibm.com/
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 10 +++++++
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 36 +++++++++++------------
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
index 9e00482d886a..0e53bef1343d 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
@@ -1,6 +1,16 @@
config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
bool
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+ bool "Debug trusted keys protocol"
+ depends on HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
+ default n
+ help
+ Drivers that support debugging the protocol dump, can opt-in that
+ feature here. Protocol dump must only use DEBUG level output, as
+ sensitive data may pass by. In the kernel-command line traces can
+ be enabled via trusted.dyndbg='+p'.
+
config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM
bool "TPM-based trusted keys"
depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index c865c97aa1b4..8fe889c7cdd1 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -46,38 +46,36 @@ enum {
SRK_keytype = 4
};
-#define TPM_DEBUG 0
-
-#if TPM_DEBUG
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
{
- pr_info("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
- pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
- pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
- pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
+ pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
+ pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
+ pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
+ pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
+ print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
}
static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
{
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
- pr_info("secret:\n");
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
- pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
+ print_hex_dump_debug("trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
+ pr_debug("secret:\n");
+ print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
+ pr_debug("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
+ print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
}
static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
{
int len;
- pr_info("\ntpm buffer\n");
+ pr_debug("\ntpm buffer\n");
len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
+ print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
}
#else
static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
--
2.47.3
next reply other threads:[~2026-03-23 9:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-23 9:00 Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2026-03-24 10:35 ` [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: Protocol debugging as a feature Jarkko Sakkinen
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