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* [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: Protocol debugging as a feature
@ 2026-03-23  9:00 Jarkko Sakkinen
  2026-03-24 10:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2026-03-23  9:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-integrity
  Cc: keyrings, Jarkko Sakkinen, Srish Srinivasan, Nayna Jain,
	James Bottomley, Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Moore,
	James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM,
	open list

TPM_DEBUG is a non-standard way to specify a feature in Linux kernel.
Introduce CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG, and use it to replace TPM_DEBUG in
TPM 1.x trusted keys.

Given that protocol bus could contain sensitive data, harden the feature as
follows:

1. In the  Kconfig description postulate that pr_debug() statements must be
   used.
2. Use pr_debug() statements in TPM 1.x driver to print the protocol dump.

Traces can be enabled e.g., by providing trusted.dyndbg='+p' for the kernel
command-line.

Cc: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/7f8b8478-5cd8-4d97-bfd0-341fd5cf10f9@linux.ibm.com/
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
 security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig        | 10 +++++++
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 36 +++++++++++------------
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
index 9e00482d886a..0e53bef1343d 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
@@ -1,6 +1,16 @@
 config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
 	bool
 
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+	bool "Debug trusted keys protocol"
+	depends on HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
+	default n
+	help
+	  Drivers that support debugging the protocol dump, can opt-in that
+	  feature here. Protocol dump must only use DEBUG level output, as
+	  sensitive data may pass by. In the kernel-command line traces can
+	  be enabled via trusted.dyndbg='+p'.
+
 config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM
 	bool "TPM-based trusted keys"
 	depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index c865c97aa1b4..8fe889c7cdd1 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -46,38 +46,36 @@ enum {
 	SRK_keytype = 4
 };
 
-#define TPM_DEBUG 0
-
-#if TPM_DEBUG
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
 static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
 {
-	pr_info("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
-	pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
-	pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
-	pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
-	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-		       16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
+	pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
+	pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
+	pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
+	pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
+	print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+			     16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
 }
 
 static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
 {
-	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-		       16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
-	pr_info("secret:\n");
-	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-		       16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
-	pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
-	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-		       16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
+	print_hex_dump_debug("trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+			     16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
+	pr_debug("secret:\n");
+	print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+			     16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
+	pr_debug("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
+	print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+			     16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
 }
 
 static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
 {
 	int len;
 
-	pr_info("\ntpm buffer\n");
+	pr_debug("\ntpm buffer\n");
 	len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
-	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
+	print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
 }
 #else
 static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
-- 
2.47.3


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: Protocol debugging as a feature
  2026-03-23  9:00 [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: Protocol debugging as a feature Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2026-03-24 10:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2026-03-24 10:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-integrity
  Cc: keyrings, Srish Srinivasan, Nayna Jain, James Bottomley,
	Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Moore, James Morris,
	Serge E. Hallyn, open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM, open list

On Mon, Mar 23, 2026 at 11:00:46AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> TPM_DEBUG is a non-standard way to specify a feature in Linux kernel.
> Introduce CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG, and use it to replace TPM_DEBUG in
> TPM 1.x trusted keys.
> 
> Given that protocol bus could contain sensitive data, harden the feature as
> follows:
> 
> 1. In the  Kconfig description postulate that pr_debug() statements must be
>    used.
> 2. Use pr_debug() statements in TPM 1.x driver to print the protocol dump.
> 
> Traces can be enabled e.g., by providing trusted.dyndbg='+p' for the kernel
> command-line.
> 
> Cc: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
> Reported-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/7f8b8478-5cd8-4d97-bfd0-341fd5cf10f9@linux.ibm.com/
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> ---

I'm posting a v2 update with HAVE_* flag and a bit wider scope.

BR, Jarkko

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

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