From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 20CD43DB63A; Tue, 24 Mar 2026 11:01:24 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1774350084; cv=none; b=oLNwda0+kNJJA3+37xJ/us5GUVeoVZsLhcmHB5qDsZajeEVoKW9BhLIQvLJiT5uxLwH+DwbaQbI0rWcDovMrhu2YYD2dCXgpbH2gotOofJtSYaByuBwDjvhAFNx++3AJqBMuXKWpOH+jXhcGsD8FQdco5h9hMkzS/Y5MVY7ek6I= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1774350084; c=relaxed/simple; bh=YW9shs/L5EFC8ZMfP+jjcBW3dgrut5uF1OXxXMpXw+Q=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version; b=a8o70ZPsGJ95pMcz41Xy/C/YcWhfv6IvXjbYpKjLb4yCzoDfIlZkZmcStwnaEIaRSbItjLS8KUB0QgBvrZthvERXHEMPmpilUCzEX5jeVCQeo+Q1RhTxrB5gxmkG000Bjn8vfZ5QjSLxPQJQxk3vFpyDlVuBi6wid08GvYOOxvk= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=AR4+2lRE; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="AR4+2lRE" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 86946C19424; Tue, 24 Mar 2026 11:01:23 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1774350084; bh=YW9shs/L5EFC8ZMfP+jjcBW3dgrut5uF1OXxXMpXw+Q=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=AR4+2lRENpgr8BlbDgn+XXkhJMaBbhOJAQaJMKuzbMw41jYW8YffOvPSuHCnb2xzL dngPP0Ve1mZiXYaFXBI+p4NCbsmJlUq2hp8HmgljpZIanzPeKhG3httCHpfsA4tbim 6L5TDBOVaDDLRhCYV2BjDrJ7q9Xizn4qMEqgwjFCXG8jvSqDP1WIteSlSBUdBlgXQM abicHlMF+dtCLNsRasykeCCZA2IUvEPKcVwbheBLpMgRn2vT6rPEiuWUd0TKVEQPsj meMCLjMtdDUy31Yqi+gaAXt2LpeT4uasAKo0JUDweTtNjT0wSaKWJ5z1rQ2c6X6JP1 gzeJg2w+roOQg== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , Srish Srinivasan , Nayna Jain , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Ahmad Fatoum , Pengutronix Kernel Team , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list), linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM) Subject: [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2026 13:01:17 +0200 Message-ID: <20260324110118.67536-1-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.47.3 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit TPM_DEBUG, and other similar flags, are a non-standard way to specify a feature in Linux kernel. Introduce CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG for trusted keys, and use it to replace these ad-hoc feature flags. Given that trusted keys debug dumps can contain sensitive data, harden the feature as follows: 1. In the Kconfig description postulate that pr_debug() statements must be used. 2. Use pr_debug() statements in TPM 1.x driver to print the protocol dump. Traces, when actually needed, can be easily enabled by providing trusted.dyndbg='+p' in the kernel command-line. Cc: Srish Srinivasan Reported-by: Nayna Jain Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/7f8b8478-5cd8-4d97-bfd0-341fd5cf10f9@linux.ibm.com/ Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v2: - Implement for all trusted keys backends. - Add HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG as it is a good practice despite full coverage. --- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 18 +++++------- security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 19 ++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c | 4 +-- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 36 +++++++++++------------ 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index 03527162613f..620a1f890b6b 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -83,18 +83,16 @@ struct trusted_key_source { extern struct key_type key_type_trusted; -#define TRUSTED_DEBUG 0 - -#if TRUSTED_DEBUG +#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) { - pr_info("key_len %d\n", p->key_len); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0); - pr_info("bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0); - pr_info("migratable %d\n", p->migratable); + pr_debug("key_len %d\n", p->key_len); + print_hex_dump_debug("key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0); + pr_debug("bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len); + print_hex_dump_debug("blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0); + pr_debug("migratable %d\n", p->migratable); } #else static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig index 9e00482d886a..2ad9ba0e03f1 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig @@ -1,10 +1,25 @@ config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS bool +config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG + bool + +config TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG + bool "Debug trusted keys" + depends on HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG + default n + help + Trusted keys backends and core code that support debug dumps + can opt-in that feature here. Dumps must only use DEBUG + level output, as sensitive data may pass by. In the + kernel-command line traces can be enabled via + trusted.dyndbg='+p'. + config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM bool "TPM-based trusted keys" depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA1 select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS @@ -23,6 +38,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE bool "TEE-based trusted keys" depends on TEE >= TRUSTED_KEYS default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as trusted @@ -33,6 +49,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM depends on CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR >= TRUSTED_KEYS select CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module @@ -42,6 +59,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP bool "DCP-based trusted keys" depends on CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP >= TRUSTED_KEYS default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of NXP's DCP (Data Co-Processor) as trusted key backend. @@ -50,6 +68,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_PKWM bool "PKWM-based trusted keys" depends on PSERIES_PLPKS >= TRUSTED_KEYS default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of IBM PowerVM Key Wrapping Module (PKWM) as a trusted key backend. diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c index 601943ce0d60..015cddc6b53c 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c @@ -28,10 +28,10 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = { {opt_err, NULL} }; -#ifdef CAAM_DEBUG +#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG static inline void dump_options(const struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info) { - pr_info("key encryption algo %d\n", pkey_info->key_enc_algo); + pr_debug("key encryption algo %d\n", pkey_info->key_enc_algo); } #else static inline void dump_options(const struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index c865c97aa1b4..8fe889c7cdd1 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -46,38 +46,36 @@ enum { SRK_keytype = 4 }; -#define TPM_DEBUG 0 - -#if TPM_DEBUG +#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) { - pr_info("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); - pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); - pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); - pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); + pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); + pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); + pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); + pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); + print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); } static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) { - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0); - pr_info("secret:\n"); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); - pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n"); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); + print_hex_dump_debug("trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0); + pr_debug("secret:\n"); + print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); + pr_debug("trusted-key: enonce:\n"); + print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); } static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) { int len; - pr_info("\ntpm buffer\n"); + pr_debug("\ntpm buffer\n"); len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0); + print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0); } #else static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) -- 2.47.3