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[87.106.108.193]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 5b1f17b1804b1-48722c6b105sm193130305e9.1.2026.03.27.09.49.29 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Fri, 27 Mar 2026 09:49:29 -0700 (PDT) From: =?UTF-8?q?G=C3=BCnther=20Noack?= To: =?UTF-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl=20Sala=C3=BCn?= , "John Johansen" Cc: =?UTF-8?q?G=C3=BCnther=20Noack?= , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, "Tingmao Wang" , "Justin Suess" , "Samasth Norway Ananda" , "Matthieu Buffet" , "Mikhail Ivanov" , konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com, "Demi Marie Obenour" , "Alyssa Ross" , "Jann Horn" , "Tahera Fahimi" , Sebastian Andrzej Siewior , "Kuniyuki Iwashima" , "Georgia Garcia" Subject: [PATCH v8 10/12] selftests/landlock: Check that coredump sockets stay unrestricted Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2026 17:48:35 +0100 Message-ID: <20260327164838.38231-11-gnoack3000@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260327164838.38231-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com> References: <20260327164838.38231-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Even when a process is restricted with the new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX right, the kernel can continue writing its coredump to the configured coredump socket. In the test, we create a local server and rewire the system to write coredumps into it. We then create a child process within a Landlock domain where LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX is restricted and make the process crash. The test uses SO_PEERCRED to check that the connecting client process is the expected one. Includes a fix by Mickaël Salaün for setting the EUID to 0 (see [1]). Link[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260218.ohth8theu8Yi@digikod.net/ Suggested-by: Mickaël Salaün Signed-off-by: Günther Noack --- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 143 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 143 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c index 3dad643741f7..af0f0b16129a 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -4928,6 +4929,148 @@ TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_seqpacket_connect_to_child_full) #undef USE_SENDTO #undef ENFORCE_ALL +static void read_core_pattern(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, + char *buf, size_t buf_size) +{ + int fd; + ssize_t ret; + + fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, fd); + + ret = read(fd, buf, buf_size - 1); + ASSERT_LE(0, ret); + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd)); + + buf[ret] = '\0'; +} + +static void set_core_pattern(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, + const char *pattern) +{ + int fd; + size_t len = strlen(pattern); + + /* + * Writing to /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern requires EUID 0 because + * sysctl_perm() checks that, ignoring capabilities like + * CAP_SYS_ADMIN or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. + * + * Switching EUID clears the dumpable flag, which must be restored + * afterwards to allow coredumps. + */ + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETUID); + ASSERT_EQ(0, seteuid(0)); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETUID); + + fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern", O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, fd) + { + TH_LOG("Failed to open core_pattern for writing: %s", + strerror(errno)); + } + + ASSERT_EQ(len, write(fd, pattern, len)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd)); + + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETUID); + ASSERT_EQ(0, seteuid(getuid())); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETUID); + + /* Restore dumpable flag cleared by seteuid(). */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 1, 0, 0, 0)); +} + +FIXTURE(coredump) +{ + char original_core_pattern[256]; +}; + +FIXTURE_SETUP(coredump) +{ + disable_caps(_metadata); + read_core_pattern(_metadata, self->original_core_pattern, + sizeof(self->original_core_pattern)); +} + +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN_PARENT(coredump) +{ + set_core_pattern(_metadata, self->original_core_pattern); +} + +/* + * Test that even when a process is restricted with + * LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, the kernel can still initiate a connection + * to the coredump socket on the processes' behalf. + */ +TEST_F_FORK(coredump, socket_not_restricted) +{ + static const char core_pattern[] = "@/tmp/landlock_coredump_test.sock"; + const char *const sock_path = core_pattern + 1; + int srv_fd, conn_fd, status; + pid_t child_pid; + struct ucred cred; + socklen_t cred_len = sizeof(cred); + char buf[4096]; + + /* Set up the coredump server socket. */ + unlink(sock_path); + srv_fd = set_up_named_unix_server(_metadata, SOCK_STREAM, sock_path); + + /* Point coredumps at our socket. */ + set_core_pattern(_metadata, core_pattern); + + /* Restrict LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX. */ + drop_access_rights(_metadata, + &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){ + .handled_access_fs = + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, + }); + + /* Fork a child that crashes. */ + child_pid = fork(); + ASSERT_LE(0, child_pid); + if (child_pid == 0) { + struct rlimit rl = { + .rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY, + .rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY, + }; + + ASSERT_EQ(0, setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rl)); + + /* Crash on purpose. */ + kill(getpid(), SIGSEGV); + _exit(1); + } + + /* + * Accept the coredump connection. If Landlock incorrectly denies the + * kernel's coredump connect, accept() will block forever, so the test + * would time out. + */ + conn_fd = accept(srv_fd, NULL, NULL); + ASSERT_LE(0, conn_fd); + + /* Check that the connection came from the crashing child. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, getsockopt(conn_fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cred, + &cred_len)); + EXPECT_EQ(child_pid, cred.pid); + + /* Drain the coredump data so the kernel can finish. */ + while (read(conn_fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) > 0) + ; + + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(conn_fd)); + + /* Wait for the child and verify it coredumped. */ + ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0)); + ASSERT_TRUE(WIFSIGNALED(status)); + ASSERT_TRUE(WCOREDUMP(status)); + + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(srv_fd)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(sock_path)); +} + /* clang-format off */ FIXTURE(layout1_bind) {}; /* clang-format on */ -- 2.53.0