public inbox for linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: "Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
	"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@google.com>,
	"Justin Suess" <utilityemal77@gmail.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
	"Masami Hiramatsu" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	"Mathieu Desnoyers" <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
	"Matthieu Buffet" <matthieu@buffet.re>,
	"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
	"Tingmao Wang" <m@maowtm.org>,
	kernel-team@cloudflare.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 06/17] landlock: Add create_ruleset and free_ruleset tracepoints
Date: Mon,  6 Apr 2026 16:37:04 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260406143717.1815792-7-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260406143717.1815792-1-mic@digikod.net>

Add tracepoints for ruleset lifecycle events: landlock_create_ruleset
fires from the landlock_create_ruleset() syscall handler, logging the
ruleset Landlock ID and handled access masks; landlock_free_ruleset
fires in free_ruleset() before the ruleset is freed, so eBPF programs
can access the full ruleset state via BTF.

The create_ruleset TP_PROTO takes only the ruleset pointer.  The handled
access masks are read from the ruleset in TP_fast_assign rather than
passed as scalar arguments, so eBPF programs can access the full ruleset
state (rules, access masks) via BTF on a single pointer.  No lock is
needed because the ruleset is not yet shared (the file descriptor has
not been installed).

Create the trace header with a DOC comment documenting the consistency
guarantees, locking conventions, TP_PROTO safety, and security
considerations shared by all Landlock tracepoints.  Add
CREATE_TRACE_POINTS in log.c to generate the tracepoint implementations.

Add an id field to struct landlock_ruleset, assigned from
landlock_get_id_range() at creation time.  Extend the CONFIG guard on
landlock_get_id_range() from CONFIG_AUDIT to
CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG so that IDs are available for tracing even
without audit support.

The deallocation events use the "free_" prefix (rather than "drop_")
because they fire when the object is actually freed.  There is no need
for allocated/deallocated symmetry because ruleset creation happens with
the landlock_create_ruleset tracepoint.

landlock_create_ruleset tracepoint.

Unlike audit records which share a record type and need a "status="
field to distinguish allocation from deallocation, tracepoints provide
one event type per lifecycle transition, each with a type-safe TP_PROTO
matching the specific transition.  This enables type-safe eBPF BTF
access and precise ftrace filtering by event name.

Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---

Changes since v1:
- New patch (split from the v1 add_rule_fs tracepoint patch).
---
 MAINTAINERS                     |  1 +
 include/trace/events/landlock.h | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/landlock/id.h          |  6 +--
 security/landlock/log.c         |  5 ++
 security/landlock/ruleset.c     |  8 +++
 security/landlock/ruleset.h     |  9 ++++
 security/landlock/syscalls.c    |  5 ++
 7 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/trace/events/landlock.h

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index c3fe46d7c4bc..51104faa3951 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -14389,6 +14389,7 @@ F:	Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/landlock.rst
 F:	Documentation/security/landlock.rst
 F:	Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
 F:	fs/ioctl.c
+F:	include/trace/events/landlock.h
 F:	include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
 F:	samples/landlock/
 F:	security/landlock/
diff --git a/include/trace/events/landlock.h b/include/trace/events/landlock.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5e847844fbf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/trace/events/landlock.h
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright © 2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ * Copyright © 2026 Cloudflare
+ */
+
+#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
+#define TRACE_SYSTEM landlock
+
+#if !defined(_TRACE_LANDLOCK_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
+#define _TRACE_LANDLOCK_H
+
+#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
+
+struct landlock_ruleset;
+
+/**
+ * DOC: Landlock trace events
+ *
+ * Consistency guarantee: every trace event corresponds to an operation
+ * that has irrevocably succeeded.  Lifecycle events fire only after
+ * the point of no return; denial events fire only for denials that
+ * actually happen.  This guarantees that eBPF programs observing the
+ * trace stream can build a faithful model of Landlock state without
+ * reconciliation logic.
+ *
+ * Mutable object pointers in TP_PROTO (e.g., struct landlock_ruleset
+ * for add_rule events) are passed while the caller holds the object's
+ * lock, so that TP_fast_assign and eBPF programs reading via BTF see a
+ * consistent snapshot.  For objects that are immutable at the emission
+ * site (e.g., a domain after creation), no lock is needed.
+ *
+ * All pointer arguments in TP_PROTO are guaranteed non-NULL by the
+ * caller.  eBPF programs can access these pointers via BTF for richer
+ * introspection than the TP_STRUCT__entry fields provide.
+ *
+ * TP_STRUCT__entry fields serve TP_printk display only.  eBPF programs
+ * access the raw TP_PROTO arguments directly.
+ *
+ * Security: as for audit, Landlock trace events may expose sensitive
+ * information about all sandboxed processes on the system.  See
+ * Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/landlock.rst for security considerations
+ * and privilege requirements.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * landlock_create_ruleset - new ruleset created
+ * @ruleset: Newly created ruleset (never NULL); not yet shared via an fd,
+ *           so no lock is needed.  eBPF programs can read the full ruleset
+ *           state via BTF.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(
+	landlock_create_ruleset,
+
+	TP_PROTO(const struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset),
+
+	TP_ARGS(ruleset),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(__field(__u64, ruleset_id) __field(access_mask_t,
+							    handled_fs)
+				 __field(access_mask_t, handled_net)
+					 __field(access_mask_t, scoped)),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(__entry->ruleset_id = ruleset->id;
+		       __entry->handled_fs = ruleset->layer.fs;
+		       __entry->handled_net = ruleset->layer.net;
+		       __entry->scoped = ruleset->layer.scope;),
+
+	TP_printk("ruleset=%llx handled_fs=0x%x handled_net=0x%x scoped=0x%x",
+		  __entry->ruleset_id, __entry->handled_fs,
+		  __entry->handled_net, __entry->scoped));
+
+/**
+ * landlock_free_ruleset - Ruleset freed
+ *
+ * Emitted when a ruleset's last reference is dropped (typically when
+ * the creating process closes the ruleset file descriptor).
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(landlock_free_ruleset,
+
+	    TP_PROTO(const struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset),
+
+	    TP_ARGS(ruleset),
+
+	    TP_STRUCT__entry(__field(__u64, ruleset_id)),
+
+	    TP_fast_assign(__entry->ruleset_id = ruleset->id;),
+
+	    TP_printk("ruleset=%llx", __entry->ruleset_id));
+
+#endif /* _TRACE_LANDLOCK_H */
+
+/* This part must be outside protection */
+#include <trace/define_trace.h>
diff --git a/security/landlock/id.h b/security/landlock/id.h
index 45dcfb9e9a8b..2a43c2b523a8 100644
--- a/security/landlock/id.h
+++ b/security/landlock/id.h
@@ -8,18 +8,18 @@
 #ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ID_H
 #define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ID_H
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG
 
 void __init landlock_init_id(void);
 
 u64 landlock_get_id_range(size_t number_of_ids);
 
-#else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG */
 
 static inline void __init landlock_init_id(void)
 {
 }
 
-#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG */
 
 #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ID_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/log.c b/security/landlock/log.c
index c9b506707af0..ef79e4ed0037 100644
--- a/security/landlock/log.c
+++ b/security/landlock/log.c
@@ -174,6 +174,11 @@ static void audit_denial(const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject,
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS
+#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+#include <trace/events/landlock.h>
+#endif /* CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS */
+
 static struct landlock_hierarchy *
 get_hierarchy(const struct landlock_domain *const domain, const size_t layer)
 {
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
index c220e0f9cf5f..0d1e3dadb318 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
@@ -22,10 +22,13 @@
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 
 #include "access.h"
+#include "id.h"
 #include "limits.h"
 #include "object.h"
 #include "ruleset.h"
 
+#include <trace/events/landlock.h>
+
 struct landlock_ruleset *
 landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask,
 			const access_mask_t net_access_mask,
@@ -49,6 +52,10 @@ landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask,
 	new_ruleset->rules.root_net_port = RB_ROOT;
 #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG
+	new_ruleset->id = landlock_get_id_range(1);
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG */
+
 	/* Should already be checked in sys_landlock_create_ruleset(). */
 	if (fs_access_mask) {
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(fs_access_mask !=
@@ -312,6 +319,7 @@ void landlock_free_rules(struct landlock_rules *const rules)
 static void free_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset)
 {
 	might_sleep();
+	trace_landlock_free_ruleset(ruleset);
 	landlock_free_rules(&ruleset->rules);
 	kfree(ruleset);
 }
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.h b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
index bf127ff7496e..0d60e7fb8ff2 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.h
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
  *
  * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
  * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ * Copyright © 2026 Cloudflare
  */
 
 #ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_RULESET_H
@@ -153,6 +154,14 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
 	 * @usage: Number of file descriptors referencing this ruleset.
 	 */
 	refcount_t usage;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG
+	/**
+	 * @id: Unique identifier for this ruleset, used for tracing.
+	 */
+	u64 id;
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG */
+
 	/**
 	 * @layer: Contains the subset of filesystem and network actions that
 	 * are handled by this ruleset.
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index 73ccc32d0afd..b18e83e457c2 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@
 #include "setup.h"
 #include "tsync.h"
 
+#include <trace/events/landlock.h>
+
 static bool is_initialized(void)
 {
 	if (likely(landlock_initialized))
@@ -256,6 +258,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(landlock_create_ruleset,
 	if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
 		return PTR_ERR(ruleset);
 
+	/* Ruleset is not yet shared (FD not installed), no lock needed. */
+	trace_landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset);
+
 	/* Creates anonymous FD referring to the ruleset. */
 	ruleset_fd = anon_inode_getfd("[landlock-ruleset]", &ruleset_fops,
 				      ruleset, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
-- 
2.53.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-04-06 14:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-04-06 14:36 [PATCH v2 00/17] Landlock tracepoints Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:36 ` [PATCH v2 01/17] landlock: Prepare ruleset and domain type split Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 02/17] landlock: Move domain query functions to domain.c Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 03/17] landlock: Split struct landlock_domain from struct landlock_ruleset Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 04/17] landlock: Split denial logging from audit into common framework Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 05/17] tracing: Add __print_untrusted_str() Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 07/17] landlock: Add landlock_add_rule_fs and landlock_add_rule_net tracepoints Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 08/17] landlock: Add restrict_self and free_domain tracepoints Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 09/17] landlock: Add tracepoints for rule checking Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 10/17] landlock: Set audit_net.sk for socket access checks Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 11/17] landlock: Add landlock_deny_access_fs and landlock_deny_access_net Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 12/17] landlock: Add tracepoints for ptrace and scope denials Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 15:01   ` Steven Rostedt
2026-04-07 13:00     ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 13/17] selftests/landlock: Add trace event test infrastructure and tests Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 14/17] selftests/landlock: Add filesystem tracepoint tests Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 15/17] selftests/landlock: Add network " Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 16/17] selftests/landlock: Add scope and ptrace " Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 17/17] landlock: Document tracepoints Mickaël Salaün

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260406143717.1815792-7-mic@digikod.net \
    --to=mic@digikod.net \
    --cc=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=gnoack@google.com \
    --cc=ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com \
    --cc=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=jeffxu@google.com \
    --cc=kees@kernel.org \
    --cc=kernel-team@cloudflare.com \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=m@maowtm.org \
    --cc=mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com \
    --cc=matthieu@buffet.re \
    --cc=mhiramat@kernel.org \
    --cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
    --cc=utilityemal77@gmail.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox