public inbox for linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: "Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@google.com>,
	"Justin Suess" <utilityemal77@gmail.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
	"Masami Hiramatsu" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	"Mathieu Desnoyers" <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
	"Matthieu Buffet" <matthieu@buffet.re>,
	"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
	"Tingmao Wang" <m@maowtm.org>,
	kernel-team@cloudflare.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 12/17] landlock: Add tracepoints for ptrace and scope denials
Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2026 15:00:27 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260407.Aesoo2sairai@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260406110123.4072a765@gandalf.local.home>

On Mon, Apr 06, 2026 at 11:01:23AM -0400, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> On Mon,  6 Apr 2026 16:37:10 +0200
> Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
> 
> > ---
> >  include/trace/events/landlock.h | 135 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  security/landlock/log.c         |  20 +++++
> >  2 files changed, 155 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/include/trace/events/landlock.h b/include/trace/events/landlock.h
> > index 1afab091efba..9f96c9897f44 100644
> > --- a/include/trace/events/landlock.h
> > +++ b/include/trace/events/landlock.h
> > @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
> >  #define _TRACE_LANDLOCK_H
> >  
> >  #include <linux/tracepoint.h>
> > +#include <net/af_unix.h>
> >  
> >  struct dentry;
> >  struct landlock_domain;
> > @@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ struct landlock_rule;
> >  struct landlock_ruleset;
> >  struct path;
> >  struct sock;
> > +struct task_struct;
> >  
> >  /**
> >   * DOC: Landlock trace events
> > @@ -433,6 +435,139 @@ TRACE_EVENT(
> >  		__entry->log_new_exec, __entry->blockers, __entry->sport,
> >  		__entry->dport));
> >  
> > +/**
> > + * landlock_deny_ptrace - ptrace access denied
> > + * @hierarchy: Hierarchy node that blocked the access (never NULL)
> > + * @same_exec: Whether the current task is the same executable that called
> > + *             landlock_restrict_self() for the denying hierarchy node
> > + * @tracee: Target task (never NULL); eBPF can read pid, comm, cred,
> > + *          namespaces, and cgroup via BTF
> > + */
> > +TRACE_EVENT(
> > +	landlock_deny_ptrace,
> > +
> > +	TP_PROTO(const struct landlock_hierarchy *hierarchy, bool same_exec,
> > +		 const struct task_struct *tracee),
> > +
> > +	TP_ARGS(hierarchy, same_exec, tracee),
> > +
> > +	TP_STRUCT__entry(
> > +		__field(__u64, domain_id) __field(bool, same_exec)
> > +			__field(u32, log_same_exec) __field(u32, log_new_exec)
> > +				__field(pid_t, tracee_pid)
> > +					__string(tracee_comm, tracee->comm)),
> 
> Event formats are different than normal macro formatting. Please use the
> event formatting. The above is a defined structure that is being created
> for use. Keep it looking like a structure:
> 
> 	TP_STRUCT__entry(
> 		__field(	__u64,		domain_id)
> 		__field(	bool,		same_exec)
> 		__field(	u32,		log_same_exec)
> 		__field(	u32,		log_new_exec)
> 		__field(	pid_t,		tracee_pid)
> 		__string(	tracee_comm,	tracee->comm)
> 	),

I was using clang-format, but it doesn't make sense here, I'll fix it.

> 
> See how the above resembles:
> 
> struct entry {
> 	__u64		domain_id;
> 	bool		same_exec;
> 	u32		log_same_exec;
> 	u32		log_new_exec;
> 	pid_t		tracee_pid;
> 	string		tracee_comm;
> };
> 
> Because that's pretty much what the trace event TP_STRUCT__entry() is going
> to do with it. (The string will obviously be something else).
> 
> This way it's also easy to spot wholes in the structure that is written
> into the ring buffer. The "same_exec" being a bool followed by two u32
> types, is going to cause a hole. Move it to between tracee_pid and
> tracee_comm.

Actually, the log_* field should be bool too.  Anyway, is it a concern
that the ring buffer leaks (previous event) kernel memory or is the
concern mostly about avoiding wasted space and making easy to spot holes
even if it's OK?

> 
> Please fix the other events too.

Sure. Thanks!

> 
> -- Steve
> 
> 
> > +
> > +	TP_fast_assign(__entry->domain_id = hierarchy->id;
> > +		       __entry->same_exec = same_exec;
> > +		       __entry->log_same_exec = hierarchy->log_same_exec;
> > +		       __entry->log_new_exec = hierarchy->log_new_exec;
> > +		       __entry->tracee_pid =
> > +			       task_tgid_nr((struct task_struct *)tracee);
> > +		       __assign_str(tracee_comm);),
> > +
> > +	TP_printk(
> > +		"domain=%llx same_exec=%d log_same_exec=%u log_new_exec=%u tracee_pid=%d comm=%s",
> > +		__entry->domain_id, __entry->same_exec, __entry->log_same_exec,
> > +		__entry->log_new_exec, __entry->tracee_pid,
> > +		__print_untrusted_str(tracee_comm)));

Are you OK with this new helper?

> > +
> >
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2026-04-07 13:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-04-06 14:36 [PATCH v2 00/17] Landlock tracepoints Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:36 ` [PATCH v2 01/17] landlock: Prepare ruleset and domain type split Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 02/17] landlock: Move domain query functions to domain.c Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 03/17] landlock: Split struct landlock_domain from struct landlock_ruleset Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 04/17] landlock: Split denial logging from audit into common framework Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 05/17] tracing: Add __print_untrusted_str() Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 06/17] landlock: Add create_ruleset and free_ruleset tracepoints Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 07/17] landlock: Add landlock_add_rule_fs and landlock_add_rule_net tracepoints Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 08/17] landlock: Add restrict_self and free_domain tracepoints Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 09/17] landlock: Add tracepoints for rule checking Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 10/17] landlock: Set audit_net.sk for socket access checks Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 11/17] landlock: Add landlock_deny_access_fs and landlock_deny_access_net Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 12/17] landlock: Add tracepoints for ptrace and scope denials Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 15:01   ` Steven Rostedt
2026-04-07 13:00     ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 13/17] selftests/landlock: Add trace event test infrastructure and tests Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 14/17] selftests/landlock: Add filesystem tracepoint tests Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 15/17] selftests/landlock: Add network " Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 16/17] selftests/landlock: Add scope and ptrace " Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 17/17] landlock: Document tracepoints Mickaël Salaün

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260407.Aesoo2sairai@digikod.net \
    --to=mic@digikod.net \
    --cc=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=gnoack@google.com \
    --cc=ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com \
    --cc=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=jeffxu@google.com \
    --cc=kees@kernel.org \
    --cc=kernel-team@cloudflare.com \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=m@maowtm.org \
    --cc=mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com \
    --cc=matthieu@buffet.re \
    --cc=mhiramat@kernel.org \
    --cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
    --cc=utilityemal77@gmail.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox