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From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
To: ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org,
	kpsingh@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, mic@digikod.net,
	viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, kees@kernel.org
Cc: gnoack@google.com, jack@suse.cz, jmorris@namei.org,
	serge@hallyn.com, song@kernel.org, yonghong.song@linux.dev,
	martin.lau@linux.dev, m@maowtm.org, eddyz87@gmail.com,
	john.fastabend@gmail.com, sdf@fomichev.me,
	skhan@linuxfoundation.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 19/20] bpf: Document BPF_MAP_TYPE_LANDLOCK_RULESET
Date: Tue,  7 Apr 2026 16:01:41 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260407200157.3874806-20-utilityemal77@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260407200157.3874806-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com>

Document the BPF_MAP_TYPE_LANDLOCK_RULESET map type and explain the
kfuncs it is associated with.

Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
---
 Documentation/bpf/map_landlock_ruleset.rst | 181 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 181 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/bpf/map_landlock_ruleset.rst

diff --git a/Documentation/bpf/map_landlock_ruleset.rst b/Documentation/bpf/map_landlock_ruleset.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..90f3141a829b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/bpf/map_landlock_ruleset.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+==============================
+BPF_MAP_TYPE_LANDLOCK_RULESET
+==============================
+
+``BPF_MAP_TYPE_LANDLOCK_RULESET`` is a specialized, array-backed map for
+holding references to Landlock rulesets that were created from userspace.
+It is meant to bridge BPF LSM policy selection with Landlock policy
+enforcement: userspace creates a normal Landlock ruleset, inserts its file
+descriptor into the map, and a BPF LSM program later looks up that ruleset and
+applies it with a Landlock kfunc during ``execve()`` preparation.
+
+BPF programs cannot create, inspect, or modify Landlock policy through this
+map.  The looked-up object is exposed only as an opaque
+``struct bpf_landlock_ruleset`` reference.
+
+The map uses ``__u32`` keys as array indexes and stores one ruleset reference
+per slot.  Like other array maps, its size is fixed at creation time and its
+elements are preallocated.
+
+Usage
+=====
+
+Kernel BPF
+----------
+
+.. note::
+   This map type is only supported for BPF LSM programs.  In practice, it is
+   useful for sleepable BPF LSM programs attached to
+   ``bprm_creds_for_exec`` or ``bprm_creds_from_file``, because those are the
+   hooks where the associated Landlock kfuncs are available.
+
+bpf_map_lookup_elem()
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+   void *bpf_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, const void *key)
+
+Lookup returns a trusted pointer to an opaque ``struct bpf_landlock_ruleset``.
+The verifier treats the result as a referenced BTF object, not as a pointer to
+the raw ``__u32`` map value declared in the map definition.
+
+Each successful lookup acquires a ruleset reference.  The BPF program must
+release that reference with ``bpf_landlock_put_ruleset()`` on all paths after
+the lookup succeeds.
+
+The returned pointer is intended to be passed to
+``bpf_landlock_restrict_binprm()``.  It is opaque and cannot be dereferenced
+or inspected from BPF.
+
+bpf_map_delete_elem()
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+   long bpf_map_delete_elem(struct bpf_map *map, const void *key)
+
+Delete removes the ruleset reference stored in the selected slot and drops the
+map's own reference to that ruleset.
+
+Landlock kfuncs
+---------------
+
+The map contains objects designed to work with the following Landlock kfuncs:
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+   void bpf_landlock_put_ruleset(const struct bpf_landlock_ruleset *ruleset)
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+   int bpf_landlock_restrict_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+                                    const struct bpf_landlock_ruleset *ruleset,
+                                    __u32 flags)
+
+``bpf_landlock_restrict_binprm()`` applies the looked-up ruleset to the new
+program credentials that are being prepared for ``execve()``.  The ``flags``
+argument uses the same Landlock restriction flags as
+``landlock_restrict_self()``, including ``LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS``.
+When this flag is used from BPF, ``no_new_privs`` is staged through the exec
+context and committed only after exec reaches point-of-no-return.  This avoids
+side effects on failed executions or ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` while ensuring that
+the resulting task cannot gain more privileges through later exec transitions.
+
+Userspace
+---------
+
+bpf_map_update_elem()
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+   int bpf_map_update_elem(int fd, const void *key, const void *value, __u64 flags)
+
+Userspace populates the map by writing a Landlock ruleset file descriptor into
+the selected slot.  The map uses FD-array update semantics:
+
+- ``key`` points to a ``__u32`` array index.
+- ``value`` points to a ``__u32`` containing the ruleset file descriptor.
+- ``flags`` must be ``BPF_ANY``.
+
+The supplied file descriptor must refer to a valid Landlock ruleset.
+
+Userspace lookup of map contents is not supported for this map type.
+
+Example
+=======
+
+Kernel BPF
+----------
+
+The following snippet shows a sleepable BPF LSM program that looks up a
+ruleset, applies it during exec credential preparation, and releases the
+lookup reference.
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+   struct {
+           __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_LANDLOCK_RULESET);
+           __uint(max_entries, 1);
+           __type(key, __u32);
+           __type(value, __u32);
+   } ruleset_map SEC(".maps");
+
+   SEC("lsm.s/bprm_creds_for_exec")
+   int BPF_PROG(apply_ruleset, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+   {
+           const struct bpf_landlock_ruleset *ruleset;
+           __u32 key = 0;
+
+           ruleset = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&ruleset_map, &key);
+           if (!ruleset)
+                   return 0;
+
+           bpf_landlock_restrict_binprm(
+                   bprm, ruleset, LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
+           bpf_landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset);
+           return 0;
+   }
+
+Userspace
+---------
+
+The following snippet shows how to insert a previously created Landlock
+ruleset into the map.
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+   int populate_ruleset_map(int map_fd, int ruleset_fd)
+   {
+           __u32 key = 0;
+           __u32 value = ruleset_fd;
+
+           return bpf_map_update_elem(map_fd, &key, &value, BPF_ANY);
+   }
+
+Semantics
+=========
+
+- Map creation requires ``CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK``.  Otherwise,
+  ``BPF_MAP_CREATE`` for this type fails with ``-EOPNOTSUPP``.
+- Map definitions use ``sizeof(__u32)`` for both keys and values because
+  userspace writes ruleset file descriptors into the map.
+- From BPF, only ``bpf_map_lookup_elem()`` and ``bpf_map_delete_elem()`` are
+  supported for this map type.
+- From userspace, insertion is done with ``bpf_map_update_elem()`` using a
+  Landlock ruleset FD.
+- The looked-up value is an opaque, trusted BTF object reference, so BPF must
+  treat it as a handle and release it with ``bpf_landlock_put_ruleset()``.
+- ``LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS`` on the BPF path pins the resulting
+   task with ``no_new_privs`` after exec is committed.  When used from
+   ``bprm_creds_from_file``, this does not retroactively suppress privilege gain
+   for the current exec transition itself.
+- If Landlock support is disabled in the running kernel, programs using the
+  associated Landlock kfuncs may still load, but the kfunc call returns
+  ``-EOPNOTSUPP`` at runtime.
+
+See ``tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/landlock_kfuncs.c`` for a complete
+example.
-- 
2.53.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-04-07 20:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-04-07 20:01 [RFC PATCH 00/20] BPF interface for applying Landlock rulesets Justin Suess
2026-04-07 20:01 ` [RFC PATCH 01/20] landlock: Move operations from syscall into ruleset code Justin Suess
2026-04-07 20:01 ` [RFC PATCH 02/20] execve: Add set_nnp_on_point_of_no_return Justin Suess
2026-04-07 20:01 ` [RFC PATCH 03/20] landlock: Implement LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS Justin Suess
2026-04-07 20:01 ` [RFC PATCH 04/20] selftests/landlock: Cover LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS Justin Suess
2026-04-07 20:01 ` [RFC PATCH 05/20] landlock: Make ruleset deferred free RCU safe Justin Suess
2026-04-07 20:01 ` [RFC PATCH 06/20] bpf: lsm: Add Landlock kfuncs Justin Suess
2026-04-07 20:01 ` [RFC PATCH 07/20] bpf: arraymap: Implement Landlock ruleset map Justin Suess
2026-04-07 20:01 ` [RFC PATCH 08/20] bpf: Add Landlock ruleset map type Justin Suess
2026-04-07 20:01 ` [RFC PATCH 09/20] bpf: syscall: Handle Landlock ruleset maps Justin Suess
2026-04-07 20:01 ` [RFC PATCH 10/20] bpf: verifier: Add Landlock ruleset map support Justin Suess
2026-04-07 20:01 ` [RFC PATCH 11/20] selftests/bpf: Add Landlock kfunc declarations Justin Suess
2026-04-07 20:01 ` [RFC PATCH 12/20] selftests/landlock: Rename gettid wrapper for BPF reuse Justin Suess
2026-04-07 20:01 ` [RFC PATCH 13/20] selftests/bpf: Enable Landlock in selftests kernel Justin Suess
2026-04-07 20:01 ` [RFC PATCH 14/20] selftests/bpf: Add Landlock kfunc test program Justin Suess
2026-04-07 20:01 ` [RFC PATCH 15/20] selftests/bpf: Add Landlock kfunc test runner Justin Suess
2026-04-07 20:01 ` [RFC PATCH 16/20] landlock: Bump ABI version Justin Suess
2026-04-07 20:01 ` [RFC PATCH 17/20] tools: bpftool: Add documentation for landlock_ruleset Justin Suess
2026-04-07 20:01 ` [RFC PATCH 18/20] landlock: Document LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS Justin Suess
2026-04-07 20:01 ` Justin Suess [this message]
2026-04-07 20:01 ` [RFC PATCH 20/20] MAINTAINERS: update entry for the Landlock subsystem Justin Suess
2026-04-08  4:40 ` [RFC PATCH 00/20] BPF interface for applying Landlock rulesets Ihor Solodrai
2026-04-08 11:41   ` Justin Suess
2026-04-08 14:00 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-08 17:10   ` Justin Suess
2026-04-08 19:21     ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-10 12:43       ` Justin Suess

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