From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: "Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>,
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] landlock: Restrict renameat2 with RENAME_WHITEOUT
Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2026 15:40:59 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260414.Lae5ida1eeGh@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260411090944.3131168-2-gnoack@google.com>
Thanks for bringing this up.
By default, creating whiteout files is not privileged e.g.,
mknod whiteout c 0 0 is allowed for unprivileged users. Landlock should
follow this semantic. So there are two issues:
1. LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR should not apply for whiteouts.
2. Whiteouts creation should be controllable by Landlock (e.g. through
mknod and renameat2).
I see four options:
1. Consider whiteouts as regular files and make them handled by
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG. This would require an erratum and would
make sense for direct mknod calls, but it would be weird for
renameat2 calls than move a file and should only require
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE from the user point of view.
2. Add a new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_WHITEOUT right to handle whitout
creation (direct and indirect?) and keep LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR
handle direct whiteout creation (and don't backport anything). It
looks inconsistent from an access control point of view.
3. Add a new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_WHITEOUT right and, when handled,
make LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR not handle whiteout. This would be
a bit weird from a kernel point of view but it should work well for
users while still forbidding direct whiteout creation.
4. Add a new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_WHITEOUT right and make
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR never handle whiteout (and backport
MAKE_CHAR fix with an errata). This would be consistent but backport
a way to directly create whiteouts (e.g. with mknod).
I think option 3 is the more pragmatic. Landlock should properly log
the right blocker wrt handled access rights though.
On Sat, Apr 11, 2026 at 11:09:42AM +0200, Günther Noack wrote:
> Hello!
>
> As discussed in [1], the renameat2() syscall's RENAME_WHITEOUT flag allows
> the creation of chardev directory entries with major=minor=0 as "whiteout
> objects" in the location of the rename source file [2].
>
> This functionality is available even without having any OverlayFS mounted
> and can be invoked with the regular renameat2(2) syscall [3].
>
>
> Motivation
> ==========
>
> The RENAME_WHITEOUT flag side-steps Landlock's LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR
> right, which is designed to restrict the creation of chardev device files.
>
> This patch set fixes that by adding a check in Landlock's path_rename hook.
>
>
> Tradeoffs considered in the implementation
> ==========================================
>
> Q: Should we guard it with a dedicated LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_WHITEOUT
> right?
>
> Pros:
> * This would be the fully backwards compatible solution,
> and Linux always strives for full backward compatibility.
>
> Cons:
> * Complicates the Landlock API surface for a very minor use case.
>
> In Debian Code search, the only use of RENAME_WHITEOUT from userspace
> seems to be for fuse-overlayfs. It is used there for the same purpose
> as in the kernel OverlayFS and it likely does not run in a Landlock
> domain.
>
> The tradeoff does not seem worth it to me. The chances that we break
> anyone with this seem very low, and I'm inclined to treat it as a bugfix
> for the existing LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR right.
>
>
> Q: Should we add a Landlock erratum for this?
>
> I punted on it for now, but we can do it if needed.
>
> Q: Should the access right check be merged into the longer
> current_check_refer_path() function?
>
> I am leaning towards keeping it as a special case earlier. This means
> that we traverse the source path twice, but as we have seen in Debian
> Code Search, there are apparently no legitimate callers of renameat2()
> with RENAME_WHITEOUT who are calling this from within a Landlock domain.
> (fuse-overlayfs is legitimate, but is not landlocked)
>
> It doesn't seem worth complicating our common rename code for a corner
> case that doesn't happen in practice.
>
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/adUBCQXrt7kmgqJT@google.com/
> [2] https://docs.kernel.org/filesystems/overlayfs.html#whiteouts-and-opaque-directories
> [3] https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/renameat2.2.html#DESCRIPTION
> [4] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=rename.*RENAME_WHITEOUT&literal=0
>
>
> Günther Noack (3):
> landlock: Require LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR for RENAME_WHITEOUT
> selftests/landlock: Add test for RENAME_WHITEOUT denial
> selftests/landlock: Test OverlayFS renames w/o
> LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR
>
> security/landlock/fs.c | 16 ++++++++
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+)
>
> --
> 2.54.0.rc0.605.g598a273b03-goog
>
>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-14 13:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-11 9:09 [PATCH 0/3] landlock: Restrict renameat2 with RENAME_WHITEOUT Günther Noack
2026-04-11 9:09 ` [PATCH 1/3] landlock: Require LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR for RENAME_WHITEOUT Günther Noack
2026-04-11 9:09 ` [PATCH 2/3] selftests/landlock: Add test for RENAME_WHITEOUT denial Günther Noack
2026-04-11 9:09 ` [PATCH 3/3] selftests/landlock: Test OverlayFS renames w/o LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR Günther Noack
2026-04-14 13:40 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
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