From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 989CA36895D; Wed, 15 Apr 2026 11:12:08 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1776251528; cv=none; b=qLF4ta2U7OL04ckMEjfHgIgCG+szmfrxLmsTq6S7EKpjKcDEztPBH7wzm5owBQCsg3rbXGDcgYbp2tYjVmnP2l6ok2vpYiTMoH2I24N6khYcAq/cbtSN0JTe0PT0SFvT9yHEPXid0JOe0w+FZSzyW0j1DS6c8wK2LEfxwbsn9YE= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1776251528; c=relaxed/simple; bh=fayZBoBbFheO/kclvc+4SUw+dXjp/LYFzJvRENUQZRU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:MIME-Version; b=uqQRCkZflz/QRS0Ip9Ize2jH4P15/Bl7ynp65w92QrPohEReoK5QBKWkOh7zO+2W0geD6aDFS+15y7ymVW5Yr6EmLx1/1+gaIhD3bdTK7Z6DFDGMaYcq2wxqS2HNsTxp5YvpSDjHS7jgnFllCc8P9AeQvh9J1KQN9BuBQ5iP3wY= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=bN0YvBY/; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="bN0YvBY/" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5CA2FC2BCB8; Wed, 15 Apr 2026 11:12:07 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1776251527; bh=fayZBoBbFheO/kclvc+4SUw+dXjp/LYFzJvRENUQZRU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=bN0YvBY/TEX8XZxKyBizo1sp/iPMShVMk8/2jAo7X+ubM+pPo2iG737HhqEflYOla x5mC9uJzqMoAv6LwiFaxkdg1XHcoAFx9jo/giJD6G9XVB/zOLnGG2SaAIkPdbZlZ4w +mphdQYEGKOM3R14LHphcZTt6SIYVE/unii4ti3A3soDG+uYDpBrYjTeKAFOkY+M8t tLJv0aeRnQKiRGFb6QqYjMe8csNiQO64m8CSNXxUbBscL8Yu6sHN2NbPRbRFi6MbQo pjrAAwq91IXgqhuIHph/UyyIExqbfFb+en+vfFI/fObr8+IP2oUTS7czCx9m1qb/Il T5hedV3g/B8eg== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , Nayna Jain , Srish Srinivasan , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Ahmad Fatoum , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Andrew Morton , "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" , Randy Dunlap , Dave Hansen , Pawan Gupta , Feng Tang , Dapeng Mi , Kees Cook , Marco Elver , Li RongQing , "Paul E. McKenney" , Thomas Gleixner , Bjorn Helgaas , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v4] KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 14:12:00 +0300 Message-Id: <20260415111202.63888-1-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.5 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit TPM_DEBUG, and other similar flags, are a non-standard way to specify a feature in Linux kernel. Introduce CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG for trusted keys, and use it to replace these ad-hoc feature flags. Given that trusted keys debug dumps can contain sensitive data, harden the feature as follows: 1. In the Kconfig description postulate that pr_debug() statements must be used. 2. Use pr_debug() statements in TPM 1.x driver to print the protocol dump. 3. Require trusted.debug=1 on the kernel command line (default: 0) to activate dumps at runtime, even when CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG=y. Traces, when actually needed, can be easily enabled by providing trusted.dyndbg='+p' and trusted.debug=1 in the kernel command-line. Reported-by: Nayna Jain Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/7f8b8478-5cd8-4d97-bfd0-341fd5cf10f9@linux.ibm.com/ Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain Tested-by: Srish Srinivasan Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v4: - Added kernel parameter documentation.t - Added tags from Srishand and Nayna. - Sanity check round. This version will be applied unless there is something specific to address. v3: - Add kernel-command line option for enabling the traces. - Add safety information to the Kconfig entry. v2: - Implement for all trusted keys backends. - Add HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG as it is a good practice despite full coverage. --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 16 +++++++ include/keys/trusted-type.h | 21 +++++---- security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 23 ++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c | 7 ++- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 6 +++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 44 +++++++++++-------- 6 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index f2ce1f4975c1..f1515668c8ab 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -7917,6 +7917,22 @@ Kernel parameters first trust source as a backend which is initialized successfully during iteration. + trusted.debug= [KEYS] + Format: + Enable trusted keys debug traces at runtime when + CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG=y. + + To make the traces visible after enabling the option, + use trusted.dyndbg='+p' as needed. By convention, + the subsystem uses pr_debug() for these traces. + + SAFETY: The traces can leak sensitive data, so be + cautious before enabling this. They remain inactive + unless this parameter is set this option to a true + value. + + Default: false + trusted.rng= [KEYS] Format: The RNG used to generate key material for trusted keys. diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index 03527162613f..9f9940482da4 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -83,18 +83,21 @@ struct trusted_key_source { extern struct key_type key_type_trusted; -#define TRUSTED_DEBUG 0 +#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG +extern bool trusted_debug; -#if TRUSTED_DEBUG static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) { - pr_info("key_len %d\n", p->key_len); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0); - pr_info("bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0); - pr_info("migratable %d\n", p->migratable); + if (!trusted_debug) + return; + + pr_debug("key_len %d\n", p->key_len); + print_hex_dump_debug("key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0); + pr_debug("bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len); + print_hex_dump_debug("blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0); + pr_debug("migratable %d\n", p->migratable); } #else static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig index 9e00482d886a..e5a4a53aeab2 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig @@ -1,10 +1,29 @@ config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS bool +config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG + bool + +config TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG + bool "Debug trusted keys" + depends on HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG + default n + help + Trusted key backends and core code that support debug traces can + opt-in that feature here. Traces must only use debug level output, as + sensitive data may pass by. In the kernel-command line traces can be + enabled via trusted.dyndbg='+p'. + + SAFETY: Debug dumps are inactive at runtime until trusted.debug is set + to a true value on the kernel command-line. Use at your utmost + consideration when enabling this feature on a production build. The + general advice is not to do this. + config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM bool "TPM-based trusted keys" depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA1 select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS @@ -23,6 +42,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE bool "TEE-based trusted keys" depends on TEE >= TRUSTED_KEYS default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as trusted @@ -33,6 +53,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM depends on CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR >= TRUSTED_KEYS select CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module @@ -42,6 +63,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP bool "DCP-based trusted keys" depends on CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP >= TRUSTED_KEYS default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of NXP's DCP (Data Co-Processor) as trusted key backend. @@ -50,6 +72,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_PKWM bool "PKWM-based trusted keys" depends on PSERIES_PLPKS >= TRUSTED_KEYS default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of IBM PowerVM Key Wrapping Module (PKWM) as a trusted key backend. diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c index 601943ce0d60..6a33dbf2a7f5 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c @@ -28,10 +28,13 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = { {opt_err, NULL} }; -#ifdef CAAM_DEBUG +#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG static inline void dump_options(const struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info) { - pr_info("key encryption algo %d\n", pkey_info->key_enc_algo); + if (!trusted_debug) + return; + + pr_debug("key encryption algo %d\n", pkey_info->key_enc_algo); } #else static inline void dump_options(const struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c index 0b142d941cd2..6aed17bee09d 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c @@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ static char *trusted_rng = "default"; module_param_named(rng, trusted_rng, charp, 0); MODULE_PARM_DESC(rng, "Select trusted key RNG"); +#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG +bool trusted_debug; +module_param_named(debug, trusted_debug, bool, 0); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(debug, "Enable trusted keys debug traces (default: 0)"); +#endif + static char *trusted_key_source; module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0); MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee, caam, dcp or pkwm)"); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index 6ea728f1eae6..13513819991e 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -46,38 +46,44 @@ enum { SRK_keytype = 4 }; -#define TPM_DEBUG 0 - -#if TPM_DEBUG +#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) { - pr_info("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); - pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); - pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); - pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); + if (!trusted_debug) + return; + + pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); + pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); + pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); + pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); + print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); } static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) { - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0); - pr_info("secret:\n"); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); - pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n"); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); + if (!trusted_debug) + return; + + print_hex_dump_debug("trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0); + pr_debug("secret:\n"); + print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); + pr_debug("trusted-key: enonce:\n"); + print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); } static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) { int len; - pr_info("\ntpm buffer\n"); + if (!trusted_debug) + return; + pr_debug("\ntpm buffer\n"); len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0); + print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0); } #else static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) -- 2.39.5