From: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] bpf: add bpf_init_inode_xattr kfunc for atomic inode labeling
Date: Sun, 26 Apr 2026 20:15:57 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260427001602.38353-2-dwindsor@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260427001602.38353-1-dwindsor@gmail.com>
Add bpf_init_inode_xattr() kfunc for BPF LSM programs to atomically set
xattrs via inode_init_security hook using lsm_get_xattr_slot().
lsm_get_xattr_slot() claims a slot by writing to xattr_count, which BPF
programs cannot do: hook arguments are not directly writable from BPF.
To hide this, the BPF-facing API is just bpf_init_inode_xattr(name,
value), and the verifier transparently rewrites each call into
bpf_init_inode_xattr_impl(xattrs, xattr_count, name, value). xattrs and
xattr_count are extracted from the hook context, which the verifier
spills to the stack at program entry since R1 is clobbered during normal
execution.
A previous attempt [1] required a kmalloc string output protocol for
the xattr name. Since commit 6bcdfd2cac55 ("security: Allow all LSMs to
provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook") [2], the xattr name is no
longer allocated; it is a static constant. We take advantage of this by
passing the name directly. Because we rely on the hook-specific ctx
layout, the kfunc is restricted to lsm/inode_init_security.
Link: https://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2022-October/034878.html [1]
Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=6bcdfd2cac55 [2]
Suggested-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
---
fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 3 ++
kernel/bpf/fixups.c | 20 +++++++++
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/bpf/hooks.c | 3 ++
5 files changed, 159 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c b/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c
index 9d27be058494..5a5951006a3f 100644
--- a/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c
+++ b/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/kernfs.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
@@ -353,6 +354,68 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_cgroup_read_xattr(struct cgroup *cgroup, const char *name__s
}
#endif /* CONFIG_CGROUPS */
+/* Called from the verifier fixup of bpf_init_inode_xattr(). */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_init_inode_xattr_impl(struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count,
+ const char *name__str,
+ const struct bpf_dynptr *value_p)
+{
+ struct bpf_dynptr_kern *value_ptr = (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)value_p;
+ size_t name_len;
+ void *xattr_value;
+ struct xattr *xattr;
+ const void *value;
+ u32 value_len;
+
+ if (!xattrs || !xattr_count || !name__str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ name_len = strlen(name__str);
+ if (name_len == 0 || name_len > XATTR_NAME_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ value_len = __bpf_dynptr_size(value_ptr);
+ if (value_len == 0 || value_len > XATTR_SIZE_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ value = __bpf_dynptr_data(value_ptr, value_len);
+ if (!value)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ xattr_value = kmemdup(value, value_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!xattr_value)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
+ if (!xattr) {
+ kfree(xattr_value);
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ }
+
+ xattr->name = name__str;
+ xattr->value = xattr_value;
+ xattr->value_len = value_len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * bpf_init_inode_xattr - set an xattr on a new inode from inode_init_security
+ * @name__str: xattr name (e.g., "bpf.file_label")
+ * @value_p: dynptr containing the xattr value
+ *
+ * Only callable from lsm/inode_init_security programs. The verifier rewrites
+ * calls to bpf_init_inode_xattr_impl() with xattrs/xattr_count extracted from
+ * the hook context.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, negative error on failure.
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_init_inode_xattr(const char *name__str,
+ const struct bpf_dynptr *value_p)
+{
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "%s called without verifier fixup\n", __func__);
+ return -EFAULT;
+}
+
__bpf_kfunc_end_defs();
BTF_KFUNCS_START(bpf_fs_kfunc_set_ids)
@@ -363,13 +426,28 @@ BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_get_dentry_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_get_file_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_set_dentry_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_remove_dentry_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_init_inode_xattr)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_init_inode_xattr_impl)
BTF_KFUNCS_END(bpf_fs_kfunc_set_ids)
+BTF_ID_LIST(bpf_lsm_inode_init_security_btf_ids)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_init_security)
+
+BTF_ID_LIST(bpf_init_inode_xattr_btf_ids)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_init_inode_xattr)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_init_inode_xattr_impl)
+
static int bpf_fs_kfuncs_filter(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 kfunc_id)
{
if (!btf_id_set8_contains(&bpf_fs_kfunc_set_ids, kfunc_id) ||
- prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM)
+ prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) {
+ /* bpf_init_inode_xattr[_impl] only attach to inode_init_security. */
+ if ((kfunc_id == bpf_init_inode_xattr_btf_ids[0] ||
+ kfunc_id == bpf_init_inode_xattr_btf_ids[1]) &&
+ prog->aux->attach_btf_id != bpf_lsm_inode_init_security_btf_ids[0])
+ return -EACCES;
return 0;
+ }
return -EACCES;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 101ca6cc5424..e73bb2222c3d 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -682,6 +682,7 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
*/
u8 fastcall_spills_num:3;
u8 arg_prog:4;
+ u8 init_inode_xattr_fixup:1;
/* below fields are initialized once */
unsigned int orig_idx; /* original instruction index */
@@ -903,6 +904,8 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env {
bool bypass_spec_v4;
bool seen_direct_write;
bool seen_exception;
+ bool needs_ctx_spill;
+ s16 ctx_stack_off;
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux_data; /* array of per-insn state */
const struct bpf_line_info *prev_linfo;
struct bpf_verifier_log log;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/fixups.c b/kernel/bpf/fixups.c
index fba9e8c00878..18d612a9fe29 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/fixups.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/fixups.c
@@ -725,6 +725,26 @@ int bpf_convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
}
}
+ if (env->needs_ctx_spill) {
+ if (epilogue_cnt) {
+ /* gen_epilogue already saved ctx to the stack */
+ env->ctx_stack_off = -(s16)subprogs[0].stack_depth;
+ } else {
+ cnt = 0;
+ subprogs[0].stack_depth += 8;
+ env->ctx_stack_off = -(s16)subprogs[0].stack_depth;
+ insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP,
+ BPF_REG_1,
+ env->ctx_stack_off);
+ insn_buf[cnt++] = env->prog->insnsi[0];
+ new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt);
+ if (!new_prog)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ env->prog = new_prog;
+ delta += cnt - 1;
+ }
+ }
+
if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) {
if (!ops->gen_prologue) {
verifier_bug(env, "gen_prologue is null");
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 03f9e16c2abe..af5753ffb16b 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -10794,6 +10794,8 @@ enum special_kfunc_type {
KF_bpf_arena_alloc_pages,
KF_bpf_arena_free_pages,
KF_bpf_arena_reserve_pages,
+ KF_bpf_init_inode_xattr,
+ KF_bpf_init_inode_xattr_impl,
KF_bpf_session_is_return,
KF_bpf_stream_vprintk,
KF_bpf_stream_print_stack,
@@ -10882,6 +10884,13 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_task_work_schedule_resume)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_arena_alloc_pages)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_arena_free_pages)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_arena_reserve_pages)
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_LSM
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_init_inode_xattr)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_init_inode_xattr_impl)
+#else
+BTF_ID_UNUSED
+BTF_ID_UNUSED
+#endif
BTF_ID(func, bpf_session_is_return)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_stream_vprintk)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_stream_print_stack)
@@ -12701,6 +12710,24 @@ static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
if (err < 0)
return err;
+ if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_init_inode_xattr_impl]) {
+ verbose(env, "bpf_init_inode_xattr_impl is not callable directly\n");
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_init_inode_xattr]) {
+ if (env->cur_state->curframe != 0) {
+ verbose(env, "bpf_init_inode_xattr cannot be called from subprograms\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ env->needs_ctx_spill = true;
+ insn_aux->init_inode_xattr_fixup = true;
+ err = bpf_add_kfunc_call(env,
+ special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_init_inode_xattr_impl], 0);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+ }
+
if (is_bpf_rbtree_add_kfunc(meta.func_id)) {
err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno,
set_rbtree_add_callback_state);
@@ -19272,6 +19299,33 @@ int bpf_fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
insn_buf[4] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1);
insn_buf[5] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_0, 0);
*cnt = 6;
+ } else if (env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].init_inode_xattr_fixup) {
+ struct bpf_kfunc_desc *impl_desc;
+
+ impl_desc = find_kfunc_desc(env->prog,
+ special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_init_inode_xattr_impl], 0);
+ if (!impl_desc) {
+ verifier_bug(env, "bpf_init_inode_xattr_impl desc not found");
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ /* Rewrite bpf_init_inode_xattr(name, value) to inject xattrs and
+ * xattr_count loaded from the saved inode_init_security ctx.
+ */
+ insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1);
+ insn_buf[1] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2);
+ insn_buf[2] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_FP,
+ env->ctx_stack_off);
+ insn_buf[3] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2,
+ 3 * sizeof(u64));
+ insn_buf[4] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_2,
+ 4 * sizeof(u64));
+ insn_buf[5] = *insn;
+ if (!bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call())
+ insn_buf[5].imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(impl_desc->addr);
+ else
+ insn_buf[5].imm = impl_desc->func_id;
+ *cnt = 6;
}
if (env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].arg_prog) {
diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
index 40efde233f3a..1e61baa821bd 100644
--- a/security/bpf/hooks.c
+++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
@@ -28,8 +28,11 @@ static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void)
return 0;
}
+#define BPF_LSM_INODE_INIT_XATTRS 1
+
struct lsm_blob_sizes bpf_lsm_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct bpf_storage_blob),
+ .lbs_xattr_count = BPF_LSM_INODE_INIT_XATTRS,
};
DEFINE_LSM(bpf) = {
--
2.53.0
next parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-27 0:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20260427001602.38353-1-dwindsor@gmail.com>
2026-04-27 0:15 ` David Windsor [this message]
2026-04-27 0:51 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] bpf: add bpf_init_inode_xattr kfunc for atomic inode labeling bot+bpf-ci
2026-04-27 2:56 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2026-04-27 3:23 ` David Windsor
2026-04-27 3:32 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2026-04-27 3:42 ` David Windsor
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