From: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@atomlin.com>
To: tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, paul@paul-moore.com,
jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, mingo@redhat.com,
peterz@infradead.org, juri.lelli@redhat.com,
vincent.guittot@linaro.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
casey@schaufler-ca.com, longman@redhat.com, tj@kernel.org,
hannes@cmpxchg.org, mkoutny@suse.com
Cc: chenridong@huaweicloud.com, dietmar.eggemann@arm.com,
rostedt@goodmis.org, bsegall@google.com, mgorman@suse.de,
vschneid@redhat.com, kprateek.nayak@amd.com, omosnace@redhat.com,
kees@kernel.org, atomlin@atomlin.com, neelx@suse.com,
sean@ashe.io, chjohnst@gmail.com, steve@abita.co,
mproche@gmail.com, nick.lange@gmail.com, cgroups@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] mips: sched: Fix CPUMASK_OFFSTACK memory corruption
Date: Sat, 9 May 2026 12:48:47 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260509164847.939294-4-atomlin@atomlin.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260509164847.939294-1-atomlin@atomlin.com>
This patch addresses a critical memory management flaw.
When CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is enabled, cpumask_var_t is a pointer.
Consequently, sizeof(new_mask) evaluates to the pointer size, causing
copy_from_user() to clobber the stack pointer. The subsequent
alloc_cpumask_var() overwrites this with an uninitialised heap address,
discarding the user's mask and risking data leaks. Fix this by
allocating masks first, and using cpumask_size() to copy data directly
into the allocated buffer.
Additionally, reorder the failure goto labels to ensure task locks and
memory allocations are cleanly unwound.
Fixes: 295cbf6d63165 ("[MIPS] Move FPU affinity code into separate file.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@atomlin.com>
---
arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c b/arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c
index a6a61393fc1a..4b3424088302 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c
@@ -71,11 +71,23 @@ asmlinkage long mipsmt_sys_sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, unsigned int len,
struct task_struct *p;
int retval;
- if (len < sizeof(new_mask))
+ if (len < cpumask_size())
return -EINVAL;
- if (copy_from_user(&new_mask, user_mask_ptr, sizeof(new_mask)))
- return -EFAULT;
+ if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&cpus_allowed, GFP_KERNEL))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&new_mask, GFP_KERNEL)) {
+ retval = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free_cpus_allowed;
+ }
+ if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&effective_mask, GFP_KERNEL)) {
+ retval = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free_new_mask;
+ }
+
+ retval = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(new_mask, user_mask_ptr, cpumask_size()))
+ goto out_free_effective_mask;
cpus_read_lock();
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -84,25 +96,14 @@ asmlinkage long mipsmt_sys_sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, unsigned int len,
if (!p) {
rcu_read_unlock();
cpus_read_unlock();
- return -ESRCH;
+ retval = -ESRCH;
+ goto out_free_effective_mask;
}
/* Prevent p going away */
get_task_struct(p);
rcu_read_unlock();
- if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&cpus_allowed, GFP_KERNEL)) {
- retval = -ENOMEM;
- goto out_put_task;
- }
- if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&new_mask, GFP_KERNEL)) {
- retval = -ENOMEM;
- goto out_free_cpus_allowed;
- }
- if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&effective_mask, GFP_KERNEL)) {
- retval = -ENOMEM;
- goto out_free_new_mask;
- }
if (!check_same_owner(p) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
retval = -EPERM;
goto out_unlock;
@@ -141,14 +142,14 @@ asmlinkage long mipsmt_sys_sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, unsigned int len,
}
}
out_unlock:
+ put_task_struct(p);
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+out_free_effective_mask:
free_cpumask_var(effective_mask);
out_free_new_mask:
free_cpumask_var(new_mask);
out_free_cpus_allowed:
free_cpumask_var(cpus_allowed);
-out_put_task:
- put_task_struct(p);
- cpus_read_unlock();
return retval;
}
--
2.51.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-09 16:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-09 16:48 [PATCH 0/3] security, sched: Expand task_setscheduler LSM hook and related fixes Aaron Tomlin
2026-05-09 16:48 ` [PATCH 1/3] cgroup/cpuset: Fix deadline bandwidth leak in cpuset_can_attach() Aaron Tomlin
2026-05-11 5:10 ` Waiman Long
2026-05-11 11:08 ` Aaron Tomlin
2026-05-11 17:54 ` Waiman Long
2026-05-09 16:48 ` [PATCH 2/3] security: Expand task_setscheduler LSM hook to include CPU affinity mask Aaron Tomlin
2026-05-09 18:29 ` Aaron Tomlin
2026-05-09 16:48 ` Aaron Tomlin [this message]
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