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From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, mic@digikod.net
Cc: m@maowtm.org, gnoack@google.com, gnoack3000@gmail.com,
	matthieu@buffet.re, Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v9 2/9] landlock: Add LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT user API
Date: Sat, 20 Jun 2026 23:52:15 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260621035223.2651547-3-utilityemal77@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260621035223.2651547-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com>

Wire up the new LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT flag for
sys_landlock_add_rule().  Define the constant in the UAPI header with
its documentation, accept it from user space for
%LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH only, and update the path-beneath useless-
rule check so that an empty allowed_access is still accepted when a
flag (quiet or no-inherit) is present.  Reject the flag with -EINVAL on
a ruleset that handles no filesystem access, since the resulting seal
would be inert.

The flag has no enforcement effect yet; that is added in a subsequent
patch.

Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
---

Notes:
    Changes since v8:
    - Reordered ahead of "Return inserted rule from landlock_insert_rule()".
    - Reject LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT with -EINVAL when the ruleset
      handles no filesystem access (the seal would be inert); documented the
      new EINVAL case in the sys_landlock_add_rule() kerneldoc.
    - Expanded the UAPI comment for LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT: the
      conservative seal (same-directory renames and hard links denied) and
      the best-effort ancestor walk that is not serialized against rename.
    - Rebased onto mic/next.

 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/landlock/syscalls.c  | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
index 7ffe2ef127ee..336b01dc43ec 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -123,10 +123,45 @@ struct landlock_ruleset_attr {
  *     allowed_access in the passed in rule_attr.  When this flag is
  *     present, the caller is also allowed to pass in an empty
  *     allowed_access.
+ * %LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT
+ *     Disable the inheritance of access rights and flags from parent objects
+ *     for the rule's object and its descendants.
+ *
+ *     This flag currently applies only to filesystem rules.  Passing it with
+ *     any other rule type returns ``-EINVAL``.
+ *
+ *     By default, Landlock filesystem rules inherit allowed accesses from
+ *     ancestor directories: rights granted on a parent directory also apply
+ *     to its children.  A rule marked with %LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT
+ *     stops this propagation at its object; only the accesses explicitly
+ *     allowed by the rule apply.  Descendants of that object continue to
+ *     inherit from it normally, unless they too carry this flag.
+ *
+ *     This flag also enforces parent-directory restrictions: rename, rmdir,
+ *     link, and other operations that would change the immediate parent of
+ *     the rule's object or any of its ancestors are denied up to the VFS
+ *     root.  This prevents sandboxed processes from manipulating the
+ *     filesystem hierarchy to evade restrictions (e.g. via sandbox-restart
+ *     attacks).  The seal is intentionally conservative: any rename, removal
+ *     or link operation targeting a sealed object is denied, including
+ *     same-directory renames and hard links that do not actually reparent it.
+ *
+ *     Inheritance of rule flags (such as %LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_QUIET) from
+ *     ancestor directories is also blocked at the rule's object.
+ *
+ *     Adding such a rule seals the rule's object and all of its ancestors up
+ *     to the VFS root, so the kernel walks the path up to the VFS root while
+ *     adding the rule, sealing each ancestor in turn.  This walk is best
+ *     effort: it is not serialized against concurrent renames, so a rename
+ *     that reparents one of the ancestors while the walk is in progress may
+ *     leave the seal incomplete.  This is not a security concern: changes to
+ *     the filesystem hierarchy between the time a ruleset is built and the
+ *     time it is enforced are outside of Landlock's threat model.
  */
 
 /* clang-format off */
 #define LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_QUIET			(1U << 0)
+#define LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT		(1U << 1)
 /* clang-format on */
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index 36b02892c62f..b847b0be1cf7 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
 	/*
 	 * Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules)
 	 * are ignored in path walks.  However, the rule is not useless if it is
-	 * there to hold a quiet flag.
+	 * there to hold a quiet or no-inherit flag.
 	 */
 	if (!flags && !path_beneath_attr.allowed_access)
 		return -ENOMSG;
@@ -375,6 +375,15 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
 	if (flags & LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_QUIET && !ruleset->quiet_masks.fs)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/*
+	 * Checks for useless no-inherit flag: a seal is only ever consulted
+	 * for a domain that handles some filesystem access, so a no-inherit
+	 * rule added to a ruleset with no handled filesystem access would be
+	 * silently inert.
+	 */
+	if (flags & LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT && !mask)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* Gets and checks the new rule. */
 	err = get_path_from_fd(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd, &path);
 	if (err)
@@ -433,7 +442,7 @@ static int add_rule_net_port(struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset,
  * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr:
  *             %LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH or %LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT.
  * @rule_attr: Pointer to a rule (matching the @rule_type).
- * @flags: Must be 0 or %LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_QUIET.
+ * @flags: Bitmask of %LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_* flags.
  *
  * This system call enables to define a new rule and add it to an existing
  * ruleset.
@@ -451,6 +460,10 @@ static int add_rule_net_port(struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset,
  * - %EINVAL: &landlock_net_port_attr.port is greater than 65535;
  * - %EINVAL: LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_QUIET is passed but the ruleset has no
  *   quiet access bits set for the corresponding rule type.
+ * - %EINVAL: LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT is passed for a rule type
+ *   that does not support it (e.g. %LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT).
+ * - %EINVAL: LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT is passed but the ruleset handles
+ *   no filesystem access.
  * - %ENOMSG: Empty accesses (e.g. &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access is
  *   0) and no flags;
  * - %EBADF: @ruleset_fd is not a file descriptor for the current thread, or a
@@ -472,7 +485,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
 	if (!is_initialized())
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-	if (flags && flags != LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_QUIET)
+	/* Rejects unknown flags. */
+	if (flags & ~(LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_QUIET | LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT only applies to path-beneath rules. */
+	if ((flags & LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT) &&
+	    rule_type != LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Gets and checks the ruleset. */
-- 
2.54.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-06-21  3:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-21  3:52 [PATCH v9 0/9] Implement LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT Justin Suess
2026-06-21  3:52 ` [PATCH v9 1/9] landlock: Add and use landlock_walk_path_up() helper Justin Suess
2026-06-21  3:52 ` Justin Suess [this message]
2026-06-21  3:52 ` [PATCH v9 3/9] landlock: Return inserted rule from landlock_insert_rule() Justin Suess
2026-06-21  3:52 ` [PATCH v9 4/9] landlock: Move log_fs_change_topology_dentry() above current_check_refer_path() Justin Suess
2026-06-21  3:52 ` [PATCH v9 5/9] landlock: Implement LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT Justin Suess
2026-06-21  3:52 ` [PATCH v9 6/9] landlock: Add documentation for LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT Justin Suess
2026-06-21  3:52 ` [PATCH v9 7/9] samples/landlock: Add LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT to landlock-sandboxer Justin Suess
2026-06-21  3:52 ` [PATCH v9 8/9] selftests/landlock: Add selftests for LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT Justin Suess
2026-06-21  3:52 ` [PATCH v9 9/9] landlock: Add KUnit tests " Justin Suess

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