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From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/3] keys: fix keyring assoc-array out-of-bounds read and index inconsistency
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 07:54:48 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260714115451.3773164-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com> (raw)

An unprivileged keyring whose keys collide through the description-chunk
path can drive assoc_array node splitting into an out-of-bounds slot write.
Patch 1 stops the out-of-bounds read in keyring_get_key_chunk(); patch 2
makes the chunk byte order agree with keyring_diff_objects(); patch 3 fixes
the shortcut-walk trim so the walk cannot be steered down the wrong
descendant.

v2 changes (patch 3 only; patches 1 and 2 are unchanged):
As sashiko pointed out, the v1 patch-3 guard (sc_level + CHUNK >
skip_to_level) fixed the word-aligned leak but wrongly fired for an
unaligned first word whose skip_to_level sits on the next chunk
boundary: shift = skip_to_level & CHUNK_MASK is then 0 and the trim clears
the whole dissimilarity word, making a differing shortcut compare equal.  v2
keys the trim on the end of the chunk that contains sc_level,
round_down(sc_level, CHUNK) + CHUNK, which matches a brute-force oracle over
every sc_level/skip_to_level pair; the original round_up guard and the v1
guard each disagree with the oracle in one regime.

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/20260712014500.480410-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com/

Michael Bommarito (3):
  keys: fix out-of-bounds read in keyring_get_key_chunk()
  keys: make keyring key-chunk byte order agree with keyring_diff_objects()
  assoc_array: trim the final shortcut word using the current chunk end

 lib/assoc_array.c       |  3 ++-
 security/keys/keyring.c | 15 ++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

-- 
2.53.0

             reply	other threads:[~2026-07-14 11:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-14 11:54 Michael Bommarito [this message]
2026-07-14 11:54 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] keys: fix out-of-bounds read in keyring_get_key_chunk() Michael Bommarito
2026-07-14 11:54 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] keys: make keyring key-chunk byte order agree with keyring_diff_objects() Michael Bommarito
2026-07-14 11:54 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] assoc_array: trim the final shortcut word using the current chunk end Michael Bommarito

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