[PATCH v3 12/20] landlock: Add tracepoints for rule checking

["Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>]

Merge landlock_find_rule() into landlock_unmask_layers() so rule
pointers stay inside the domain implementation while unmask checking
gets the matched rule it needs for the check_rule tracepoint.
landlock_unmask_layers() now takes a landlock_id and the domain instead
of a rule pointer.  A rename or link evaluates the same dentry against
both renamed parents, so this path now looks the rule up once per
parent; collapsing that back to a single lookup is left to a follow-up.

Emit, via the per-type wrappers unmask_layers_fs() and
unmask_layers_net(), the rights each matching rule grants at every
domain layer.  The events carry this as a dynamic per-layer array (up to
LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS entries) reserved from the trace ring buffer,
not the caller's stack, and rendered symbolically per layer.  A
WARN_ON_ONCE() in __trace_landlock_fill_layers() flags a rule whose
layer levels fall outside the domain range or are unsorted, a
cannot-happen case; the zero-filled slots keep the rendered output and
the array bounds safe regardless.

Setting allowed_parent2 to true for non-dom-check requests when
get_inode_id() returns false preserves the pre-refactoring behavior: a
negative dentry (no backing inode) has no matching rule, so the access
is allowed at this path component.  Before the refactoring,
landlock_unmask_layers() with a NULL rule produced this result as a side
effect; now the caller must set it explicitly.

Name the trace-only check_rule fields so each printk label equals its
ring-buffer field name and works directly as an ftrace filter: the
request field is labelled access_request= and the per-layer array is
named grants.  Values audit also logs keep audit's label (domain=,
ruleset=) so a single filter works across trace and audit.

Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---

Changes since v2:
https://patch.msgid.link/20260406143717.1815792-10-mic@digikod.net
- Order the check_rule tracepoint arguments with the common part
  (domain, rule) before the event-specific access_request and object.
- Reformatted TP_STRUCT__entry and TP_fast_assign to kernel tracing
  convention (requested by Steven Rostedt).
- Render the request access right as symbolic names with
  __print_flags(), shared with the audit blocker names.
- Rename the per-layer field label allowed= to grants= and render it
  symbolically via __print_landlock_layers(), intersected with the
  request to show the granted requested rights per layer (was a raw hex
  value).
- Rename struct layer_access_masks to the base's struct layer_masks.
- Rename the check_rule printk label request= to access_request= and the
  per-layer ring-buffer field layers to grants, so each trace-only field
  and its printk label share one name (usable directly as an ftrace
  filter); audit-shared labels (domain=, ruleset=) are unchanged.

Changes since v1:
https://patch.msgid.link/20250523165741.693976-6-mic@digikod.net
- Merged find-rule consolidation (v1 2/5) into this patch.
- Added check_rule_net tracepoint for network rules.
- Added get_inode_id() helper with rcu_access_pointer().
- Added allowed_parent2 behavioral fix.
---
 include/trace/events/landlock.h | 203 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/landlock/domain.c      |  32 +++--
 security/landlock/domain.h      |  10 +-
 security/landlock/fs.c          | 149 +++++++++++++++--------
 security/landlock/net.c         |  21 +++-
 5 files changed, 350 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/trace/events/landlock.h b/include/trace/events/landlock.h
index 7f221d8fff38..c693248afe23 100644
--- a/include/trace/events/landlock.h
+++ b/include/trace/events/landlock.h
@@ -11,10 +11,13 @@
 #define _TRACE_LANDLOCK_H
 
 #include <linux/landlock.h>
+#include <linux/trace_seq.h>
 #include <linux/tracepoint.h>
 
+struct dentry;
 struct landlock_domain;
 struct landlock_hierarchy;
+struct landlock_rule;
 struct landlock_ruleset;
 struct path;
 
@@ -74,7 +77,110 @@ struct path;
  * (e.g. network ports are __u64 in host endianness, like
  * landlock_net_port_attr.port).  Per-event details, such as where a value
  * is byte-swapped, live in the field's own kdoc.
+ *
+ * Rule-check fields
+ * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ *
+ * The check_rule events fire during an access check, once per matching
+ * rule, before the final allow-or-deny verdict.  They share domain (the
+ * enforcing domain being evaluated), access_request (the access mask being
+ * checked), and rule (the matching rule, with per-layer access masks).
+ */
+
+#ifdef CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+
+/*
+ * Fills the dense per-domain-layer array layers (one access mask per layer,
+ * indexed by level - 1) from rule's sparse layer stack, keeping only the
+ * requested rights (access_request).  Layers with no matching rule entry get
+ * a zero mask.  Shared by the check_rule_fs and check_rule_net events.
+ *
+ * rule->layers is sorted by ascending level, with levels in the domain's
+ * [1, num_layers] range (see landlock_merge_ruleset()), so every entry maps
+ * to a slot.  A leftover entry would be a malformed rule; the zero-filled
+ * slots keep the output and the array bounds safe regardless.
  */
+static inline void
+__trace_landlock_fill_layers(access_mask_t *const layers,
+			     const size_t num_layers,
+			     const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
+			     const access_mask_t access_request)
+{
+	size_t i = 0;
+
+	for (size_t level = 1; level <= num_layers; level++) {
+		access_mask_t grants = 0;
+
+		if (i < rule->num_layers && level == rule->layers[i].level) {
+			grants = rule->layers[i].access & access_request;
+			i++;
+		}
+		layers[level - 1] = grants;
+	}
+
+	/* A leftover entry means an out-of-range or unsorted rule level. */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(i < rule->num_layers);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Renders the dense per-domain-layer access array as symbolic flag names for
+ * the grants field: layers wrapped in "{}", flags within a layer joined by
+ * "|", layers separated by ",", an empty layer rendered as nothing.
+ * Open-codes the flag walk because trace_print_flags_seq() NUL-terminates per
+ * call and so cannot be chained into a single field.  The shared names table
+ * covers every access right, so masked bits are always named.  Returns the
+ * trace_seq position like __print_flags().
+ */
+static inline const char *
+__trace_landlock_print_layers(struct trace_seq *p,
+			      const access_mask_t *const layers,
+			      const size_t num_layers,
+			      const struct trace_print_flags *const names,
+			      const size_t names_size)
+{
+	const char *const ret = trace_seq_buffer_ptr(p);
+
+	trace_seq_putc(p, '{');
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < num_layers; i++) {
+		access_mask_t mask = layers[i];
+		bool first = true;
+
+		if (i)
+			trace_seq_putc(p, ',');
+		for (size_t j = 0; mask && j < names_size; j++) {
+			if ((mask & names[j].mask) != names[j].mask)
+				continue;
+			if (!first)
+				trace_seq_putc(p, '|');
+			trace_seq_puts(p, names[j].name);
+			mask &= ~names[j].mask;
+			first = false;
+		}
+	}
+	trace_seq_putc(p, '}');
+	trace_seq_putc(p, 0);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* CREATE_TRACE_POINTS */
+
+/*
+ * Prints a per-layer access mask array (the dynamic array @array) as symbolic
+ * flag names using the shared @flag_names list (a _LANDLOCK_*_NAMES macro).
+ * Stays outside CREATE_TRACE_POINTS: TP_printk is expanded in the print-output
+ * pass where that macro is undefined.
+ */
+#define __print_landlock_layers(array, flag_names...)			\
+	({								\
+		static const struct trace_print_flags __layer_names[] = { \
+			flag_names					\
+		};							\
+		__trace_landlock_print_layers(				\
+			p, __get_dynamic_array(array),			\
+			__get_dynamic_array_len(array) /		\
+				sizeof(access_mask_t),			\
+			__layer_names, ARRAY_SIZE(__layer_names));	\
+	})
 
 /**
  * landlock_create_ruleset - New ruleset created
@@ -374,6 +480,103 @@ TRACE_EVENT(landlock_free_domain,
 		__entry->domain_id, __entry->denials)
 );
 
+/**
+ * landlock_check_rule_fs - Filesystem rule evaluated during access check
+ *
+ * @domain: Enforcing domain (never NULL).
+ * @rule: Matching rule with per-layer access masks (never NULL).
+ * @access_request: Access mask evaluated against the rule (the domain's
+ *                   handled mask during rename/link double-checks).
+ * @dentry: Filesystem dentry being checked (never NULL).
+ *
+ * Emitted for each rule that matches during a filesystem access check.
+ * The grants array shows the requested rights the rule grants at each
+ * domain layer.  See Documentation/trace/events-landlock.rst for how to
+ * interpret it.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(landlock_check_rule_fs,
+
+	TP_PROTO(const struct landlock_domain *domain,
+		 const struct landlock_rule *rule,
+		 access_mask_t access_request, const struct dentry *dentry),
+
+	TP_ARGS(domain, rule, access_request, dentry),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	__u64,		domain_id	)
+		__field(	access_mask_t,	access_request	)
+		__field(	dev_t,		dev		)
+		__field(	ino_t,		ino		)
+		__dynamic_array(access_mask_t,	grants,
+				domain->num_layers)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->domain_id	= domain->hierarchy->id;
+		__entry->access_request	= access_request;
+		__entry->dev		= dentry->d_sb->s_dev;
+		__entry->ino		= d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_ino;
+
+		__trace_landlock_fill_layers(__get_dynamic_array(grants),
+					     __get_dynamic_array_len(grants) /
+						     sizeof(access_mask_t),
+					     rule, access_request);
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("domain=%llx access_request=%s dev=%u:%u ino=%lu grants=%s",
+		__entry->domain_id,
+		__print_flags(__entry->access_request, "|", _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_NAMES),
+		MAJOR(__entry->dev), MINOR(__entry->dev), __entry->ino,
+		__print_landlock_layers(grants, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_NAMES))
+);
+
+/**
+ * landlock_check_rule_net - Network port rule evaluated during access check
+ *
+ * @domain: Enforcing domain (never NULL).
+ * @rule: Matching rule with per-layer access masks (never NULL).
+ * @access_request: Access mask being requested.
+ * @port: Network port being checked (host endianness).
+ *
+ * Emitted for each rule that matches during a network access check.  The
+ * grants array shows the requested rights the rule grants at each domain
+ * layer.  See Documentation/trace/events-landlock.rst for how to
+ * interpret it.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(landlock_check_rule_net,
+
+	TP_PROTO(const struct landlock_domain *domain,
+		 const struct landlock_rule *rule,
+		 access_mask_t access_request, __u64 port),
+
+	TP_ARGS(domain, rule, access_request, port),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	__u64,		domain_id	)
+		__field(	access_mask_t,	access_request	)
+		__field(	__u64,		port		)
+		__dynamic_array(access_mask_t,	grants,
+				domain->num_layers)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->domain_id	= domain->hierarchy->id;
+		__entry->access_request	= access_request;
+		__entry->port		= port;
+
+		__trace_landlock_fill_layers(__get_dynamic_array(grants),
+					     __get_dynamic_array_len(grants) /
+						     sizeof(access_mask_t),
+					     rule, access_request);
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("domain=%llx access_request=%s port=%llu grants=%s",
+		__entry->domain_id,
+		__print_flags(__entry->access_request, "|", _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_NAMES),
+		__entry->port,
+		__print_landlock_layers(grants, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_NAMES))
+);
+
 #undef _LANDLOCK_NAME_ENTRY
 
 #endif /* _TRACE_LANDLOCK_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/domain.c b/security/landlock/domain.c
index 082c4da68536..c20020024de4 100644
--- a/security/landlock/domain.c
+++ b/security/landlock/domain.c
@@ -97,9 +97,9 @@ void landlock_put_domain_deferred(struct landlock_domain *const domain)
 }
 
 /* The returned access has the same lifetime as the domain. */
-const struct landlock_rule *
-landlock_find_rule(const struct landlock_domain *const domain,
-		   const struct landlock_id id)
+static const struct landlock_rule *
+find_rule(const struct landlock_domain *const domain,
+	  const struct landlock_id id)
 {
 	const struct rb_root *root;
 	const struct rb_node *node;
@@ -126,26 +126,38 @@ landlock_find_rule(const struct landlock_domain *const domain,
 
 /**
  * landlock_unmask_layers - Remove the access rights in @masks which are
- *                          granted in @rule
+ *                          granted by a matching rule
  *
- * Updates the set of (per-layer) unfulfilled access rights @masks so that all
- * the access rights granted in @rule are removed from it (because they are now
- * fulfilled).
+ * Looks up the rule matching @id in @domain, then updates the set of
+ * (per-layer) unfulfilled access rights @masks so that all the access rights
+ * granted by that rule are removed (because they are now fulfilled).
  *
- * @rule: A rule that grants a set of access rights for each layer.
+ * @domain: The Landlock domain to search for a matching rule.
+ * @id: Identifier for the rule target (e.g. inode, port).
  * @masks: A matrix of unfulfilled access rights for each layer.
+ * @matched_rule: Optional output for the matched rule (for tracing); set to
+ *                the matching rule when non-NULL, unchanged otherwise.
  *
  * Return: True if the request is allowed (i.e. the access rights granted all
  * remaining unfulfilled access rights and masks has no leftover set bits).
  */
-bool landlock_unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
-			    struct layer_masks *masks)
+bool landlock_unmask_layers(const struct landlock_domain *const domain,
+			    const struct landlock_id id,
+			    struct layer_masks *masks,
+			    const struct landlock_rule **matched_rule)
 {
+	const struct landlock_rule *rule;
+
 	if (!masks)
 		return true;
+
+	rule = find_rule(domain, id);
 	if (!rule)
 		return false;
 
+	if (matched_rule)
+		*matched_rule = rule;
+
 	/*
 	 * An access is granted if, for each policy layer, at least one rule
 	 * encountered on the pathwalk grants the requested access, regardless
diff --git a/security/landlock/domain.h b/security/landlock/domain.h
index 8351e22016fe..5baa4a73b446 100644
--- a/security/landlock/domain.h
+++ b/security/landlock/domain.h
@@ -305,12 +305,10 @@ struct landlock_domain *
 landlock_merge_ruleset(struct landlock_domain *const parent,
 		       struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset);
 
-const struct landlock_rule *
-landlock_find_rule(const struct landlock_domain *const domain,
-		   const struct landlock_id id);
-
-bool landlock_unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
-			    struct layer_masks *masks);
+bool landlock_unmask_layers(const struct landlock_domain *const domain,
+			    const struct landlock_id id,
+			    struct layer_masks *masks,
+			    const struct landlock_rule **matched_rule);
 
 access_mask_t
 landlock_init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_domain *const domain,
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 48744a21d0a3..fe028aac26ae 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -376,31 +376,55 @@ int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
 
 /* Access-control management */
 
-/*
- * The lifetime of the returned rule is tied to @domain.
+/**
+ * get_inode_id - Look up the Landlock object for a dentry
+ * @dentry: The dentry to look up.
+ * @id: Filled with the inode's Landlock object pointer on success.
+ *
+ * Extracts the Landlock object pointer from @dentry's inode security blob and
+ * stores it in @id for use as a rule-tree lookup key.
  *
- * Returns NULL if no rule is found or if @dentry is negative.
+ * When this returns false (negative dentry or no Landlock object), no rule can
+ * match this inode, so landlock_unmask_layers() need not be called.  Callers
+ * that gate landlock_unmask_layers() on this function must handle the NULL
+ * masks case independently, since the !masks-returns-true early-return in
+ * landlock_unmask_layers() will not be reached.  See the allowed_parent2
+ * initialization in is_access_to_paths_allowed().
+ *
+ * Return: True if a Landlock object exists for @dentry, false otherwise.
  */
-static const struct landlock_rule *
-find_rule(const struct landlock_domain *const domain,
-	  const struct dentry *const dentry)
+static bool get_inode_id(const struct dentry *const dentry,
+			 struct landlock_id *id)
 {
-	const struct landlock_rule *rule;
-	const struct inode *inode;
-	struct landlock_id id = {
-		.type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE,
-	};
-
 	/* Ignores nonexistent leafs. */
 	if (d_is_negative(dentry))
-		return NULL;
+		return false;
 
-	inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	id.key.object = rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object);
-	rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-	return rule;
+	/*
+	 * rcu_access_pointer() is sufficient: the pointer is used only as a
+	 * numeric comparison key for rule lookup, not dereferenced.  The object
+	 * cannot be freed while the domain exists because the domain's rule
+	 * tree holds its own reference to it.
+	 */
+	id->key.object = rcu_access_pointer(
+		landlock_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry))->object);
+	return !!id->key.object;
+}
+
+static bool unmask_layers_fs(const struct landlock_domain *const domain,
+			     const struct landlock_id id,
+			     const access_mask_t access_request,
+			     struct layer_masks *masks,
+			     const struct dentry *const dentry)
+{
+	const struct landlock_rule *rule = NULL;
+	bool ret;
+
+	ret = landlock_unmask_layers(domain, id, masks, &rule);
+	if (rule)
+		trace_landlock_check_rule_fs(domain, rule, access_request,
+					     dentry);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -781,6 +805,9 @@ is_access_to_paths_allowed(const struct landlock_domain *const domain,
 	bool allowed_parent1 = false, allowed_parent2 = false, is_dom_check,
 	     child1_is_directory = true, child2_is_directory = true;
 	struct path walker_path;
+	struct landlock_id id = {
+		.type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE,
+	};
 	access_mask_t access_masked_parent1, access_masked_parent2;
 	struct layer_masks _layer_masks_child1, _layer_masks_child2;
 	struct layer_masks *layer_masks_child1 = NULL,
@@ -820,28 +847,46 @@ is_access_to_paths_allowed(const struct landlock_domain *const domain,
 		/* For a simple request, only check for requested accesses. */
 		access_masked_parent1 = access_request_parent1;
 		access_masked_parent2 = access_request_parent2;
+		/*
+		 * Simple requests have no parent2 to check, so parent2 is
+		 * trivially allowed.  This must be set explicitly because the
+		 * get_inode_id() gate in the pathwalk loop may prevent
+		 * landlock_unmask_layers() from being called (which would
+		 * otherwise return true for NULL masks as a side effect).
+		 */
+		allowed_parent2 = true;
 		is_dom_check = false;
 	}
 
 	if (unlikely(dentry_child1)) {
-		/*
-		 * Get the layer masks for the child dentries for use by domain
-		 * check later.
-		 */
-		if (landlock_init_layer_masks(domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
-					      &_layer_masks_child1,
-					      LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE))
-			landlock_unmask_layers(find_rule(domain, dentry_child1),
-					       &_layer_masks_child1);
+		struct landlock_id id = {
+			.type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE,
+		};
+		access_mask_t handled;
+
+		handled = landlock_init_layer_masks(domain,
+						    LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
+						    &_layer_masks_child1,
+						    LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
+		if (handled && get_inode_id(dentry_child1, &id))
+			unmask_layers_fs(domain, id, handled,
+					 &_layer_masks_child1, dentry_child1);
 		layer_masks_child1 = &_layer_masks_child1;
 		child1_is_directory = d_is_dir(dentry_child1);
 	}
 	if (unlikely(dentry_child2)) {
-		if (landlock_init_layer_masks(domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
-					      &_layer_masks_child2,
-					      LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE))
-			landlock_unmask_layers(find_rule(domain, dentry_child2),
-					       &_layer_masks_child2);
+		struct landlock_id id = {
+			.type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE,
+		};
+		access_mask_t handled;
+
+		handled = landlock_init_layer_masks(domain,
+						    LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
+						    &_layer_masks_child2,
+						    LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
+		if (handled && get_inode_id(dentry_child2, &id))
+			unmask_layers_fs(domain, id, handled,
+					 &_layer_masks_child2, dentry_child2);
 		layer_masks_child2 = &_layer_masks_child2;
 		child2_is_directory = d_is_dir(dentry_child2);
 	}
@@ -853,8 +898,6 @@ is_access_to_paths_allowed(const struct landlock_domain *const domain,
 	 * restriction.
 	 */
 	while (true) {
-		const struct landlock_rule *rule;
-
 		/*
 		 * If at least all accesses allowed on the destination are
 		 * already allowed on the source, respectively if there is at
@@ -895,13 +938,20 @@ is_access_to_paths_allowed(const struct landlock_domain *const domain,
 				break;
 		}
 
-		rule = find_rule(domain, walker_path.dentry);
-		allowed_parent1 =
-			allowed_parent1 ||
-			landlock_unmask_layers(rule, layer_masks_parent1);
-		allowed_parent2 =
-			allowed_parent2 ||
-			landlock_unmask_layers(rule, layer_masks_parent2);
+		if (get_inode_id(walker_path.dentry, &id)) {
+			allowed_parent1 =
+				allowed_parent1 ||
+				unmask_layers_fs(domain, id,
+						 access_masked_parent1,
+						 layer_masks_parent1,
+						 walker_path.dentry);
+			allowed_parent2 =
+				allowed_parent2 ||
+				unmask_layers_fs(domain, id,
+						 access_masked_parent2,
+						 layer_masks_parent2,
+						 walker_path.dentry);
+		}
 
 		/* Stops when a rule from each layer grants access. */
 		if (allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2)
@@ -1064,23 +1114,30 @@ static bool collect_domain_accesses(const struct landlock_domain *const domain,
 				    struct layer_masks *layer_masks_dom)
 {
 	bool ret = false;
+	access_mask_t access_masked_dom;
 
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain || !mnt_root || !dir || !layer_masks_dom))
 		return true;
 	if (is_nouser_or_private(dir))
 		return true;
 
-	if (!landlock_init_layer_masks(domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
-				       layer_masks_dom, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE))
+	access_masked_dom =
+		landlock_init_layer_masks(domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
+					  layer_masks_dom, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
+	if (!access_masked_dom)
 		return true;
 
 	dget(dir);
 	while (true) {
 		struct dentry *parent_dentry;
+		struct landlock_id id = {
+			.type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE,
+		};
 
 		/* Gets all layers allowing all domain accesses. */
-		if (landlock_unmask_layers(find_rule(domain, dir),
-					   layer_masks_dom)) {
+		if (get_inode_id(dir, &id) &&
+		    unmask_layers_fs(domain, id, access_masked_dom,
+				     layer_masks_dom, dir)) {
 			/*
 			 * Stops when all handled accesses are allowed by at
 			 * least one rule in each layer.
diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
index ead97fcfdcff..8f2aaac54b33 100644
--- a/security/landlock/net.c
+++ b/security/landlock/net.c
@@ -53,6 +53,22 @@ int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
 	return err;
 }
 
+static bool unmask_layers_net(const struct landlock_domain *const domain,
+			      const struct landlock_id id,
+			      struct layer_masks *masks,
+			      access_mask_t access_request)
+{
+	const struct landlock_rule *rule = NULL;
+	bool ret;
+
+	ret = landlock_unmask_layers(domain, id, masks, &rule);
+	if (rule)
+		trace_landlock_check_rule_net(
+			domain, rule, access_request,
+			ntohs((__force __be16)id.key.data));
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
 				       struct sockaddr *const address,
 				       const int addrlen,
@@ -62,7 +78,6 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
 	unsigned short sock_family;
 	__be16 port;
 	struct layer_masks layer_masks = {};
-	const struct landlock_rule *rule;
 	struct landlock_id id = {
 		.type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
 	};
@@ -248,14 +263,14 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
 	id.key.data = (__force uintptr_t)port;
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
 
-	rule = landlock_find_rule(subject->domain, id);
 	access_request = landlock_init_layer_masks(subject->domain,
 						   access_request, &layer_masks,
 						   LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
 	if (!access_request)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (landlock_unmask_layers(rule, &layer_masks))
+	if (unmask_layers_net(subject->domain, id, &layer_masks,
+			      access_request))
 		return 0;
 
 	audit_net.family = address->sa_family;
-- 
2.54.0