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From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: "Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: "Daniel Durning" <danieldurning.work@gmail.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Justin Suess" <utilityemal77@gmail.com>,
	"Lennart Poettering" <lennart@poettering.net>,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
	"Nicolas Bouchinet" <nicolas.bouchinet@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>,
	"Shervin Oloumi" <enlightened@google.com>,
	"Tingmao Wang" <m@maowtm.org>,
	kernel-team@cloudflare.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 01/12] ns: Free anonymous mount namespaces via ns_common_free()
Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2026 18:13:46 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260726161400.3010511-2-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260726161400.3010511-1-mic@digikod.net>

From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

free_mnt_ns() skipped ns_common_free() for anonymous mount namespaces
(the "if (!is_anon_ns(ns))" guard) because they carry the reserved inum
MNT_NS_ANON_INO, which proc_free_inum() must never release.

A following change needs ns_common_free() to run for every namespace, to
release per-namespace state attached during __ns_common_init().  Move
the reserved-inum decision into __ns_common_free() and let free_mnt_ns()
call ns_common_free() unconditionally.

__ns_common_free() is shared by all namespace types, so it gates
proc_free_inum() on ns->inum > MNT_NS_INO_SPECIAL_MAX (a new alias for
MNT_NS_ANON_INO) rather than the mount-specific is_anon_ns().  The
reserved inums (MNT_NS_ANON_INO and the *_NS_INIT_INO values just above
it) belong to namespaces that are never freed, except the anonymous
mount namespace; dynamically allocated inums are >= PROC_DYNAMIC_FIRST.
So the comparison frees every dynamic inum and skips exactly the
anonymous mount namespace, matching the previous guard.

Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---

Changes since v2:
- New patch, split from "security: add LSM blob and hooks for
  namespaces" (suggested by Paul Moore).
---
 fs/namespace.c            | 3 +--
 include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h | 1 +
 kernel/nscommon.c         | 3 ++-
 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 3d5cd5bf3b05..0602f133f3a0 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -4186,8 +4186,7 @@ static void dec_mnt_namespaces(struct ucounts *ucounts)
 
 static void free_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *ns)
 {
-	if (!is_anon_ns(ns))
-		ns_common_free(ns);
+	ns_common_free(ns);
 	dec_mnt_namespaces(ns->ucounts);
 	mnt_ns_tree_remove(ns);
 }
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h b/include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h
index a25e38d1c874..ea0f0267d90f 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ enum init_ns_ino {
 	MNT_NS_INIT_INO		= 0xEFFFFFF8U,
 #ifdef __KERNEL__
 	MNT_NS_ANON_INO		= 0xEFFFFFF7U,
+	MNT_NS_INO_SPECIAL_MAX	= MNT_NS_ANON_INO,
 #endif
 };
 
diff --git a/kernel/nscommon.c b/kernel/nscommon.c
index 3166c1fd844a..e6f623e1bc37 100644
--- a/kernel/nscommon.c
+++ b/kernel/nscommon.c
@@ -91,7 +91,8 @@ int __ns_common_init(struct ns_common *ns, u32 ns_type, const struct proc_ns_ope
 
 void __ns_common_free(struct ns_common *ns)
 {
-	proc_free_inum(ns->inum);
+	if (ns->inum > MNT_NS_INO_SPECIAL_MAX)
+		proc_free_inum(ns->inum);
 }
 
 struct ns_common *__must_check ns_owner(struct ns_common *ns)
-- 
2.54.0


  reply	other threads:[~2026-07-26 16:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-26 16:13 [PATCH v3 00/12] Landlock: Namespace and capability control Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-26 16:13 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2026-07-26 16:13 ` [PATCH v3 02/12] security: add LSM blob and hooks for namespaces Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-26 16:13 ` [PATCH v3 03/12] security: Add LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NS for namespace audit records Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-26 16:13 ` [PATCH v3 04/12] landlock: Rename quiet_masks to quiet_access Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-26 16:13 ` [PATCH v3 05/12] landlock: Wrap per-layer access masks in struct layer_config Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-26 16:13 ` [PATCH v3 06/12] landlock: Copy the quiet mask in the ruleset merge helper Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-26 16:13 ` [PATCH v3 07/12] landlock: Enforce namespace use restrictions Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-26 16:13 ` [PATCH v3 08/12] landlock: Enforce capability restrictions Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-26 16:13 ` [PATCH v3 09/12] selftests/landlock: Add namespace restriction tests Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-26 16:13 ` [PATCH v3 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add capability " Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-26 16:13 ` [PATCH v3 11/12] samples/landlock: Add capability and namespace restriction support Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-26 16:13 ` [PATCH v3 12/12] landlock: Add documentation for capability and namespace restrictions Mickaël Salaün

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