Linux Security Modules development
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
To: gnoack3000@gmail.com, mic@digikod.net
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 1/5] landlock: Check landlock_restrict_self(2)'s flags before privileges
Date: Sun,  9 Aug 2026 11:45:19 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260809154544.1253100-2-utilityemal77@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260809154544.1253100-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com>

sys_landlock_restrict_self() currently checks the no_new_privs /
CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement before validating the flags argument.  An
unprivileged caller without no_new_privs thus gets EPERM even when the
passed flags are invalid, hiding the EINVAL error.

Move the no_new_privs / CAP_SYS_ADMIN check just after the flags check
so that malformed calls consistently error out with EINVAL whatever the
caller's privileges, the same way seccomp(2) validates its flags before
checking no_new_privs.

Update the restrict_self_checks_ordering test accordingly.

Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
---

Notes:
    v4:
        - New patch, following Mickaël's review of the main patch: check
          the flags argument before the no_new_privs / CAP_SYS_ADMIN
          requirement, in the same order as seccomp(2).

 security/landlock/syscalls.c                 | 8 ++++----
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 6 +++++-
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index 36b02892c62f..e3ef7b980c82 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -535,6 +535,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(landlock_restrict_self, const int, ruleset_fd, const __u32,
 	if (!is_initialized())
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
+	if ((flags | LANDLOCK_MASK_RESTRICT_SELF) !=
+	    LANDLOCK_MASK_RESTRICT_SELF)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/*
 	 * Similar checks as for seccomp(2), except that an -EPERM may be
 	 * returned.
@@ -543,10 +547,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(landlock_restrict_self, const int, ruleset_fd, const __u32,
 	    !ns_capable_noaudit(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	if ((flags | LANDLOCK_MASK_RESTRICT_SELF) !=
-	    LANDLOCK_MASK_RESTRICT_SELF)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
 	/* Translates "off" flag to boolean. */
 	log_same_exec = !(flags & LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF);
 	/* Translates "on" flag to boolean. */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
index cbd3c1669951..f3c126d5c003 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
@@ -255,8 +255,12 @@ TEST(restrict_self_checks_ordering)
 
 	/* Checks unprivileged enforcement without no_new_privs. */
 	drop_caps(_metadata);
+	/*
+	 * The flags validity is checked before the no_new_privs /
+	 * CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement.
+	 */
 	ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_restrict_self(-1, -1));
-	ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+	ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
 	ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_restrict_self(-1, 0));
 	ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
 	ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0));
-- 
2.55.0


  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-09 15:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-09 15:45 [PATCH v4 0/5] Implement LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS Justin Suess
2026-08-09 15:45 ` Justin Suess [this message]
2026-08-09 15:45 ` [PATCH v4 3/5] selftests/landlock: Test LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS Justin Suess
2026-08-09 15:45 ` [PATCH v4 4/5] landlock: Document LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS Justin Suess
2026-08-09 15:45 ` [PATCH v4 5/5] samples/landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS to sampler Justin Suess
2026-08-09 15:53 ` [PATCH v4 0/5] Implement LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS Justin Suess
2026-08-09 21:24 ` [PATCH v4 2/5] landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS Justin Suess
2026-08-11  7:19 ` [PATCH v4 0/5] Implement LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS Mickaël Salaün

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260809154544.1253100-2-utilityemal77@gmail.com \
    --to=utilityemal77@gmail.com \
    --cc=gnoack3000@gmail.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mic@digikod.net \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox