From: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 0/3] lib/crypto: Provide a function for zeroizing hmac_sha1_ctx
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2026 18:33:33 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260812163336.3103835-1-thuth@redhat.com> (raw)
It's maybe not worth the effort for hmac_sha1_ctx right now (since there
is only one spot that forgot to zeroize the structure in case of errors),
but offering a function for zeroizing the data via __cleanup might help to
get future code into the proper shape right from the start. Thus let's
introduce a hmac_sha1_zeroize_ctx() function now and use it in the
appropriate spots.
Thomas Huth (3):
crypto: Provide a wrapper for zeroizing hmac_sha1_ctx
security: keys: trusted: always clear the hmac_sha1_ctx before
returning
lib/crypto: sha1: Use hmac_sha1_zeroize_ctx() instead of
memzero_explicit()
include/crypto/sha1.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++
lib/crypto/sha1.c | 2 +-
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--
2.55.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-08-12 16:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-12 16:33 Thomas Huth [this message]
2026-08-12 16:33 ` [PATCH 1/3] crypto: Provide a wrapper for zeroizing hmac_sha1_ctx Thomas Huth
2026-08-12 16:33 ` [PATCH 2/3] security: keys: trusted: always clear the hmac_sha1_ctx before returning Thomas Huth
2026-08-12 16:33 ` [PATCH 3/3] lib/crypto: sha1: Use hmac_sha1_zeroize_ctx() instead of memzero_explicit() Thomas Huth
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