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Tue, 18 Aug 2026 12:51:43 -0700 (PDT) From: Jann Horn Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2026 21:51:07 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 3/3] selinux: require EXECMEM or PTRACE for FOLL_FORCE introspection Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <20260818-selinux-pokemem-v1-3-90cd2357ee05@google.com> References: <20260818-selinux-pokemem-v1-0-90cd2357ee05@google.com> In-Reply-To: <20260818-selinux-pokemem-v1-0-90cd2357ee05@google.com> To: Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Stephen Smalley , Jeff Xu , =?utf-8?q?Thi=C3=A9baud_Weksteen?= Cc: Alexander Viro , Christian Brauner , Jan Kara , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Ondrej Mosnacek , selinux@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Lorenzo Stoakes , Vlastimil Babka , Pedro Falcato , David Hildenbrand , linux-mm@kvack.org, Jann Horn X-Mailer: b4 0.15.2 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1787082694; l=2735; i=jannh@google.com; s=20240730; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=zSdAoshV6PguyX7bw95N4A7c09eJSx5mBc5Ua6Jl6bA=; b=Lyhniy9H5W1G2wuKZtV9Z+ZJwr+oTZ4Wxkivk0swGQT5TVkCUpGEnUh4di50Ud5ofYDrM8FV3 hG088NQOnE8BjBxCnVn9kU0SPcGSVr57AdYgL4wVzDxIO+bERsoFvU6 X-Developer-Key: i=jannh@google.com; a=ed25519; pk=AljNtGOzXeF6khBXDJVVvwSEkVDGnnZZYqfWhP1V+C8= On systems configured with PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS, ensure that a process can only create anonymous executable memory via /proc/self/mem if it has one of: - EXECMEM (like for other methods of creating anonymous executable pages) - PTRACE (like when using /proc/$pid/mem of another process) This closes a hole in EXECMEM enforcement that Project Zero has used in a remote Android exploit chain: It was possible to use a memory corruption bug in a service without EXECMEM permission to overwrite executable code via /proc/self/mem, which made it possible to load and run shellcode with a kernel exploit. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 18dd28b2bb13..905137c47321 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2157,6 +2157,32 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); } +/* + * Decide whether it should be possible to read non-readable VMAs and write + * non-writable VMAs via /proc/self/mem. + * This only applies to systems configured with PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS, and only + * triggers on accesses that are not visible to selinux_ptrace_access_check(). + * + * This allows a process to overwrite read-only code in its own address space. + * + * Creating an audit record on denial doesn't make sense here, since we can't + * tell whether FOLL_FORCE matters for the accessed VMAs. + */ +static int selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject) +{ + struct av_decision avd; + int rc; + u32 sid = cred_sid(subject); + + /* Allow if the process is generally allowed to have executable anonymous memory. */ + rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECMEM, 0, &avd); + + /* Also allow if selinux_ptrace_access_check() would allow it. */ + if (rc) + rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd); + return rc; +} + static int selinux_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) { @@ -7558,6 +7584,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(introspect_mem_foll_force, selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable), -- 2.55.0.737.g08866a6d13-goog