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Tue, 25 Aug 2026 11:39:33 -0700 (PDT) From: Jann Horn Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2026 20:39:19 +0200 Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] selinux: require PROCESS__PTRACE for FOLL_FORCE introspection Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <20260825-selinux-pokemem-v2-3-b46bc64916d8@google.com> References: <20260825-selinux-pokemem-v2-0-b46bc64916d8@google.com> In-Reply-To: <20260825-selinux-pokemem-v2-0-b46bc64916d8@google.com> To: Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Stephen Smalley , Jeff Xu , =?utf-8?q?Thi=C3=A9baud_Weksteen?= Cc: Alexander Viro , Christian Brauner , Jan Kara , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Ondrej Mosnacek , selinux@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Lorenzo Stoakes , Vlastimil Babka , Pedro Falcato , David Hildenbrand , linux-mm@kvack.org, Jann Horn X-Mailer: b4 0.15.2 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1787683164; l=2509; i=jannh@google.com; s=20240730; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=Ns+udTpi8SWKloYkKMw8Din2oarGSCfqpMuFm48xRLo=; b=zeD7wBrHYoqhVh6HblaO+73EuAz1CQeVXst7AZwlAE/ssLvvQw8Ia6UL9q7TkXPnVftUvkutA EZh2GLrwyjZCNMAdQM0EcaCQZx1Tr+oTA0Tv+2dWEkEGth/XbX8l9/W X-Developer-Key: i=jannh@google.com; a=ed25519; pk=AljNtGOzXeF6khBXDJVVvwSEkVDGnnZZYqfWhP1V+C8= On systems configured with PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS, ensure that a process can only create anonymous executable memory via /proc/self/mem if it has PROCESS__PTRACE (like when using /proc/$pid/mem of another process). This closes a hole in code integrity enforcement that Project Zero has used in a remote Android exploit chain: It was possible to use a memory corruption bug in a service without EXECMEM/EXECMOD/PTRACE permission to overwrite executable code via /proc/self/mem, which made it possible to load and run shellcode containing a kernel exploit. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 18dd28b2bb13..2c2c60e9e0fe 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2157,6 +2157,27 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); } +/* + * Decide whether it should be possible to read non-readable VMAs and write + * non-writable VMAs via /proc/self/mem. + * This only applies to systems configured with PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS, and only + * triggers on accesses that are not visible to selinux_ptrace_access_check() + * because of the introspection exceptions in may_access_mm() and + * __ptrace_may_access(). + * + * This allows a process to overwrite read-only code in its own address space. + * + * Creating an audit record on denial doesn't make sense here, since we can't + * tell whether FOLL_FORCE matters for the accessed VMAs. + */ +static int selinux_mem_foll_force_opened_by_owner(const struct cred *subject) +{ + struct av_decision avd; + u32 sid = cred_sid(subject); + + return avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd); +} + static int selinux_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) { @@ -7558,6 +7579,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mem_foll_force_opened_by_owner, selinux_mem_foll_force_opened_by_owner), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable), -- 2.55.0.860.g4b6b3295ed-goog