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Mon, 31 Aug 2026 07:59:42 -0700 (PDT) From: Justin Suess To: ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org, kpsingh@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, mic@digikod.net, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, kees@kernel.org Cc: gnoack@google.com, jack@suse.cz, song@kernel.org, yonghong.song@linux.dev, martin.lau@linux.dev, m@maowtm.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Justin Suess , Casey Schaufler Subject: [PATCH v2 01/15] lsm: Add the LSM policy object lifetime hooks Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 10:58:43 -0400 Message-ID: <20260831145858.3869191-2-utilityemal77@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260831145858.3869191-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com> References: <20260831145858.3869191-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Add struct lsm_policy_object, the identity an LSM embeds in a policy object it shares with BPF programs, and the three hooks managing such an object's lifetime: policy_object_from_fd(fd, &object) policy_object_get(object) policy_object_put(object) The object records the owning LSM's LSM_ID_* value. The BPF kfuncs built on these hooks dispatch each call on an object to the one LSM matching its lsmid, which resolves the containing object with container_of(); the framework never interprets an object beyond its lsmid. The type field discriminates between the owning LSM's own policy object kinds and is private to it, with 0 reserved as "unset" so a zeroed, untagged object fails every type check. from_fd has no object to route by: the fd refers to a file set up through the owning LSM's own userspace interface, so the fd itself identifies its LSM. The framework offers the fd to every implementation in turn; an LSM declines a fd that is not one of its policy objects with -EOPNOTSUPP, and any other error is a definitive translation failure. The hooks back referenced BPF kptrs, which imposes the same lifetime contract on every implementation: from_fd returns a reference on a live object, get acquires with inc-not-zero semantics and fails with -ENOENT once the count dropped to zero, put may be called from contexts that cannot sleep (BPF drives it from map destructors), and the containing object is freed only after an RCU grace period, as programs load policy object kptrs from maps under RCU and may examine an object concurrently with its last put. The hooks are excluded from the "bpf" LSM's attachment points. The object-routed hooks are unreachable there, as LSM_ID_BPF policy objects cannot exist; for from_fd, whose walk visits every implementation, a BPF program cannot fill the object out parameter, so an attachment returning 0 would hand the caller an uninitialized pointer. Cc: Paul Moore Cc: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: Justin Suess --- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 4 ++++ include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++ kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 65c9609ec207..d7684407737a 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -452,6 +452,10 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_token_create, struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bpf_token_free, struct bpf_token *token) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_token_cmd, const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_token_capable, const struct bpf_token *token, int cap) +LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, policy_object_from_fd, int fd, + struct lsm_policy_object **object) +LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, policy_object_get, struct lsm_policy_object *object) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, policy_object_put, struct lsm_policy_object *object) #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, locked_down, enum lockdown_reason what) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 153e9043058f..5e423bea080e 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -168,6 +168,17 @@ struct lsm_prop { struct lsm_prop_bpf bpf; }; +/* + * Identity of a policy object an LSM shares with BPF programs, + * embedded in the LSM's own object. @lsmid identifies the owning + * LSM; @type discriminates that LSM's policy object types, with 0 + * reserved as "unset". + */ +struct lsm_policy_object { + u64 lsmid; + u32 type; +}; + extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1]; /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c index 1433809bb166..d06744d72e04 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c @@ -56,6 +56,9 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_xfrm_decode_session) #endif BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_ismaclabel) BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security) +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_policy_object_from_fd) +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_policy_object_get) +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_policy_object_put) BTF_SET_END(bpf_lsm_disabled_hooks) /* List of LSM hooks that should operate on 'current' cgroup regardless -- 2.55.0