From: Binbin Deng <18983559317@163.com>
To: john.johansen@canonical.com, georgia.garcia@canonical.com,
paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com
Cc: ryan.lee@canonical.com, cengiz.can@canonical.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Binbin Deng <18983559317@163.com>
Subject: [PATCH security v1] apparmor: fix a use-after-free in aa_lookupn_ns()
Date: Sat, 26 Sep 2026 12:47:24 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260926044724.4187-1-18983559317@163.com> (raw)
aa_lookupn_ns() takes a reference on the namespace it finds with
aa_get_ns(),which is kref_get() on the reference count that the
namespace is released through, without checking whether the namespace
is still in use. A concurrent removal of a ":"-prefixed namespace
looks the same namespace up and only then takes the parent lock to
remove it, so the last reference can be dropped between the lookup and
the aa_get_ns() call: the reference count then reports the increment on
a zero count and the kernel classifies the following use of the object
as a use-after-free. A user with CAP_MAC_ADMIN can trigger this by
writing a ":<name>" removal and a ":<name>/<profile>" removal to
/sys/kernel/security/apparmor/.remove concurrently.
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate+0xc0/0xe0, CPU#6
Call Trace:
<TASK>
aa_lookupn_ns+0xa9/0xc0
aa_remove_profiles+0x4fb/0x730
? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x219/0x5c0
? __pfx_aa_remove_profiles+0x10/0x10
? aa_loaddata_alloc+0x65/0x1f0
? _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
? aa_loaddata_alloc+0x111/0x1f0
profile_remove+0x2ee/0x4a0
vfs_write+0x21e/0xcf0
? rcu_core+0x29c/0x1740
? timerqueue_linked_add+0x1f4/0x3d0
? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10
? mutex_lock+0x81/0xe0
? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_rcu_core+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_hrtimer_update_next_event+0x10/0x10
? mutex_unlock+0x7b/0xd0
? fdget_pos+0x24d/0x4b0
ksys_write+0xf7/0x1c0
? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10
? restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x37/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Fix by rejecting a namespace whose reference count.
Fixes: 3664268f19ea0 ("apparmor: add namespace lookup fns()")
Signed-off-by: Binbin Deng <18983559317@163.com>
---
security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h
index cc6e84151812..4f8359875476 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h
@@ -117,6 +117,22 @@ static inline struct aa_ns *aa_get_ns(struct aa_ns *ns)
return ns;
}
+/**
+ * aa_get_ns_not0 - increment references count on @ns found via lookup
+ * @ns: namespace to increment reference count of (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to @ns, if @ns is NULL returns NULL,
+ * NULL if @ns is being freed
+ * Requires: @ns must be held with valid refcount when called
+ */
+static inline struct aa_ns *aa_get_ns_not0(struct aa_ns *ns)
+{
+ if (ns && aa_get_profile_not0(ns->unconfined))
+ return ns;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
/**
* aa_put_ns - decrement refcount on @ns
* @ns: namespace to put reference of
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
index 5a907a875d8f..ae9168c1a85e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ struct aa_ns *aa_lookupn_ns(struct aa_ns *view, const char *name, size_t n)
struct aa_ns *ns = NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
- ns = aa_get_ns(__aa_lookupn_ns(view, name, n));
+ ns = aa_get_ns_not0(__aa_lookupn_ns(view, name, n));
rcu_read_unlock();
return ns;
--
2.43.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-09-26 4:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-26 4:47 Binbin Deng [this message]
2026-09-26 5:01 ` [PATCH security v1] apparmor: fix a use-after-free in aa_lookupn_ns() sashiko-bot
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-09-23 5:46 Binbin Deng
2026-09-23 5:56 ` sashiko-bot
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260926044724.4187-1-18983559317@163.com \
--to=18983559317@163.com \
--cc=cengiz.can@canonical.com \
--cc=georgia.garcia@canonical.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=ryan.lee@canonical.com \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox