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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] security: safesetid: use real GID for GID policy lookup
Date: Sat, 03 Oct 2026 10:39:50 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261003103950.754C41F0089B@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d7e10b50556ab3b79c7132018249f6f7c608411b.1791023194.git.tjdqudcks0424@naver.com>

> From: Sung Byeongchan <tjdqudcks0424@naver.com>
> 
> SafeSetID policies constrain the ID transitions available to a task for
> each source ID.  id_permitted_for_cred() always builds that source key
> from the old real UID, even when it is checking a GID transition.  If the
> real UID and real GID differ, the policy attached to the real GID is
> therefore missed and the lookup can return the unconstrained default.
> 
> On current mainline, a test task with real UID 1000, real GID 2000 and
> only CAP_SETGID obtained non-allowlisted GID 2002 despite a 2000:2001 GID
> policy.  The bypass reproduced for setgid(), setegid(), setregid(),
> setresgid(), setfsgid() and setgroups() across three clean QEMU boots,
> and enabled access to a synthetic group-protected resource.  This shows
> a SafeSetID GID policy bypass and group privilege expansion; it does not
> show direct UID 0 elevation or a universal local privilege escalation.
> 
> Build the source key from the old real UID for UID policy checks and the
> old real GID for GID policy checks.  In three fixed-kernel boots, all
> tested non-allowlisted transitions were blocked while the allowed target,
> existing-ID, no-policy and UID-policy controls, and the existing SafeSetID
> selftest continued to pass.
> 
> Fixes: 5294bac97e12 ("LSM: SafeSetID: Add GID security policy handling")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Assisted-by: OpenAI Codex
> Signed-off-by: Sung Byeongchan <tjdqudcks0424@naver.com>

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. It looks great!

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/cover.1791023194.git.tjdqudcks0424@naver.com?part=1


  reply	other threads:[~2026-10-03 10:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-03 10:34 [PATCH 0/2] SafeSetID: use real GID for GID policy lookups tjdqudcks0424
2026-10-03 10:34 ` [PATCH 1/2] security: safesetid: use real GID for GID policy lookup tjdqudcks0424
2026-10-03 10:39   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-10-04 22:05   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2026-10-03 10:34 ` [PATCH 2/2] selftests/safesetid: test GID policy with mismatched real IDs tjdqudcks0424
2026-10-03 10:44   ` sashiko-bot

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