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From: "Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] landlock: Fix superblock use-after-free in release_inode()
Date: Tue,  6 Oct 2026 12:58:47 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261006105847.2541190-1-gnoack@google.com> (raw)

Without this fix, release_inode() (task 1) can race with a umount operation in
hook_sb_delete() (task 2).  The order of operations in which the race occurs is:

* task 2: hook_sb_delete() arrives at the end of the function, waiting for
  landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs to become zero.
* task 1: release_inode(): does atomic_long_dec_and_test(), decrementing
  inode_refs to zero.
* task 2: gets woken up through some other means, sees that inode_refs is
  zero and returns.  The caller is the unmount operation and proceeds to
  release the superblock.
* task 1: Runs wake_up_var(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs),
  *dereferencing the sb_security on the freed-up superblock*.

Notably, wake_up_var() does not dereference the pointer passed to it, and
only uses it to determine an overapproximated set of tasks to wake up. So
while it's potentially possible for an attacker to provide a different
value for that pointer, this only results in the wrong set of tasks getting
woken up, and in this scenario, no further tasks are actually waiting.

Nevertheless, KASAN detects it as a slab-use-after-free read on
sb->s_security:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in release_inode+0x196/0x290
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff888103b6c0a8 by task repro/217
   release_inode+0x196/0x290
   landlock_put_object+0x71/0x90
   landlock_free_rules+0x38/0xc0
   landlock_put_ruleset+0x47/0x130
   fop_ruleset_release+0x33/0x40
   __fput+0x305/0x780
  Freed by task 54:
   kfree+0x11c/0x390
   process_scheduled_works+0x766/0xe50
   worker_thread+0x7bc/0xb20

The fix is to determine &landlock_superblock(inode->i_sb)->inode_refs only once
earlier in release_inode(), and later use that precalculated address for the
wake_up_var() call, without having to dereference through the superblock.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: cb2c7d1a1776 ("landlock: Support filesystem access-control")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
---
 security/landlock/fs.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index cab43892ec2f..0959e9f487e6 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ static void release_inode(struct landlock_object *const object)
 	__releases(object->lock)
 {
 	struct inode *const inode = object->underobj;
-	struct super_block *sb;
+	atomic_long_t *inode_refs;
 
 	if (!inode) {
 		spin_unlock(&object->lock);
@@ -77,8 +77,8 @@ static void release_inode(struct landlock_object *const object)
 	 * Makes sure that if the filesystem is concurrently unmounted,
 	 * hook_sb_delete() will wait for us to finish iput().
 	 */
-	sb = inode->i_sb;
-	atomic_long_inc(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs);
+	inode_refs = &landlock_superblock(inode->i_sb)->inode_refs;
+	atomic_long_inc(inode_refs);
 	spin_unlock(&object->lock);
 	/*
 	 * Because object->underobj was not NULL, hook_sb_delete() and
@@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ static void release_inode(struct landlock_object *const object)
 	 */
 
 	iput(inode);
-	if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs))
-		wake_up_var(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs);
+	if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(inode_refs))
+		wake_up_var(inode_refs);
 }
 
 static const struct landlock_object_underops landlock_fs_underops = {
-- 
2.56.0.rc1.315.gc6ed9934b7-goog


             reply	other threads:[~2026-10-06 10:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-06 10:58 Günther Noack [this message]
2026-10-06 11:08 ` [PATCH] landlock: Fix superblock use-after-free in release_inode() sashiko-bot

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