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Wed, 21 Oct 2026 13:37:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: from toxicpanda.com ([153.61.196.245]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 6a1803df08f44-91c10cf9f32sm33269736d6.45.2026.10.21.13.37.38 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 21 Oct 2026 13:37:38 -0700 (PDT) From: Josef Bacik Subject: [PATCH v3 0/5] capabilities: close the ways around the CAP_SETFCAP rule for uid 0 Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 20:37:24 +0000 Message-Id: <20261021-b4-setfcap-userns-v3-0-97c7ed4e43e1@toxicpanda.com> X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-B4-Tracking: v=1; b=H4sIAIUi2WoC/33OTQ6CMBAF4KuQrq20pRZ05T2Mi/4MUqMtaYFgC HeX4kajcfkm8768CUUIFiI6ZBMKMNhovVtCscmQbqS7ALZmyYgRJighAiuOI3S1li3ul66L2Ii CVjtZUA0FWnptgNqOq3k6v3Ls1RV0l6D0oWQErIJ0ukmnW5srnq/HTzr9NjZ2PjzWgQNN5r8tA 8UE17yEEowQpGTHzo9Wt9IZudX+jtKggb0xlP9iWGKk5obuWUVN+cXM8/wE4BaoqTwBAAA= X-Change-ID: 20261006-b4-setfcap-userns-d63185a31ce3 To: Serge Hallyn , Paul Moore , Christian Brauner Cc: James Morris , David Howells , Jarkko Sakkinen , "Andrew G. Morgan" , Serge Hallyn , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Bradley Morgan , Josef Bacik X-Mailer: b4 0.15.2 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openssh-sha256; t=1792615055; l=6973; i=josef@toxicpanda.com; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=OCTzCzF6xbrNeax8f+4+604UcNM0s0xpehQTENXnCsU=; b=U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgUBr36M/n0nWN0DNbnxwzIiCZez6MG JiruuNaSCI/zXsAAAAGcGF0YXR0AAAAAAAAAAZzaGE1MTIAAABTAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAA QCBIqv0Oyyt/6cABl719ndFj9zZPh6GDediulNkL7LmlncdSow5CWRyMHCHYuT9QLzYUPMWsOcr IZfnmHDdNvgg= X-Developer-Key: i=josef@toxicpanda.com; a=openssh; fpr=SHA256:C8kOX2QUJCMqnCX+KEeoqRAjLo9L+ELOSH2NSAJHqGA v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261006-b4-setfcap-userns-v1-0-f47e7ed66072@toxicpanda.com/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261014-b4-setfcap-userns-v2-0-fac4d19281d7@toxicpanda.com/ v2->v3: - The setns() check in 2/5 and the ptrace check in 5/5 only apply to namespaces that map the root user of an ancestor within the creator's CAP_SETFCAP, or that have no uid_map yet. Root users stored through an idmapped mount are left to whoever sets up the mount, so a root task without CAP_SETFCAP can join an ordinary "0 100000" container again (Serge, Christian). - 2/5 adds cred_may_setfcap_userns() for those two checks and cred_setfcap_reaches() for the uid_map check; nothing outside create_user_ns() calls cap_setfcap_level() directly (Serge). - Fixed the cap_setfcap_level() kernel-doc, @ns doesn't have to be the cred's namespace or below; cap_capable() is compared with != 0 (Serge). - Picked up Bradley's Reviewed-by on 1/5 and 3/5, not on 2/5, which changed. - Rebased onto current vfs.all. v1->v2: - The state lives on the user namespace now: ns->setfcap_level replaces ns->parent_could_setfcap, and cred->setfcap_level is gone (Serge, Christian). - New 2/5: setns() refuses a task whose CAP_SETFCAP doesn't reach as far up as the namespace's setfcap_level. It applies to every user namespace, not only to those that map the parent's uid 0, because of idmapped mounts (Serge, Christian). - 5/5 asks a tracer for what setns() asks for, also when the namespace doesn't map an ancestor's root user, again because of idmapped mounts. - Dropped "userns: don't let setns() lend the right to map uid 0", the setns() check covers it. Its nested case moved into 3/5, which checks the opener and the writer. - set_cred_user_ns() isn't touched anymore, so the put-before-use in userns_install() is gone (Sashiko). - Rebased onto current vfs.all. What it does now: Every user namespace gets a setfcap_level when it's created, which is how far up the creator's CAP_SETFCAP counted. If its tasks can write file capabilities for the root user of an ancestor, because the namespace maps that root user or can still map it, setns() only lets in tasks whose own CAP_SETFCAP reaches that far, and PTRACE_ATTACH asks the tracer for the same. The checks on the way to file capabilities then go by the namespace instead of the cred: a uid_map write that maps the parent's uid 0 (opener and writer), and setting security.capability. The visible difference from v1 is the setns() restriction. A task without CAP_SETFCAP can't join, or attach to tasks in, a namespace that maps the root user of an ancestor, such as host uid 0, and was created by a task that had it. A task that joins takes on the namespace's reach. Containers that don't map host uid 0, unprivileged users and anything with CAP_SETFCAP aren't affected. Testing: the v1 flows plus the setns() and ptrace cases, 41 in all, on vfs.all with and without the series. Every flow gives what's expected, and the only ones that changed from v2 are the five idmapped mount and "0 100000" container cases, which are allowed again. The pidfd, namespaces, mount_setattr and ptrace selftests give identical results with and without. The TLA+ model, which has no idmapped mounts, finds no violation with the narrower checks, and still finds the setns() bypass when the check is taken out. --- Original email (v1) --- Hello, Commit db2e718a4798 ("capabilities: require CAP_SETFCAP to map uid 0") stops a root task that has given up CAP_SETFCAP from creating a user namespace that maps uid 0 and then writing file capabilities in it that the initial namespace honours. The check only looks at the task that creates the namespace, so if somebody who did have CAP_SETFCAP created one, there are still several ways around it: - setns() into their namespace and write uid_map from inside (patch 2) - write "0 0 1" through a uid_map fd that they opened (patch 3) - setns() into a namespace of theirs that already maps uid 0 and set security.capability there, no map write needed (patch 4) - ptrace one of their tasks and have it do any of the above (patch 5) On an unmodified kernel we took a uid 0 task with CAP_SETFCAP dropped from its permitted, effective and bounding sets and, through each of these, ended up with a file that a uid 1000 user execs with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its effective set. Patch 1 adds cred->setfcap_level, which records how far up the namespace tree a task's CAP_SETFCAP reached when it entered its namespace, and patches 2-5 check it. Patch 4 is the check that closes the class, the map patches make the uid 0 map rule mean what db2e718a4798 meant it to, and patch 5 keeps ptrace from borrowing what the target is entitled to. This does change behaviour. Everything new is -EPERM: - a task that entered a namespace without CAP_SETFCAP outside can't map uid 0 of the outside or write fscaps for that root user anymore - a uid_map fd opened by a task with CAP_SETFCAP can't be used by a task without it to map uid 0 - if a privileged task maps "0 0 1" from the parent for a namespace created by a task without CAP_SETFCAP, that namespace can no longer write fscaps honoured outside - PTRACE_ATTACH and PTRACE_TRACEME fail when the tracer gave up CAP_SETFCAP and CAP_SYS_PTRACE, the target didn't, and they share a root user Rootless containers, privileged runtimes writing the map from the parent, nested unprivileged namespaces and containers that don't map host uid 0 aren't affected. The ptrace check is one compare for targets in the initial namespace and in namespaces entered without the capability. Testing: a set of flows run on the base and patched kernels, every bypass route above gets -EPERM with the series and the 16 legitimate flows behave the same. The capabilities, namespaces, ptrace, pidfd and proc selftests give the same results before and after. Thanks, Josef --- Changes in v3: - Link to v2: https://patch.msgid.link/20261014-b4-setfcap-userns-v2-0-fac4d19281d7@toxicpanda.com Changes in v2: - Link to v1: https://patch.msgid.link/20261006-b4-setfcap-userns-v1-0-f47e7ed66072@toxicpanda.com --- Josef Bacik (5): userns: record how far up CAP_SETFCAP reaches userns: don't let setns() lend CAP_SETFCAP userns: check the opener and the writer before mapping uid 0 capabilities: limit fscaps to where CAP_SETFCAP reaches capabilities: don't let ptrace borrow CAP_SETFCAP include/linux/capability.h | 7 ++ include/linux/user_namespace.h | 7 +- kernel/user_namespace.c | 37 ++++++--- security/commoncap.c | 167 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 202 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 2c3ba1f1cb416b81d617b92a24a4bcaa48d574e3 change-id: 20261006-b4-setfcap-userns-d63185a31ce3