From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1794456195; b=3T3RB94BTRmndxsOBkVrx26WztWfxJ3093T83Z8al8is7Ktx4j2cI6Yu/EtVJzlTAJ0a eI1vmy0Y2Ulcn8GTp/AKxZQVisAsln/rSHDCAQxvDjzDYasRJdeecN3CZ/dDJ6oxn4eJf 3j6lIBVTX3stPRLxu6HURO4xUfUaOecj9RK978ic+lPZmr1nNSzUdgrZHPgzwlTl0bh2Y Day5DEg1HUp2Co5zEI0opa5+6m3c287f3fRHuh9wgoDvzlXZu007Ml7RXewQPbmOnKIKX UnxD6s8KozDHbHZCVH4orwBysqnO+CpFVcUBAqN4xJ59lZWus1f7xebtNoBAYrzcOYQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1794456195; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=0tB8T/8/Vf4fFGUJiMpqK6eVISBvnS8fXk8P1RE1vVo=; b=oGFoWMLD8Ey5SFd5mz8QnkY4o/sTSSbnp+GaBNRQpXMIJw6QGgpdaXD3qDNIzjvYJdQr 9VxXdQsDkMB5qZzts4etDIp0Q8+rdSmJzHXo3wuw90l5V4z+yiXyCBNEu/hnMTJgbUwUw /u5LW+SsxNbr33bHq/C0IIpa46C4p1Kmu2Xhx3rqEv16WETcnWhF5DWXoVS7pHBEdYIvY zoBu/T0ZYDufR5bC0VVlrKbnY9zhpIesN3bsTRk/bkSlLyucbVm6yS6n0vQZGDJALIOai YhMDqaYOr3Jt0irLgrscBirafvzXVoB7Q5cxbzUEYSXkGo1EO469xJnwI/K4UbLBsgg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=gEAMwwna; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPS id 7C5C6606A8B0; Thu, 12 Nov 2026 04:03:14 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=gEAMwwna Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPSA id 140C51F00A0E; Thu, 12 Nov 2026 04:03:14 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1794456194; bh=0tB8T/8/Vf4fFGUJiMpqK6eVISBvnS8fXk8P1RE1vVo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=gEAMwwnaYqX34fFI1L6cLOgpLKyR0LusNxBdzSFD2PFn3/D66z2E+fIb93s03ZKeg 3soPSyqrDicFKlqxQiYwmyjd9MPBl8YdCsAZZlFrrQtCoOY/WIX9atxv4c1w8Gvika /tqIFl3e2KHABXoDZAzTEozewk7TbBMRFRX1Jv8s79PrFgmuTf3U0ZKzL0N2UUlEUC 81PGWvdIJuuJOVAPDzE+AYGDGHo6Zls7WXw1xXo7UJ9cNLuKIlrr3WD7hB0n9Q8ij9 zHtWijfT9mUmDk43yUc1kHSwjC/7Gd4WbAYAYJ0OHf0L6Q/wTwdZKhR02g7dyxlDev ousSHbuqhBhDw== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: David Howells Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, Alexander Gordeev , Anna Schumaker , Bharath SM , Christian Borntraeger , "David S. Miller" , Eric Biggers , Eric Dumazet , Heiko Carstens , Jakub Kicinski , James Bottomley , James Morris , Marc Dionne , Mimi Zohar , Namjae Jeon , Paolo Abeni , Paul Moore , Paulo Alcantara , Ronnie Sahlberg , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Shyam Prasad N , Simon Horman , Sumit Garg , Sven Schnelle , Tom Talpey , Trond Myklebust , Vasily Gorbik , stable@vger.kernel.org, Sumit Garg Subject: [PATCH v6 07/13] KEYS: trusted: TEE: Synchronize session lifetime Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 06:02:36 +0200 Message-ID: <20261112040242.247168-8-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.47.3 In-Reply-To: <20261112040242.247168-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20261112040242.247168-1-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The parent TEE device can remove the client device while live instances keep trusted.ko loaded. Guard session context state with a mutex, publish pvt_data.dev before registering key_type_trusted and sanitize pvt_data on probe failure and removal. When an active TEE has not been bound, reject seal, unseal and get_random with -ENODEV. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.15+ Fixes: 0a95ebc91305 ("KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys") Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c index 6e465c8bef5e..ad9c7baddcef 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -56,6 +57,8 @@ struct trusted_key_tee_private { }; static struct trusted_key_tee_private pvt_data; +/* Do not hold this mutex across key type registration or unregistration. */ +static DEFINE_MUTEX(trusted_key_tee_mutex); /* * Have the TEE seal(encrypt) the symmetric key @@ -67,6 +70,12 @@ static int trusted_tee_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) struct tee_param param[4]; struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL; + mutex_lock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex); + if (!pvt_data.ctx) { + ret = -ENODEV; + goto out_unlock; + } + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); @@ -74,7 +83,8 @@ static int trusted_tee_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) sizeof(p->key) + sizeof(p->blob)); if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) { dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "shm register failed\n"); - return PTR_ERR(reg_shm); + ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm); + goto out_unlock; } inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_SEAL; @@ -100,7 +110,8 @@ static int trusted_tee_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) } tee_shm_free(reg_shm); - +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex); return ret; } @@ -114,6 +125,12 @@ static int trusted_tee_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) struct tee_param param[4]; struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL; + mutex_lock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex); + if (!pvt_data.ctx) { + ret = -ENODEV; + goto out_unlock; + } + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); @@ -121,7 +138,8 @@ static int trusted_tee_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) sizeof(p->key) + sizeof(p->blob)); if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) { dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "shm register failed\n"); - return PTR_ERR(reg_shm); + ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm); + goto out_unlock; } inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_UNSEAL; @@ -147,7 +165,8 @@ static int trusted_tee_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) } tee_shm_free(reg_shm); - +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex); return ret; } @@ -161,13 +180,20 @@ static int trusted_tee_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) struct tee_param param[4]; struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL; + mutex_lock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex); + if (!pvt_data.ctx) { + ret = -ENODEV; + goto out_unlock; + } + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); reg_shm = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, key, key_len); if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) { dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); - return PTR_ERR(reg_shm); + ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm); + goto out_unlock; } inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM; @@ -189,7 +215,8 @@ static int trusted_tee_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) } tee_shm_free(reg_shm); - +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex); return ret; } @@ -205,50 +232,67 @@ static int optee_ctx_match(struct tee_ioctl_version_data *ver, const void *data) static int trusted_key_probe(struct tee_client_device *rng_device) { struct device *dev = &rng_device->dev; + struct tee_context *ctx; int ret; struct tee_ioctl_open_session_arg sess_arg; + mutex_lock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex); + if (pvt_data.ctx) { + ret = -EBUSY; + goto out_unlock; + } + memset(&sess_arg, 0, sizeof(sess_arg)); - pvt_data.ctx = tee_client_open_context(NULL, optee_ctx_match, NULL, - NULL); - if (IS_ERR(pvt_data.ctx)) - return -ENODEV; + ctx = tee_client_open_context(NULL, optee_ctx_match, NULL, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(ctx)) { + ret = -ENODEV; + goto out_unlock; + } memcpy(sess_arg.uuid, rng_device->id.uuid.b, TEE_IOCTL_UUID_LEN); sess_arg.clnt_login = TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL; sess_arg.num_params = 0; - ret = tee_client_open_session(pvt_data.ctx, &sess_arg, NULL); + ret = tee_client_open_session(ctx, &sess_arg, NULL); if ((ret < 0) || (sess_arg.ret != 0)) { dev_err(dev, "tee_client_open_session failed, err: %x\n", sess_arg.ret); ret = -EINVAL; goto out_ctx; } + pvt_data.ctx = ctx; pvt_data.session_id = sess_arg.session; - - ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); - if (ret < 0) - goto out_sess; - pvt_data.dev = dev; + mutex_unlock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex); - return 0; + ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); + if (!ret) + return 0; -out_sess: - tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id); + mutex_lock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex); + tee_client_close_session(ctx, pvt_data.session_id); out_ctx: - tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx); - + tee_client_close_context(ctx); + pvt_data.ctx = NULL; + pvt_data.dev = NULL; + pvt_data.session_id = 0; +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex); return ret; } static void trusted_key_remove(struct tee_client_device *dev) { unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); + + mutex_lock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex); tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id); tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx); + pvt_data.ctx = NULL; + pvt_data.dev = NULL; + pvt_data.session_id = 0; + mutex_unlock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex); } static const struct tee_client_device_id trusted_key_id_table[] = { -- 2.47.3