From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=84.16.66.169 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1794835616; b=oaOvGZo08EIoe0Xjbc2l5KB3RrPd6LiYsSKYzLvnZQD5x8EnNT+DwmENszMnOV5ZmtLX pbB2Xx+QNfdQM5Naz/4U+jZEPvWUsWaKFwpXdOLcym4OjDzkYY3EJR3pHbf92gB3ThbfO g25Uao3aKtn6zwiRMevgmthsW/8WANCh/1GYXeV0KTYaVHof1Ye0QEQUuL/BtGUQ/DeOO VJ3qKGX+LmAB6Qjfy4KzevJeEEDqmg04cRfXdNLuDkH5gVvE88ZuPGAg4dUfhpgl63uXv 5h0mjoY7Yp5AgPMvnTKvXq2tStQsRSgEjj6PrmHR+z0lZRZGi/Pu59d1sz1BTAzftgA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1794835616; h=DMARC-Filter:Received:DKIM-Signature:Received:Date:From:To:Cc: Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version:Content-Type: Content-Disposition:Content-Transfer-Encoding:In-Reply-To: X-Infomaniak-Routing; bh=TCgq84WO/3cyokOtecMji3tTMIJuIqZrzNWkIKcIx0k=; b=pb5Rc2W7gnIYFzNTj8XM0iTn7dJ6oW7t1TlOgu9oCo+v35RxUi3PvF3ubmM7DIL51mO9 iBLHWFX2DsG7OisUTg+QSmUzYsGJwh2EFyZ5aidk60E9hYsicKgoEQm9+44+mGZWpVWjP d43tHaq+nBs1AzOPTX4rSsAeyzgXuUaJvU+MzhAcrvOGB1Q+bVi/y7HOsDB3HEG0q3Lml sPuqWffflrGrVCWVA+ZRYrDQtUIGmLmOFXbjMjAa5WlfM/NWwbvCXhuw8K40rzmhm7KDw ltEr3+NGN+T0sVfbb6EZfX2z77OLE9tZilGWR/1Mclxf+HVGf5KNhpKr4SF2O/Eq3bQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none header.from=digikod.net; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=digikod.net; dkim=pass header.d=digikod.net header.i=@digikod.net header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20191114 header.b=lgj0Vnbt; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=84.16.66.169 Received: from smtp-42a9.mail.infomaniak.ch (smtp-42a9.mail.infomaniak.ch [84.16.66.169]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E51BF606A334 for ; Mon, 16 Nov 2026 13:26:52 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.4.2 smtp.subspace.kernel.org E51BF606A334 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=digikod.net Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=digikod.net Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=digikod.net header.i=@digikod.net header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20191114 header.b=lgj0Vnbt Received: from smtp-4-0001 (smtp-4-0001.mail.infomaniak.ch [10.7.10.108]) by smtp-4-3000.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4jSpYJ6zryz1L6X; Mon, 16 Nov 2026 14:26:44 +0100 (CET) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=digikod.net; s=20191114; t=1794835604; bh=TCgq84WO/3cyokOtecMji3tTMIJuIqZrzNWkIKcIx0k=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=lgj0Vnbt4KkN/1k4fsZPie+qFfCeFxZPLbG3wkr7ko1kCIzoVmZenCNH8zmdMIBwh RfhgJhZo2l1Uh6cv1mYQYahi/TcY+4Rp7RVr5cuZSJ1HIQlnQrSOdwxDJyd0FWOkUq DYZxj6QopUlCumNVJgAPkKQkCLnAs+p4bEeTx8OQ= Received: from unknown by smtp-4-0001 (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 4jSpYF0pWnzZ3j; Mon, 16 Nov 2026 14:26:41 +0100 (CET) Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 14:26:37 +0100 From: =?utf-8?Q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= To: =?utf-8?Q?G=C3=BCnther?= Noack Cc: Ada Smith , Hungyu Lin , James Morris , Josef Bacik , Paul Moore , Serge Hallyn , kernel-team@cloudflare.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/6] landlock: Fix capability restriction documentation Message-ID: <20261116.afieche0Te7E@digikod.net> References: <20261110202436.2408244-1-mic@digikod.net> <20261110202436.2408244-7-mic@digikod.net> X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <20261110202436.2408244-7-mic@digikod.net> X-Infomaniak-Routing: alpha Thanks, applied! I fixed some minor issues though, see https://git.kernel.org/mic/c/57493c3b7f449a60d1c43322158671b98684f9b1 On Tue, Nov 10, 2026 at 09:24:34PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > Some documented claims about LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE do not > hold for every capability check. Remove them instead of listing their > exceptions, and call it a permission instead of a hook. > > Cc: Günther Noack > Cc: Paul Moore > Cc: Serge Hallyn > Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions") > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün > --- > Documentation/security/landlock.rst | 8 ++++---- > Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 8 ++++---- > include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 6 +++--- > 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst > index d81f1c2cd236..98c2e7139e8d 100644 > --- a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst > +++ b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst > @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock LSM: kernel documentation > ================================== > > :Author: Mickaël Salaün > -:Date: October 2026 > +:Date: November 2026 > > Landlock's goal is to create scoped access-control (i.e. sandboxing). To > harden a whole system, this feature should be available to any process, > @@ -359,9 +359,9 @@ framework in ``log.c``, compiled under ``CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG`` > (automatically selected by ``CONFIG_AUDIT`` or ``CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS``). > > Audit records respect audit configuration, the domain's Landlock log > -flags, and ``LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED``. Tracepoints fire unconditionally, > -independent of these settings. The denial counter (``num_denials``) is > -always incremented regardless of logging configuration. > +flags, and ``LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED``. Tracepoints fire independently of > +these settings. The denial counter (``num_denials``) is > +incremented regardless of logging configuration. > > Each denial tracepoint carries a ``logged`` field reporting the > audit-logging verdict: whether the denial would be written to the audit > diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst > index 3d45b956b640..d00e94d8ed37 100644 > --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst > +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst > @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control > ===================================== > > :Author: Mickaël Salaün > -:Date: October 2026 > +:Date: November 2026 > > The goal of Landlock is to enable restriction of ambient rights (e.g. global > filesystem or network access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock > @@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ acquisition via :manpage:`open_tree(2)` / :manpage:`fsmount(2)`. Namespaces > the process is already a member of when the domain is enforced are implicitly > allowed (the process could not continue running otherwise); rules describe > which new namespace types the process may acquire. > -``LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE`` gates every exercise of a capability > +``LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE`` gates the exercise of capabilities > after the domain is enforced, regardless > of how the capability was obtained (inherited credentials, ``CLONE_NEWUSER`` > grant, ``setuid``/file-cap-bearing :manpage:`execve(2)`, etc.). Configuring > @@ -641,9 +641,9 @@ after a domain is enforced through user namespace entry or :manpage:`capset(2)`; > privileged sandboxes that did not set ``PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS`` may also gain > capabilities through :manpage:`execve(2)` of binaries with file capabilities. > In all cases, :manpage:`capget(2)` will report the credential's capability sets, > -but any denied capability will fail with ``EPERM`` when exercised. Do not rely > +but any denied capability will fail when exercised. Do not rely > on :manpage:`capget(2)` to determine whether the policy permits a given > -capability; only the actual operation will return ``EPERM`` upon denial. > +capability. > > Truncating files > ---------------- > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h > index 24510e5d8479..c9e4ce23778b 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h > @@ -622,9 +622,9 @@ struct landlock_capability_attr { > * - %LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE: Restrict the use of specific Linux > * capabilities. A process in a Landlock domain that handles this permission > * is denied from exercising capabilities that are not explicitly allowed by a > - * %LANDLOCK_RULE_CAPABILITY rule. This hook is purely restrictive: it can > - * deny capabilities that the kernel would otherwise grant, but it can never > - * grant capabilities that the kernel already denied. Support added in > + * %LANDLOCK_RULE_CAPABILITY rule. This permission is purely restrictive: it > + * can deny capabilities that the kernel would otherwise grant, but it can > + * never grant capabilities that the kernel already denied. Support added in > * Landlock ABI version 12. > */ > #define LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_NAMESPACE_USE (1ULL << 0) > -- > 2.56.0 > >