Linux Security Modules development
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Ada Smith" <adasmithgt@gmail.com>,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
	"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	"KP Singh" <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	"Matt Bobrowski" <matt@bobrowski.net>,
	"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-team@cloudflare.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/2] Fix LSM mediation of PR_SET_SECUREBITS
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 11:17:35 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261117101738.2523492-1-mic@digikod.net> (raw)

Hi,

This is series 2 of 3:

  1. fix Landlock mediation of commoncap's capability checks;
* 2. fix PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation and add focused Landlock tests;
  3. fix Landlock mediation of capabilities guarding LSM policies.

This series applies on top of series 1:
https://patch.msgid.link/20261117101157.2520463-1-mic@digikod.net

Since per-process securebits were introduced, PR_SET_SECUREBITS checks
CAP_SETPCAP with cap_capable() instead of ns_capable(), so LSMs
restricting capabilities through the capable hook (SELinux, AppArmor,
Landlock and BPF LSM programs) cannot deny it.  A task with CAP_SETPCAP
can therefore change privileged securebits, and thus how its
capabilities evolve across UID changes and execve(), without the
expected denial or audit record.

Patch 1 uses ns_capable(), as PR_CAPBSET_DROP already does, for the
changes that require CAP_SETPCAP; changes limited to the unprivileged
securebits still do not check a capability.  It applies cleanly to the
6.18 and 7.2 stable branches; older ones need a simpler adapted
backport.  Patch 2 adds a Landlock audit test that fails without patch
1.  It shares cap_test.c with series 1, which is the only reason for the
ordering.

Paul, John, Stephen, KP and Matt, please check the AppArmor, SELinux and
BPF LSM implications of exposing this CAP_SETPCAP check to the capable
hook.

Changes since v1:
https://patch.msgid.link/20261110202811.2409395-1-mic@digikod.net
- Shorten the commit message of patch 1 and check the non-change case
  separately (suggested by Serge Hallyn).
- Add Serge Hallyn's Reviewed-by.

Regards,

Mickaël Salaün (2):
  capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable()
  selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation

 security/commoncap.c                        | 45 +++++++-------
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)


base-commit: 7475ea8b58616b33c04afb976cf0fbaad9dd63fb
prerequisite-patch-id: 365071039dd2be439f67707944d12edbe1422d60
prerequisite-patch-id: 021705fb5147cdc8edcac9dbe53c06b854cf976a
prerequisite-patch-id: 1dfd782b28feeac47423e702764778031b850d6c
prerequisite-patch-id: 0bf745b08b99168d266461ef5b0b943a2b71eceb
prerequisite-patch-id: ad96449ac2b66342bdc171582d400276372ce386
prerequisite-patch-id: 39d6ce2bdfc170b545eb2d275ab781e15c9e887a
-- 
2.56.0


             reply	other threads:[~2026-11-17 10:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-17 10:17 Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2026-11-17 10:17 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable() Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:23   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 10:17 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:23   ` sashiko-bot

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20261117101738.2523492-1-mic@digikod.net \
    --to=mic@digikod.net \
    --cc=adasmithgt@gmail.com \
    --cc=apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com \
    --cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=gnoack@google.com \
    --cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
    --cc=kernel-team@cloudflare.com \
    --cc=kpsingh@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=matt@bobrowski.net \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=sergeh@kernel.org \
    --cc=stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox