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From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
	"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	"KP Singh" <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	"Matt Bobrowski" <matt@bobrowski.net>,
	"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-team@cloudflare.com, "Serge Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: [PATCH v1] lsm: Set PF_SUPERPRIV only when all mmap_addr hooks allow a mapping
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 17:56:02 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261118165603.2573289-1-mic@digikod.net> (raw)

cap_mmap_addr() sets PF_SUPERPRIV when commoncap grants CAP_SYS_RAWIO
for a mapping below vm.mmap_min_addr, before the other LSMs' mmap_addr
hooks run.  If one of them then denies the mapping (e.g. SELinux's
mmap_zero check), process accounting still reports a use of privileges.

Set the flag in security_mmap_addr() once all hooks allowed the mapping,
as ns_capable() does after security_capable().  commoncap runs first and
denies such a mapping without CAP_SYS_RAWIO, so a successful hook chain
means that the capability was used.

Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Closes: https://patch.msgid.link/avxjfHybQBcATFKV@google.com
Fixes: 9c0d90103c7e ("Capabilities: move cap_file_mmap to commoncap.c")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
 include/linux/security.h | 6 +++++-
 security/commoncap.c     | 6 +-----
 security/security.c      | 7 ++++++-
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 1e89bc1fec17..faf118b58ade 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1209,7 +1209,11 @@ static inline int security_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 
 static inline int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
-	return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+	int rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+
+	if (!rc && addr < dac_mmap_min_addr)
+		current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static inline int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 9794a594bdd9..36c7b394867d 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1471,13 +1471,9 @@ int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
+	if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr)
 		ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
 				  CAP_OPT_NONE);
-		/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
-		if (ret == 0)
-			current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
-	}
 	return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 36365fac5801..fd6717de31ad 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2687,7 +2687,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_mmap_backing_file);
  */
 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, addr);
+	int rc = call_int_hook(mmap_addr, addr);
+
+	/* commoncap granted CAP_SYS_RAWIO and no LSM denied the mapping. */
+	if (!rc && addr < dac_mmap_min_addr)
+		current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
-- 
2.56.0


             reply	other threads:[~2026-11-18 16:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-18 16:56 Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2026-11-18 17:03 ` [PATCH v1] lsm: Set PF_SUPERPRIV only when all mmap_addr hooks allow a mapping sashiko-bot

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