From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=209.85.218.69 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795084971; b=gxFAOSVhiQpOIE4J3th5XeXF+gKlzUHTIhzfgEgc724fqpnpcL1Io2N7rXTJZb7ccIZP G7Ir/ERiR+aPjaaSNLnhsxmDnUkfrZvLtSPgwAJSGIm84ajpnD198YiDGrpI81Xnad6kW YCGctvChyBDmqXdykqnt5JmhmUt77v+lEUy6+7AjvN9wGmqjFblAiXaPSMpn0KMUHhZMH l1f8SMhZVNh0gkKoTmPi+oLBkLVmR+fgbwCtvR0iN2X2Ak6DsAtHy3+okeg1AjiAZlptn mqcBa3ZjzCAfnBqKBwRtvzfJjKsiPP4wGYOghg3eOJB6etgu37X86e5AM3c8DH6iWTg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795084971; h=DMARC-Filter:Received:DKIM-Signature:X-Google-DKIM-Signature: X-Forwarded-Encrypted:X-Gm-Message-State:X-Received:Date:Mime-Version: X-Mailer:Message-ID:Subject:From:To:Cc:Content-Type; bh=vMWbbWSOkcM/Z7Vh8kox11muEBd1XkiAo3xwlvt0N24=; b=xH2nRkIKSKa581jzvK7d+EHSDIWsyqtfBRRp7dCOTH82F1UFDYxaxj0Ame9cW+8IgR1G D04xUvdhdOmmabho/v5p5NaGwN6cyjGKjMIsXLiqQmL/Yljg7Alt3u8K2q0e24zU4zkGW 6ScLXGIn6jhdK3SGn6kqnLOKDfowI946pH+9S7gwjf/TRVIifPFHOGTZriK0OACHsABaT AySbkocOG6XUTDGa6n3Xm8rFSikH/LQ4TCOUZHWoz54moz4xRDz+IpNwMOJaap8ZPd8HW 1DGObwc0l/BiZ/jxR3+IuhiobNoqX+EKt6nvEqz00hkwPtXLD00yo+0QLJugTxD8WqQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass header.from=google.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=flex--halg.bounces.google.com; dkim=pass header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20260707 header.b=oW11fiAh; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=209.85.218.69 Received: from mail-ej1-f69.google.com (mail-ej1-f69.google.com [209.85.218.69]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (128/128 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4F1A360A2605 for ; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 10:42:51 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.4.2 smtp.subspace.kernel.org 4F1A360A2605 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=reject dis=none) header.from=google.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=flex--halg.bounces.google.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key, unprotected) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20260707 header.b=oW11fiAh Received: by mail-ej1-f69.google.com with SMTP id a640c23a62f3a-c51314820bfso25167566b.1 for ; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 02:42:51 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20260707; t=1795084970; x=1795689770; darn=vger.kernel.org; h=content-type:cc:to:from:subject:message-id:mime-version:date:from :to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to:content-type; bh=vMWbbWSOkcM/Z7Vh8kox11muEBd1XkiAo3xwlvt0N24=; b=oW11fiAh1fVsy6xgq5IQLkJN98zWoYddIagqZkzDkpueCJDM5RIhtOWVt2Ibp+QeE4 vLVz/VN3IfukbMIEgIcSxtqVOJdjFTy1kTkm+xYeScSIN0agEKjQzNIglCtubHhdZahM gW2PO3wR6vduTj/PsGUzsQ16G6wt3LnAgQJ0PlyesozFr9xxEvViV95OZVtK6h8LF1uW qlrnxlMEFynQwmpWIygxK29xxqFPiAzMQbI3oAVcqzzu7lhaDtqAqhBqv4kQ6GXBoYCy WseF3F/odDo7mOODaKXMCIpmLHus2gdb4ou41qfyP4iiaDg+6kgjD2md05OsgrD+rxPp LRBw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20260707; t=1795084970; x=1795689770; h=content-type:cc:to:from:subject:message-id:mime-version:date :x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to :content-type; bh=vMWbbWSOkcM/Z7Vh8kox11muEBd1XkiAo3xwlvt0N24=; b=YswENldke8DHsyipku9pcI1KIdoRmj7AzUrNjXMaCAGW+ypv42mY2WKFpPc4sT7U7O ICvEGOfsWAYUFl9s4klGvOSMQ7TGlJigtVcF2WKuKLxoxuFGFoXxjJhV1sKxVMtrpDyD 8YU4Jo3FcddLRU5j//hM/NSnmQbY9RzaLY5zenDUmAXw5TLg4QkscUPeSs6c4TSWg2ZW j1qlM+U62bjQvbkypuzZGqy+o6gbrQmADQbEPr1OXvCk+c6rnLpDW+yhpp2GWaxnYKFG Hvk1vZKY0WQOdGterLxQVJ+ZExOn/616hEpHXFSIeGJkBuqkJqXXFdv/2giOW7EAD2mi Yq+Q== X-Forwarded-Encrypted: i=1; AL+hErEyeBfEndl5YxZ8xQ9y4S38/HFqaIkirNyI3tTIbEYQ/OoSOKbVWEHZN175qtK5kD5U4vZh74tPvFoa8kkN8iAq57RVrHk=@vger.kernel.org X-Gm-Message-State: APuU4Z/ogRMClzyZ0Ht8bQmw4cL19nadd/CSoNXUy9ugwoc/lho+Ma3K bJz8s/sJ01bgV7UkeMeTeiq5Y5gRwE4DFDz3t2f4+nFNYGYtcITCsGOJt4ainprVgulu8gjCPw= = X-Received: from ejak1.prod.google.com ([2002:a17:906:541:b0:c3f:7129:4c10]) (user=halg job=prod-delivery.src-stubby-dispatcher) by 2002:a17:906:9f8a:b0:c41:61b9:6ef6 with SMTP id a640c23a62f3a-c510e376c7dmr532576166b.27.1795084969312; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 02:42:49 -0800 (PST) Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 10:42:04 +0000 X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.1.708.g77570a6a1d-goog Message-ID: <20261119104208.782900-1-halg@google.com> Subject: [PATCH v2 0/4] userns: per-namespace capability bounding set From: "Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson" To: Christian Brauner , Serge Hallyn , Andy Lutomirski Cc: Paul Moore , James Morris , David Howells , Jarkko Sakkinen , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Randy Dunlap , "=?UTF-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl=20Sala=C3=BCn?=" , Jonathan Calmels , Jann Horn , "=?UTF-8?q?G=C3=BCnther=20Noack?=" , KP Singh , Casey Schaufler , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux.dev, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson" Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" When an unprivileged process creates a new user namespace, it is granted a full set of capabilities (CAP_FULL_SET) scoped to that namespace. While isolated to the namespace, these capabilities allow unprivileged local users to reach deep kernel subsystems (most notably networking configuration and raw sockets via CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_NET_RAW) that historically assumed a trusted caller and have accounted for a large share of local privilege escalation vulnerabilities. Many sandboxes and workloads use unprivileged user namespaces strictly for UID/GID, mount, PID, or network isolation and never need high-risk capabilities like CAP_NET_ADMIN. Likewise, system administrators, service managers, and container runtimes often want to enforce a capability ceiling across descendant user namespaces while still permitting exceptions for authorized workloads. Prior work by Jonathan Calmels [1, 2] proposed a per-thread userns capability set (cap_userns), while v1 of this series [3] proposed a capability bounding set (cap_bset) in struct user_namespace configured via a global sysctl and clone3(). During v1 review, both Christian Brauner and Andy Lutomirski had reservations about the sysctl and clone3() approach, and Andy pointed out the need to cover the single-deep container case. Christian then proposed combining per-cred cap_userns with the per-namespace cap_bset ceiling [4]. This series implements that combined approach: 1. Per-namespace cap_bset and per-cred cap_userns (Patch 1) Introduce user_namespace->cap_bset and cred->cap_userns, controlled via prctl(PR_CAP_USERNS) and SECBIT_CAP_USERNS_STRICT (named _STRICT rather than SECURE_NO_USERNS_CAP_RAISE as it also disables the default cap_permitted exemption). Clamp namespace creation, set_cred_user_ns(), and parent-owner checks in cap_capable_helper() against these ceilings. One refinement over the v1 review sketch: set_cred_user_ns() also intersects cred->cap_userns with user_ns->cap_bset on namespace entry. Since userns transitions only move downward in the hierarchy, excluded bits are permanently inert anyway. Clearing them keeps CapUns and PR_CAP_USERNS_IS_SET accurate after setns() and gives all six task capability masks a uniform user_ns->cap_bset subset invariant. 2. Ptrace and dumpability bounding (Patch 2) Require the tracee's cred_userns_bset() to be a subset of the tracer's in the same-namespace ptrace check (complementing the cross-userns owner check in cap_capable_helper()), and update cred_cap_issubset() so widening the effective userns ceiling resets mm->dumpable and pdeath_signal. 3. Introspection via /proc//status (Patch 3) Expose cred->cap_userns as CapUns in /proc//status. Leave AUDIT_CAPSET unchanged, as capset() never modifies cap_userns (matching cap_bset, where prctl() changes are covered by syscall auditing). 4. Selftests (Patch 4) Add kselftests covering PR_CAP_USERNS, CapUns, nested monotonicity, creator capability retention, SECBIT_CAP_USERNS_STRICT, setns() clamping, parent-owner bounding, ptrace restrictions, and dumpability resets. Changes in v2: - Replace the global sysctl, CLONE_NEWUSER_BSET / struct clone_args extension, and NS_USER_GET_INFO ioctl with per-cred cap_userns, prctl(PR_CAP_USERNS), SECBIT_CAP_USERNS_STRICT, and CapUns in /proc//status. - Drop CLONE_NEWNET_LOOPBACK and UNSHARE_NEWNET_LOOPBACK to handle in a separate series. - Clamp set_cred_user_ns() (including cred->cap_userns) against user_ns->cap_bset and cred_userns_bset(cred). - In cap_capable_helper(), bound implicit parent-owner capabilities by the owned namespace's cap_bset, and grant them only when that cap_bset is a subset of cred_userns_bset(cred). - Bound same-namespace ptrace checks in cap_ptrace_access_check() and cap_ptrace_traceme() and credential subset checks in cred_cap_issubset() by userns capability ceilings. - Rebase onto v7.4-rc1, preserving SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED handling in set_cred_user_ns(). - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261028221705.3915340-1-halg@google.com [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240609104355.442002-1-jcalmels@3xx0.net/ [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/978846/ [3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261028221705.3915340-1-halg@google.com/ [4] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261111-behagen-faktisch-entgegen-e2e714373895@brauner/ Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson (4): userns: introduce capability bounding set for user namespaces capability: bound ptrace and cred subset checks by userns ceilings proc: expose userns capability mask as CapUns in /proc//status selftests/capabilities: add userns capability bounding set tests Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 2 + Documentation/security/credentials.rst | 12 +- fs/proc/array.c | 4 +- include/linux/cred.h | 22 + include/linux/user_namespace.h | 12 + include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 7 + include/uapi/linux/securebits.h | 16 +- init/init_task.c | 1 + kernel/cred.c | 13 +- kernel/user.c | 1 + kernel/user_namespace.c | 33 +- security/commoncap.c | 80 +- security/keys/process_keys.c | 1 + .../testing/selftests/capabilities/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/capabilities/Makefile | 2 +- .../capabilities/userns_bounding_set_test.c | 1064 +++++++++++++++++ 16 files changed, 1246 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/capabilities/userns_bounding_set_test.c base-commit: 6628e7d4c6b25c8d18f1345e3a20d21829aae7e4 -- 2.56.1.708.g77570a6a1d-goog