From: "Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson" <halg@google.com>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Jonathan Calmels" <jcalmels@3xx0.net>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
"KP Singh" <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
containers@lists.linux.dev, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson" <halg@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/4] proc: expose userns capability mask as CapUns in /proc/<pid>/status
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 10:42:07 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261119104208.782900-4-halg@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261119104208.782900-1-halg@google.com>
Render cred->cap_userns as CapUns in /proc/<pid>/status alongside other
capability masks, allowing userspace tools to inspect a task's userns
capability mask directly.
Document the new field in Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst.
Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson <halg@google.com>
---
Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 2 ++
fs/proc/array.c | 4 +++-
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
index fa7a468e8edf..9cf45810e41c 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
@@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ read the file /proc/PID/status::
CapEff: 0000000000000000
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
CapAmb: 0000000000000000
+ CapUns: ffffffffffffffff
NoNewPrivs: 0
Seccomp: 0
Speculation_Store_Bypass: thread vulnerable
@@ -286,6 +287,7 @@ It's slow but very precise.
CapEff bitmap of effective capabilities
CapBnd bitmap of capabilities bounding set
CapAmb bitmap of ambient capabilities
+ CapUns bitmap of userns capabilities
NoNewPrivs no_new_privs, like prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIV, ...)
Seccomp seccomp mode, like prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, ...)
Speculation_Store_Bypass speculative store bypass mitigation status
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index f6f75d206762..2b86673aae00 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
{
const struct cred *cred;
kernel_cap_t cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_effective,
- cap_bset, cap_ambient;
+ cap_bset, cap_ambient, cap_userns;
rcu_read_lock();
cred = __task_cred(p);
@@ -320,6 +320,7 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
cap_effective = cred->cap_effective;
cap_bset = cred->cap_bset;
cap_ambient = cred->cap_ambient;
+ cap_userns = cred->cap_userns;
rcu_read_unlock();
render_cap_t(m, "CapInh:\t", &cap_inheritable);
@@ -327,6 +328,7 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
render_cap_t(m, "CapEff:\t", &cap_effective);
render_cap_t(m, "CapBnd:\t", &cap_bset);
render_cap_t(m, "CapAmb:\t", &cap_ambient);
+ render_cap_t(m, "CapUns:\t", &cap_userns);
}
static inline void task_seccomp(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
--
2.56.1.708.g77570a6a1d-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-19 10:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-19 10:42 [PATCH v2 0/4] userns: per-namespace capability bounding set Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 10:42 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] userns: introduce capability bounding set for user namespaces Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 11:11 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19 10:42 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] capability: bound ptrace and cred subset checks by userns ceilings Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 10:51 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19 10:42 ` Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson [this message]
2026-11-19 10:46 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] proc: expose userns capability mask as CapUns in /proc/<pid>/status sashiko-bot
2026-11-19 10:42 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] selftests/capabilities: add userns capability bounding set tests Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 10:47 ` sashiko-bot
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