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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alex@amutable.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	Neal Gompa <neal@gompa.dev>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>,
	Zygmunt Krynicki <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v5 05/25] mount: Enforce mount_too_revealing() for foreign mntns
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2026 02:08:24 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261121000844.1863324-6-jarkko@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261121000844.1863324-1-jarkko@kernel.org>

mount_too_revealing() skips visibility checks whenever
current->nsproxy->mnt_ns belongs to init_user_ns, assuming the caller
holds CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its current mount namespace. That assumption does
not hold when an unprivileged caller creates mounts for a child user
namespace while running in init_mnt_ns or another foreign mount
namespace.

Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in init_user_ns before bypassing
mount_too_revealing() for init_mnt_ns, reject chrooted callers lacking
CAP_SYS_ADMIN in their current mount namespace, and treat existing
mounts and child overmounts in a foreign mount namespace as locked
during mnt_already_visible() checks.

Co-developed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
 fs/namespace.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 781380945d78..b2dc84c0d0d6 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -6582,6 +6582,7 @@ static bool mnt_already_visible(struct mnt_namespace *ns,
 				const struct super_block *sb,
 				int *new_mnt_flags)
 {
+	bool foreign_ns = !ns_capable_noaudit(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
 	int new_flags = *new_mnt_flags;
 	struct mount *mnt;
 
@@ -6606,11 +6607,16 @@ static bool mnt_already_visible(struct mnt_namespace *ns,
 			continue;
 
 		/* A local view of the mount flags */
-		mnt_flags = mnt->mnt.mnt_flags;
+		mnt_flags = READ_ONCE(mnt->mnt.mnt_flags);
 
 		/* Don't miss readonly hidden in the superblock flags */
 		if (sb_rdonly(mnt->mnt.mnt_sb))
 			mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_READONLY;
+		if (foreign_ns) {
+			if (mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY)
+				mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_READONLY;
+			mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_ATIME;
+		}
 
 		/* Verify the mount flags are equal to or more permissive
 		 * than the proposed new mount.
@@ -6629,7 +6635,7 @@ static bool mnt_already_visible(struct mnt_namespace *ns,
 		list_for_each_entry(child, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) {
 			struct inode *inode = child->mnt_mountpoint->d_inode;
 			/* Only worry about locked mounts */
-			if (!(child->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED))
+			if (!foreign_ns && !(READ_ONCE(child->mnt.mnt_flags) & MNT_LOCKED))
 				continue;
 			/* Is the directory permanently empty? */
 			if (!is_empty_dir_inode(inode))
@@ -6650,13 +6656,18 @@ static bool mount_too_revealing(const struct super_block *sb, int *new_mnt_flags
 	struct mnt_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns;
 	unsigned long s_iflags;
 
-	if (ns->user_ns == &init_user_ns)
-		return false;
-
 	/* Can this filesystem be too revealing? */
 	if (!(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_MOUNT_RESTRICTED))
 		return false;
 
+	if (ns->user_ns == &init_user_ns &&
+	    ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return false;
+
+	if (!ns_capable_noaudit(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
+	    current_chrooted())
+		return true;
+
 	s_iflags = sb->s_iflags;
 	if ((s_iflags & required_iflags) != required_iflags) {
 		WARN_ONCE(1, "Expected s_iflags to contain 0x%lx\n",
-- 
2.47.3


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-21  0:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-21  0:08 [RFC PATCH v5 00/25] rootns: fd-bound process closures Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 01/25] userns: Factor out idmap validation and commit helpers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 02/25] userns: Add userns_set_idmap() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 03/25] arch: Wire up " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 04/25] mount: Add mnt_ns_get_root() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 06/25] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 07/25] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 08/25] userns: Factor out install_user_ns_cred() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 09/25] nsfs: Add nsproxy_open_namespace() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 10/25] nsproxy: Pass nsproxy to create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 11/25] rootns: Add core infrastructure for root namespaces Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 12/25] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 13/25] rootns: Add rootns() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 14/25] rootns: Add ROOTNS_WAIT ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:17   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:18     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  1:09       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 15/25] rootns: Add ROOTNS_KILL ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 16/25] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS in clone3() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 17/25] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 18/25] proc: Implement ->set_rootns() fs_context operation Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 19/25] ipc/mqueue: " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 20/25] security: Add rootns LSM hooks Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 21/25] bpf: Register " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 22/25] arch: Wire up rootns() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 23/25] docs: Document root namespace uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 24/25] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 25/25] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for ROOT NAMESPACE Jarkko Sakkinen

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