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From: labbott@redhat.com (Laura Abbott)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: arm64 physmap (was Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory)
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2018 12:13:36 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <213effab-f0d0-cfc5-8feb-c72eed8ae0aa@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKv+Gu8CNGFKLhX2XRuesn3n3k5P2bYS8qKWTTNXGFnr7SUVUA@mail.gmail.com>

On 02/14/2018 11:28 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 14 February 2018 at 19:06, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote:
>> On 02/13/2018 01:43 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:09 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> No, arm64 doesn't fixup the aliases, mostly because arm64 uses larger
>>>> page sizes which can't be broken down at runtime. CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING
>>>> does use 4K pages which could be adjusted at runtime. So yes, you are
>>>> right we would have physmap exposure on arm64 as well.
>>>
>>>
>>> Errr, so that means even modules and kernel code are writable via the
>>> arm64 physmap? That seems extraordinarily bad. :(
>>>
>>> -Kees
>>>
>>
>> (adding linux-arm-kernel and changing the subject)
>>
>> Kernel code should be fine, if it isn't that is a bug that should be
>> fixed.
> 
> We take care to ensure that the linear alias of the core kernel's
> .text and .rodata segments are mapped read-only. When we first moved
> the kernel out of the linear region, we did not map it there at all
> anymore, but that broke hibernation so we had to put something back.
> 
>> Modules yes are not fully protected. The conclusion from past
>> experience has been that we cannot safely break down larger page sizes
>> at runtime like x86 does. We could theoretically
>> add support for fixing up the alias if PAGE_POISONING is enabled but
>> I don't know who would actually use that in production. Performance
>> is very poor at that point.
>>
> 
> As long as the linear alias of the module is mapped down to pages, we
> should be able to tweak the permissions. I take it that PAGE_POISONING
> does more than just that?
> 

Page poisoning does exactly that. The argument I was trying to make
was that if nobody really uses page poisoning except for debugging
it might not be worth it to fix up the alias. Thinking a bit more,
this is a terrible argument for many reasons so yes I agree that
we can just fix up the alias if PAGE_POISONING (or other features)
are enabled.

Thanks,
Laura
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  reply	other threads:[~2018-02-14 20:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-24 17:56 [RFC PATCH v11 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 19:10   ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2018-01-25 11:59     ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-25 15:14       ` Boris Lukashev
2018-01-25 15:38         ` Jerome Glisse
2018-01-26 12:28           ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-26 16:36             ` Boris Lukashev
2018-01-30 13:46               ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-26  5:35     ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-01-26 11:46       ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-02 18:39       ` Christopher Lameter
2018-02-03 15:38         ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-03 19:57           ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-03 20:12             ` Boris Lukashev
2018-02-03 20:32               ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-03 22:29                 ` Boris Lukashev
2018-02-04 15:05                   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 23:27                     ` Kees Cook
2018-02-13  0:40                       ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-13  1:25                         ` Kees Cook
2018-02-13  3:39                           ` Jann Horn
2018-02-13 16:09                             ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-13 21:43                               ` Kees Cook
2018-02-14 19:06                                 ` arm64 physmap (was Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory) Laura Abbott
2018-02-14 19:28                                   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-14 20:13                                     ` Laura Abbott [this message]
2018-02-14 19:29                                   ` Kees Cook
2018-02-14 19:35                                     ` Kees Cook
2018-02-20 16:28                                     ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-21 22:22                                       ` Kees Cook
2018-02-14 19:48                                   ` Kees Cook
2018-02-14 22:13                                     ` Tycho Andersen
2018-02-14 22:27                                       ` Kees Cook
     [not found]                         ` <5a83024c.64369d0a.a1e94.cdd6SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2018-02-13 18:10                           ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory Laura Abbott
2018-02-20 17:16                             ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-21 22:37                               ` Kees Cook
2018-02-05 15:40           ` Christopher Lameter
2018-02-09 11:17             ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-26 19:41   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 5/6] Documentation for Pmalloc Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 19:14   ` Ralph Campbell
2018-01-25  7:53     ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 6/6] Pmalloc: self-test Igor Stoppa

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