From: dhowells@redhat.com (David Howells)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: fix refcount_inc() on zero
Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 13:20:44 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <26155.1496233244@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1495820254-6651-1-git-send-email-mark.rutland@arm.com>
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> This patch uses refcount_inc_not_zero() to perform the peek and
> increment atomically.
I think the helper is unnecessary. Better to adjust the comment if you really
want to explain it. Anyone editing the code should be that this is inside a
critical section.
> A helper with lockdep annotation is added to document why this is safe.
This doesn't explain why this is safe.
> + /*
> + * Pretend it doesn't exist if it is awaiting deletion. This races with
> + * key_put(), but we can peek at the key until we drop key_serial_lock.
> */
With your change, there is no race with key_put() - so the second sentence is
unnecessary.
I've adjusted your patch - see attached.
David
---
commit f66bf831c45306ebbc28aecd407e238983457251
Author: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Date: Fri May 26 18:37:34 2017 +0100
KEYS: fix refcount_inc() on zero
If a key's refcount is dropped to zero between key_lookup() peeking at
the refcount and subsequently attempting to increment it, refcount_inc()
will see a zero refcount. Here, refcount_inc() will WARN_ONCE(), and
will *not* increment the refcount, which will remain zero.
Once key_lookup() drops key_serial_lock, it is possible for the key to
be freed behind our back.
This patch uses refcount_inc_not_zero() to perform the peek and increment
atomically.
Fixes: fff292914d3a2f1e ("security, keys: convert key.usage from atomic_t to refcount_t")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 455c04d80bbb..d84ee2a87da6 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -660,14 +660,11 @@ struct key *key_lookup(key_serial_t id)
goto error;
found:
- /* pretend it doesn't exist if it is awaiting deletion */
- if (refcount_read(&key->usage) == 0)
- goto not_found;
-
- /* this races with key_put(), but that doesn't matter since key_put()
- * doesn't actually change the key
+ /* A key is allowed to be looked up only if someone still owns a
+ * reference to it - otherwise it's awaiting the gc.
*/
- __key_get(key);
+ if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&key->usage))
+ goto not_found;
error:
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-05-31 12:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-05-26 17:37 [PATCH] KEYS: fix refcount_inc() on zero Mark Rutland
2017-05-26 19:05 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-31 12:20 ` David Howells [this message]
2017-05-31 12:39 ` Mark Rutland
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