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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [GIT PULL] selinux/selinux-pr-20240814
Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2024 11:32:08 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <30fc5b38165e4eda57d640eca76b7df1@paul-moore.com> (raw)

Linus,

Three SELinux fixes for v6.11-rcX:

- Fix a xperms counting problem where we adding to the xperms count
  even if we failed to add the xperm.

- Propogate errors from avc_add_xperms_decision() back to the caller
  so that we can trigger the proper cleanup and error handling.

- Revert our use of vma_is_initial_heap() in favor of our older logic
  as vma_is_initial_heap() doesn't correctly handle the no-heap case
  and it is causing issues with the SELinux process/execheap access
  control.  While the older SELinux logic may not be perfect, it
  restores the expected user visible behavior.  Hopefully we will be
  able to resolve the problem with the vma_is_initial_heap() macro
  with the mm folks, but we need to fix this in the meantime.

-Paul

--
The following changes since commit 8400291e289ee6b2bf9779ff1c83a291501f017b:

  Linux 6.11-rc1 (2024-07-28 14:19:55 -0700)

are available in the Git repository at:

  https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git
    tags/selinux-pr-20240814

for you to fetch changes up to 05a3d6e9307250a5911d75308e4363466794ab21:

  selinux: revert our use of vma_is_initial_heap()
    (2024-08-08 16:22:47 -0400)

----------------------------------------------------------------
selinux/stable-6.11 PR 20240814

----------------------------------------------------------------
Paul Moore (1):
      selinux: revert our use of vma_is_initial_heap()

Zhen Lei (2):
      selinux: fix potential counting error in
               avc_add_xperms_decision()
      selinux: add the processing of the failure of
               avc_add_xperms_decision()

 security/selinux/avc.c   |  8 ++++++--
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 +++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--
paul-moore.com

             reply	other threads:[~2024-08-14 15:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-08-14 15:32 Paul Moore [this message]
2024-08-14 16:28 ` [GIT PULL] selinux/selinux-pr-20240814 pr-tracker-bot

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