From: "Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" <chleroy@kernel.org>
To: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: maddy@linux.ibm.com, mpe@ellerman.id.au, npiggin@gmail.com,
James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, jarkko@kernel.org,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, rnsastry@linux.ibm.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] Extend "trusted" keys to support a new trust source named the PowerVM Key Wrapping Module (PKWM)
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 2026 08:51:15 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <31dfcf7a-5b3d-406d-bdd4-c8b09f7eb1f0@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260201135930.898721-1-ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
Le 01/02/2026 à 14:59, Srish Srinivasan a écrit :
> Power11 has introduced a feature called the PowerVM Key Wrapping Module
> (PKWM), where PowerVM in combination with Power LPAR Platform KeyStore
> (PLPKS) [1] supports a new feature called "Key Wrapping" [2] to protect
> user secrets by wrapping them using a hypervisor generated wrapping key.
> This wrapping key is an AES-GCM-256 symmetric key that is stored as an
> object in the PLPKS. It has policy based protections that prevents it from
> being read out or exposed to the user. This wrapping key can then be used
> by the OS to wrap or unwrap secrets via hypervisor calls.
>
> This patchset intends to add the PKWM, which is a combination of IBM
> PowerVM and PLPKS, as a new trust source for trusted keys. The wrapping key
> does not exist by default and its generation is requested by the kernel at
> the time of PKWM initialization. This key is then persisted by the PKWM and
> is used for wrapping any kernel provided key, and is never exposed to the
> user. The kernel is aware of only the label to this wrapping key.
>
> Along with the PKWM implementation, this patchset includes two preparatory
> patches: one fixing the kernel-doc inconsistencies in the PLPKS code and
> another reorganizing PLPKS config variables in the sysfs.
>
> Changelog:
>
> v6:
Seems like v5 was applied, if needed can you send followup patch ?
Christophe
>
> * Patch 1 to Patch 3:
> - Add Nayna's Tested-by tag
> * Patch 4
> - Fix build error reported by kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
> - Add Nayna's Tested-by tag
> * Patch 5
> - Add Nayna's Tested-by tag
>
> v5:
>
> * Patch 1 to Patch 3:
> - Add Nayna's Reviewed-by tag
> * Patch 4:
> - Fix build error identified by chleroy@kernel.org
> - Add Nayna's Reviewed-by tag
> * Patch 5:
> - Add Reviewed-by tags from Nayna and Jarkko
>
> v4:
>
> * Patch 5:
> - Add a per-backend private data pointer in trusted_key_options
> to store a pointer to the backend-specific options structure
> - Minor clean-up
>
> v3:
>
> * Patch 2:
> - Add Mimi's Reviewed-by tag
> * Patch 4:
> - Minor tweaks to some print statements
> - Fix typos
> * Patch 5:
> - Fix typos
> - Add Mimi's Reviewed-by tag
> * Patch 6:
> - Add Mimi's Reviewed-by tag
>
> v2:
>
> * Patch 2:
> - Fix build warning detected by the kernel test bot
> * Patch 5:
> - Use pr_debug inside dump_options
> - Replace policyhande with wrap_flags inside dump_options
> - Provide meaningful error messages with error codes
>
> Nayna Jain (1):
> docs: trusted-encryped: add PKWM as a new trust source
>
> Srish Srinivasan (5):
> pseries/plpks: fix kernel-doc comment inconsistencies
> powerpc/pseries: move the PLPKS config inside its own sysfs directory
> pseries/plpks: expose PowerVM wrapping features via the sysfs
> pseries/plpks: add HCALLs for PowerVM Key Wrapping Module
> keys/trusted_keys: establish PKWM as a trusted source
>
> .../ABI/testing/sysfs-firmware-plpks | 58 ++
> Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar | 65 --
> .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 1 +
> Documentation/arch/powerpc/papr_hcalls.rst | 43 ++
> .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 50 ++
> MAINTAINERS | 9 +
> arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h | 4 +-
> arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpks.h | 95 +--
> arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h | 1 -
> arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c | 21 +-
> arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Makefile | 2 +-
> arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c | 29 -
> arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-sysfs.c | 96 +++
> arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks.c | 688 +++++++++++++++++-
> include/keys/trusted-type.h | 7 +-
> include/keys/trusted_pkwm.h | 33 +
> security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 8 +
> security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 2 +
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 6 +-
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_pkwm.c | 190 +++++
> 20 files changed, 1207 insertions(+), 201 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-firmware-plpks
> create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-sysfs.c
> create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_pkwm.h
> create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_pkwm.c
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-27 7:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-01 13:59 [PATCH v6 0/6] Extend "trusted" keys to support a new trust source named the PowerVM Key Wrapping Module (PKWM) Srish Srinivasan
2026-02-01 13:59 ` [PATCH v6 1/6] pseries/plpks: fix kernel-doc comment inconsistencies Srish Srinivasan
2026-02-01 13:59 ` [PATCH v6 2/6] powerpc/pseries: move the PLPKS config inside its own sysfs directory Srish Srinivasan
2026-02-01 13:59 ` [PATCH v6 3/6] pseries/plpks: expose PowerVM wrapping features via the sysfs Srish Srinivasan
2026-02-01 13:59 ` [PATCH v6 4/6] pseries/plpks: add HCALLs for PowerVM Key Wrapping Module Srish Srinivasan
2026-02-01 13:59 ` [PATCH v6 5/6] keys/trusted_keys: establish PKWM as a trusted source Srish Srinivasan
2026-02-01 13:59 ` [PATCH v6 6/6] docs: trusted-encryped: add PKWM as a new trust source Srish Srinivasan
2026-02-01 22:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-02-01 15:19 ` [PATCH v6 0/6] Extend "trusted" keys to support a new trust source named the PowerVM Key Wrapping Module (PKWM) Srish Srinivasan
2026-02-27 7:51 ` Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP) [this message]
2026-02-27 8:29 ` Srish Srinivasan
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=31dfcf7a-5b3d-406d-bdd4-c8b09f7eb1f0@kernel.org \
--to=chleroy@kernel.org \
--cc=James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com \
--cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
--cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org \
--cc=maddy@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=mpe@ellerman.id.au \
--cc=nayna@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=npiggin@gmail.com \
--cc=rnsastry@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=ssrish@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox