From: stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Stefan Berger)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2] xattr: Enable security.capability in user namespaces
Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 15:19:46 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3368afe9-1e0c-6f6a-aba6-9ce26d2e45e4@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170712175357.GA32609@redhat.com>
On 07/12/2017 01:53 PM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 11:05:11AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>
> [..]
>> @@ -301,14 +721,39 @@ ssize_t
>> __vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>> void *value, size_t size)
>> {
>> - const struct xattr_handler *handler;
>> + const struct xattr_handler *handler = NULL;
>> + char *newname = NULL;
>> + int ret, userns_supt_xattr;
>> + struct user_namespace *userns = current_user_ns();
>> +
>> + userns_supt_xattr = (xattr_is_userns_supported(name, false) >= 0);
>> +
> Hi Stephan,
>
>> + do {
>> + kfree(newname);
>> +
>> + newname = xattr_userns_name(name, userns);
> ^^^
> Will name be pointing to a freed string in second iteration of loop.
Fixing for v3.
>
>> + if (IS_ERR(newname))
>> + return PTR_ERR(newname);
>> +
>> + if (!handler) {
>> + name = newname;
> Here we assign name and at the beginning of second iteration we free
> newname.
>
> Also I am not sure why do we do this assignment only if handler is NULL.
The handler shouldn't change but this optimization isn't helpful. Fixed
through this patch:
https://github.com/stefanberger/linux/commit/10828401b29a13f8c56f8fad0c0fb2690e4af878
>
> BTW, I set cap_sys_admin on a file outside usernamespace and then launched
> user namespace (mapping 1000 to 0). And then tried to do getcap on file
> and I am not seeing security.capability set by host. Not sure what am I
> doing wrong. getxattr() seems to return -ENODATA. Still debugging it.
This was a regression due to the bug in the loop. I didn't have a test
case (with runc) for it, now I do.
>
> Also, have we resovled the question of stacked filesystem like overlayfs.
> There we are switching creds to mounter's creds when doing operations on
> underlying filesystem. I am concenrned does that mean, we will get and
> return security.capability to caller in usernamespace instead of
> security.capability at uid=1000.
I would have to test this, otherwise I don't know. I'll try it out with
Docker.
Stefan
>
> Vivek
>
>> + handler = xattr_resolve_name(inode, &name);
>> + if (IS_ERR(handler)) {
>> + ret = PTR_ERR(handler);
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> + if (!handler->get) {
>> + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> + }
>> + ret = handler->get(handler, dentry, inode, name, value, size);
>> + userns = userns->parent;
>> + } while ((ret == -ENODATA) && userns && userns_supt_xattr);
>>
>> - handler = xattr_resolve_name(inode, &name);
>> - if (IS_ERR(handler))
>> - return PTR_ERR(handler);
>> - if (!handler->get)
>> - return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> - return handler->get(handler, dentry, inode, name, value, size);
>> +out:
>> + kfree(newname);
>> + return ret;
>> }
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__vfs_getxattr);
>>
> Thanks
> Vivek
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-12 19:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <1499785511-17192-1-git-send-email-stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
[not found] ` <1499785511-17192-2-git-send-email-stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-07-11 17:12 ` [PATCH v2] xattr: Enable security.capability in user namespaces Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-12 0:15 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-12 0:47 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-12 3:45 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-12 11:35 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-12 17:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-12 7:59 ` James Morris
2017-07-12 13:25 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-12 17:03 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-12 22:20 ` James Morris
2017-07-13 0:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-13 1:01 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-12 23:13 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-13 0:43 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-13 0:44 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-13 1:15 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-07-13 2:34 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-13 12:11 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-13 16:40 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-07-13 17:05 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-13 17:39 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-13 19:14 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-07-13 19:41 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-13 21:17 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-18 7:01 ` James Morris
2017-07-18 12:12 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-18 13:26 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-18 23:13 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-13 17:14 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-13 17:33 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-13 17:49 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-13 19:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-13 21:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <9a3010e5-ca2b-5e7a-656b-fcc14f7bec4e@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-07-14 0:38 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-14 11:32 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-14 12:04 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-14 12:39 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-14 13:34 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-14 15:22 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-14 17:35 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-14 18:17 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-14 18:48 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-14 18:52 ` James Bottomley
2017-07-14 20:03 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-14 20:39 ` James Bottomley
2017-07-14 21:34 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-07-14 23:22 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-14 23:29 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-14 23:53 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-14 19:29 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-07-14 19:43 ` Mimi Zohar
[not found] ` <xagsmtp2.20170714182525.6604@vmsdvm4.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-07-14 19:26 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-15 0:02 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <xagsmtp3.20170715001054.9173@uk1vsc.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-07-16 11:25 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-26 3:00 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-26 13:57 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-14 17:36 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-14 19:22 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-13 21:21 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-13 21:13 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-12 17:53 ` Vivek Goyal
2017-07-12 19:19 ` Stefan Berger [this message]
2017-07-14 23:41 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-15 21:27 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-17 18:58 ` Vivek Goyal
2017-07-17 20:50 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-18 11:48 ` Vivek Goyal
2017-07-18 12:05 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-18 12:30 ` Vivek Goyal
2017-07-18 12:36 ` Vivek Goyal
2017-07-18 13:29 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-18 13:21 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-18 14:57 ` Vivek Goyal
2017-07-18 16:11 ` Stefan Berger
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