From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
To: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
serge@hallyn.com, containers@lists.linux.dev,
dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com,
mpeters@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, lsturman@redhat.com,
puiterwi@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, jamjoom@us.ibm.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
rgb@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
jmorris@namei.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 10/16] ima: Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:22:46 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <395640be-e11d-c242-9e64-9ecf7b479f86@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <60fa585b-984e-fa13-e76f-56083a726259@linux.ibm.com>
On 12/8/21 11:50, Stefan Berger wrote:
>
> On 12/8/21 07:23, Christian Brauner wrote:
>> On Wed, Dec 08, 2021 at 01:09:54PM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
>>> On Tue, Dec 07, 2021 at 03:21:21PM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
>>>> Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses in IMA
>>>> namespaces by
>>>> walking the list of IMA namespaces towards the init_ima_ns. This way
>>>> file accesses can be audited in an IMA namespace and also be evaluated
>>>> against the IMA policies of parent IMA namespaces.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>>>> 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
>>>> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
>>>> index 2121a831f38a..e9fa46eedd27 100644
>>>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
>>>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
>>>> @@ -200,10 +200,10 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
>>>> ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
>>>> }
>>>> -static int process_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns,
>>>> - struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
>>>> - u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
>>>> - enum ima_hooks func)
>>>> +static int _process_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns,
>>> Hm, it's much more common to use double underscores then single
>>> underscores to
>>>
>>> __process_measurement()
>>>
>>> reads a lot more natural to people perusing kernel code quite often.
>>>
>>>> + struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
>>>> + u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
>>>> + enum ima_hooks func)
>>>> {
>>>> struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
>>>> struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
>>>> @@ -405,6 +405,27 @@ static int process_measurement(struct
>>>> ima_namespace *ns,
>>>> return 0;
>>>> }
>>>> +static int process_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns,
>>>> + struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
>>>> + u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
>>>> + enum ima_hooks func)
>>>> +{
>>>> + int ret = 0;
>>>> + struct user_namespace *user_ns;
>>>> +
>>>> + do {
>>>> + ret = _process_measurement(ns, file, cred, secid, buf,
>>>> size, mask, func);
>>>> + if (ret)
>>>> + break;
>>>> + user_ns = ns->user_ns->parent;
>>>> + if (!user_ns)
>>>> + break;
>>>> + ns = user_ns->ima_ns;
>>>> + } while (1);
>>> I'd rather write this as:
>>>
>>> struct user_namespace *user_ns = ns->user_ns;
>>>
>>> while (user_ns) {
>>> ns = user_ns->ima_ns;
>>>
>>> ret = __process_measurement(ns, file, cred, secid, buf,
>>> size, mask, func);
>>> if (ret)
>>> break;
>>> user_ns = user_ns->parent;
>>>
>>> }
>>>
>>> because the hierarchy is only an implicit property inherited by ima
>>> namespaces from the implementation of user namespaces. In other words,
>>> we're only indirectly walking a hierarchy of ima namespaces because
>>> we're walking a hierarchy of user namespaces. So the ima ns actually
>>> just gives us the entrypoint into the userns hierarchy which the double
>>> deref writing it with a while() makes obvious.
>> Which brings me to another point.
>>
>> Technically nothing seems to prevent an ima_ns to survive the
>> destruction of its associated userns in ima_ns->user_ns?
>>
>> One thread does get_ima_ns() and mucks around with it while another one
>> does put_user_ns().
>>
>> Assume it's the last reference to the userns which is now -
>> asynchronously - cleaned up from ->work. So at some point you're ending
>> with a dangling pointer in ima_ns->user_ns eventually causing a UAF.
>>
>> If I'm thinking correct than you need to fix this. I can think of two
>> ways right now where one of them I'm not sure how well that would work:
>> 1. ima_ns takes a reference count to userns at creation. Here you need
>> to make very sure that you're not ending up with reference counting
>> cycles where the two structs keep each other alive.
>
> Right. I am not sure what the trigger would be for ima_ns to release
> that one reference.
>
>
>> 2. rcu trickery. That's the one I'm not sure how well that would work
>> where you'd need rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() with a
>> get_user_ns() in the middle whenever you're trying to get a ref to
>> the userns from an ima_ns and handle the case where the userns is
>> gone.
>>
>> Or maybe I'me missing something in the patch series that makes this all
>> a non-issue.
>
> I suppose one can always call current_user_ns() to get a pointer to
> the current user namespace that the process is accessing the file in
> that IMA now reacts to. With the hierarchical processing we are
> walking backwards towards init_user_ns. The problem should only exist
> if something else frees the current user namespace (or its parents) so
> that the hierarchy collapses. Assuming we are always in a process
> context then 'current' should protect us, no ?
>
All existing callers to process_measurements call it at least once with
current_cred().
The only problem that I see where we are accessing the IMA namespace
outside a process context is in 4/16 'ima: Move delayed work queue and
variables into ima_namespace' where a delayed work queue is used. I
fixed this now by getting an additional reference to the user namesapce
before scheduling the delayed work and release it when it ran or when it
is canceled (cancel_delayed_work_sync()) but it didn't run.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-12-08 18:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-12-07 20:21 [PATCH v4 00/16] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
2021-12-07 20:21 ` [PATCH v4 01/16] ima: Add IMA namespace support Stefan Berger
2021-12-08 11:29 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-08 11:54 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-08 14:50 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-07 20:21 ` [PATCH v4 02/16] ima: Define ns_status for storing namespaced iint data Stefan Berger
2021-12-07 20:21 ` [PATCH v4 03/16] ima: Namespace audit status flags Stefan Berger
2021-12-07 20:21 ` [PATCH v4 04/16] ima: Move delayed work queue and variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-07 20:21 ` [PATCH v4 05/16] ima: Move IMA's keys queue related " Stefan Berger
2021-12-07 20:21 ` [PATCH v4 06/16] ima: Move policy " Stefan Berger
2021-12-07 20:21 ` [PATCH v4 07/16] ima: Move ima_htable " Stefan Berger
2021-12-07 20:21 ` [PATCH v4 08/16] ima: Move measurement list related variables " Stefan Berger
2021-12-07 20:21 ` [PATCH v4 09/16] ima: Only accept AUDIT rules for IMA non-init_ima_ns namespaces for now Stefan Berger
2021-12-07 20:21 ` [PATCH v4 10/16] ima: Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses Stefan Berger
2021-12-08 12:09 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-08 12:23 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-08 16:50 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-08 18:22 ` Stefan Berger [this message]
2021-12-15 23:04 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-12-16 2:55 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-07 20:21 ` [PATCH v4 11/16] securityfs: Only use simple_pin_fs/simple_release_fs for init_user_ns Stefan Berger
2021-12-08 11:58 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-08 14:03 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-08 12:46 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-11 14:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-11 14:44 ` James Bottomley
2021-12-07 20:21 ` [PATCH v4 12/16] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support Stefan Berger
2021-12-07 20:21 ` [PATCH v4 13/16] ima: Move some IMA policy and filesystem related variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-07 20:21 ` [PATCH v4 14/16] ima: Use mac_admin_ns_capable() to check corresponding capability Stefan Berger
2021-12-08 12:40 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-07 20:21 ` [PATCH v4 15/16] ima: Move dentries into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-07 20:21 ` [PATCH v4 16/16] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-08 12:58 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-08 13:16 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-08 14:11 ` James Bottomley
2021-12-08 14:46 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-08 15:04 ` James Bottomley
2021-12-08 15:22 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-08 15:39 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-08 15:49 ` Christian Brauner
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