From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8CDA6C433F5 for ; Wed, 11 May 2022 10:47:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233477AbiEKKr3 (ORCPT ); Wed, 11 May 2022 06:47:29 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:37540 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232679AbiEKKr2 (ORCPT ); Wed, 11 May 2022 06:47:28 -0400 Received: from metis.ext.pengutronix.de (metis.ext.pengutronix.de [IPv6:2001:67c:670:201:290:27ff:fe1d:cc33]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B35654BFEC for ; Wed, 11 May 2022 03:47:26 -0700 (PDT) Received: from ptz.office.stw.pengutronix.de ([2a0a:edc0:0:900:1d::77] helo=[127.0.0.1]) by metis.ext.pengutronix.de with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1nojs0-0005aX-R8; Wed, 11 May 2022 12:47:04 +0200 Message-ID: <3a8c493b-b19c-4490-85b4-22d240bfd06e@pengutronix.de> Date: Wed, 11 May 2022 12:47:02 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/91.8.0 Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 0/7] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys Content-Language: en-US To: Michael Walle Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , =?UTF-8?Q?Horia_Geant=c4=83?= , Mimi Zohar , Pankaj Gupta , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , James Bottomley , kernel@pengutronix.de, David Howells , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Steffen Trumtrar , Jan Luebbe , David Gstir , Eric Biggers , Richard Weinberger , Franck LENORMAND , Sumit Garg , Andreas Rammhold , Tim Harvey , Matthias Schiffer , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org References: <20220506062553.1068296-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> <49e1738c55c73819ee0e2cac0be74d81@walle.cc> From: Ahmad Fatoum In-Reply-To: <49e1738c55c73819ee0e2cac0be74d81@walle.cc> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 2a0a:edc0:0:900:1d::77 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: a.fatoum@pengutronix.de X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on metis.ext.pengutronix.de); SAEximRunCond expanded to false X-PTX-Original-Recipient: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: Hello Michael, On 06.05.22 12:52, Michael Walle wrote: > Am 2022-05-06 08:25, schrieb Ahmad Fatoum: >> Series applies on top of v5.18-rc5. Would be great if this could make it >> into v5.19. >> >> v8 was here: >> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/09e2552c-7392-e1da-926b-53c7db0b118d@pengutronix.de >> >> Changelog is beneath each individual patch. Compared to v8, only code >> change is checking whether CAAM can support blobbing at init-time as >> apparently some Layerscape SoCs are available in a non-E(ncryption) >> variant that doesn't do AES. Previously, adding trusted keys on such >> SoCs would return an error with a cryptic error message. >> >> >> The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core >> built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP. >> >> Its blob mechanism can AES encrypt/decrypt user data using a unique >> never-disclosed device-specific key. >> >> There has been multiple discussions on how to represent this within the kernel: >> >> The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core >> built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP. >> >> Its blob mechanism can AES encrypt/decrypt user data using a unique >> never-disclosed device-specific key. There has been multiple >> discussions on how to represent this within the kernel: >> >>  - [RFC] crypto: caam - add red blobifier >>    Steffen implemented[1] a PoC sysfs driver to start a discussion on how to >>    best integrate the blob mechanism. >>    Mimi suggested that it could be used to implement trusted keys. >>    Trusted keys back then were a TPM-only feature. >> >>  - security/keys/secure_key: Adds the secure key support based on CAAM. >>    Udit Agarwal added[2] a new "secure" key type with the CAAM as backend. >>    The key material stays within the kernel only. >>    Mimi and James agreed that this needs a generic interface, not specific >>    to CAAM. Mimi suggested trusted keys. Jan noted that this could serve as >>    basis for TEE-backed keys. >> >>  - [RFC] drivers: crypto: caam: key: Add caam_tk key type >>    Franck added[3] a new "caam_tk" key type based on Udit's work. This time >>    it uses CAAM "black blobs" instead of "red blobs", so key material stays >>    within the CAAM and isn't exposed to kernel in plaintext. >>    James voiced the opinion that there should be just one user-facing generic >>    wrap/unwrap key type with multiple possible handlers. >>    David suggested trusted keys. >> >>  - Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support >>    Sumit reworked[4] trusted keys to support multiple possible backends with >>    one chosen at boot time and added a new TEE backend along with TPM. >>    This now sits in Jarkko's master branch to be sent out for v5.13 >> >> This patch series builds on top of Sumit's rework to have the CAAM as >> yet another >> trusted key backend. >> >> The CAAM bits are based on Steffen's initial patch from 2015. His work had been >> used in the field for some years now, so I preferred not to deviate >> too much from it. >> >> This series has been tested with dmcrypt[5] on an i.MX6Q/DL and an i.MX8M[6]. >> >> Looking forward to your feedback. > > For the whole series: > > Tested-by: Michael Walle # on ls1028a (non-E and E) Thanks! Did you test checkpatch.pl and make htmldocs/pdfdocs too or should I add the Tested-by just for the first 5 patches? Cheers, Ahmad > > -michael > -- Pengutronix e.K. | | Steuerwalder Str. 21 | http://www.pengutronix.de/ | 31137 Hildesheim, Germany | Phone: +49-5121-206917-0 | Amtsgericht Hildesheim, HRA 2686 | Fax: +49-5121-206917-5555 |