From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>,
dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH -next] evm: Use __vfs_setxattr() to update security.evm
Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2023 16:45:02 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3c34c1e8c74722110e5d7e87146b090791734916.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221228030248.94285-1-xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
On Wed, 2022-12-28 at 11:02 +0800, Xiu Jianfeng wrote:
> Currently it uses __vfs_setxattr_noperm() to update "security.evm",
> however there are two lsm hooks(inode_post_setxattr and inode_setsecurity)
> being called inside this function, which don't make any sense for xattr
> "security.evm", because the handlers of these two hooks, such as selinux
> and smack, only care about their own xattr.
Updating the security.ima hash triggers re-calculating and writing the
security.evm HMAC. Refer to evm_inode_post_setxattr().
Mimi
>
> On the other hand, there is a literally rather than actually cyclical
> callchain as follows:
> security_inode_post_setxattr
> ->evm_inode_post_setxattr
> ->evm_update_evmxattr
> ->__vfs_setxattr_noperm
> ->security_inode_post_setxattr
>
> So use __vfs_setxattr() to update "security.evm".
>
> Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
> ---
> security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 7 +++----
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 8 ++++----
> 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> index fa5ff13fa8c9..d8275dfa49ef 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> @@ -376,10 +376,9 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
> xattr_value_len, &data);
> if (rc == 0) {
> data.hdr.xattr.sha1.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
> - rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&init_user_ns, dentry,
> - XATTR_NAME_EVM,
> - &data.hdr.xattr.data[1],
> - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1, 0);
> + rc = __vfs_setxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, d_inode(dentry),
> + XATTR_NAME_EVM, &data.hdr.xattr.data[1],
> + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1, 0);
> } else if (rc == -ENODATA && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
> rc = __vfs_removexattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
> }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index ee6f7e237f2e..d2de9dc6c345 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -98,10 +98,10 @@ static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG;
> iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.algo = algo;
> }
> - rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA,
> - &iint->ima_hash->xattr.data[offset],
> - (sizeof(iint->ima_hash->xattr) - offset) +
> - iint->ima_hash->length, 0);
> + rc = __vfs_setxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, d_inode(dentry),
> + XATTR_NAME_IMA, &iint->ima_hash->xattr.data[offset],
> + (sizeof(iint->ima_hash->xattr) - offset) +
> + iint->ima_hash->length, 0);
> return rc;
> }
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-18 21:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-12-28 3:02 [PATCH -next] evm: Use __vfs_setxattr() to update security.evm Xiu Jianfeng
2023-01-18 21:45 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2023-01-30 1:53 ` Guozihua (Scott)
2023-01-31 11:31 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-02-01 6:42 ` xiujianfeng
2023-02-01 7:10 ` Guozihua (Scott)
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