From: "Adrian Ratiu" <adrian.ratiu@collabora.com>
To: "Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@google.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
kernel@collabora.com, gbiv@google.com, inglorion@google.com,
ajordanr@google.com, "Doug Anderson" <dianders@chromium.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
"Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb@kernel.org>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] proc: add config & param to block forcing mem writes
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2024 14:15:54 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3ea8c0-66aa3900-3-2bfd8e00@3451942> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wiAzuaVxhHUg2De3yWG5fgcZpCFKJptDXYdcgF-uRru4w@mail.gmail.com>
On Wednesday, July 31, 2024 02:18 EEST, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> On Tue, 30 Jul 2024 at 16:09, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > > + task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file));
> > > + if (task) {
> > > + ptrace_active = task->ptrace && task->mm == mm && task->parent == current;
> >
> > Do we need to call "read_lock(&tasklist_lock);" ?
> > see comments in ptrace_check_attach() of kernel/ptrace.c
>
> Well, technically I guess the tasklist_lock should be taken.
>
> Practically speaking, maybe just using READ_ONCE() for these fields
> would really be sufficient.
>
> Yes, it could "race" with the task exiting or just detaching, but the
> logic would basically be "at one point we were tracing it", and since
> this fundamentally a "one-point" situation (with the actual _accesses_
> happening later anyway), logically that should be sufficient.
>
> I mean - none of this is about "permissions" per se. We actually did
> the proper *permission* check at open() time regardless of all this
> code. This is more of a further tightening of the rules (ie it has
> gone from "are we allowed to ptrace" to "are we actually actively
> ptracing".
>
> I suspect that the main difference between the two situations is
> probably (a) one extra step required and (b) whatever extra system
> call security things people might have which may disable an actual
> ptrace() or whatever..
Either approach is fine with me.
Will leave v4 a few days longer in case others have a stronger
opinion or to gather & address more feedback.
If no one objects by then, I'll send v5 with READ_ONCE().
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-07-31 13:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-07-30 13:25 [PATCH v4] proc: add config & param to block forcing mem writes Adrian Ratiu
2024-07-30 23:08 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-30 23:18 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-07-31 13:15 ` Adrian Ratiu [this message]
2024-07-31 14:39 ` Christian Brauner
2024-07-31 13:48 ` Adrian Ratiu
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