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From: Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>,
	Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>,
	Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/2] ima: Fix keyrings race condition and other key related bugs
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2020 11:57:44 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <48c98a62-01f0-825b-7648-7d8fa9f13b40@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200811192621.281675-1-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>


On 8/11/20 3:26 PM, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> v2:
>   - Always return an ERR_PTR from ima_alloc_rule_opt_list() (Nayna)
>   - Add Lakshmi's Reviewed-by to both patches
>   - Rebased on commit 3db0d0c276a7 ("integrity: remove redundant
>     initialization of variable ret") of next-integrity
> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200727140831.64251-1-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com/
>
> Nayna pointed out that the "keyrings=" option in an IMA policy rule
> should only be accepted when CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is
> enabled:
>
>   https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/336cc947-1f70-0286-6506-6df3d1d23a1d@linux.vnet.ibm.com/
>
> While fixing this, the compiler warned me about the potential for the
> ima_keyrings pointer to be NULL despite it being used, without a check
> for NULL, as the destination address for the strcpy() in
> ima_match_keyring().
>
> It also became apparent that there was not adequate locking around the
> use of the pre-allocated buffer that ima_keyrings points to. The kernel
> keyring has a lock (.sem member of struct key) that ensures only one key
> can be added to a given keyring at a time but there's no protection
> against adding multiple keys to different keyrings at the same time.
>
> The first patch in this series fixes both ima_keyrings related issues by
> parsing the list of keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule at policy load time
> rather than deferring the parsing to policy check time. Once that fix is
> in place, the second patch can enforce that
> CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS must be enabled in order to use
> "func=KEY_CHECK" or "keyrings=" options in IMA policy.
>
> The new "keyrings=" value handling is done in a generic manner that can
> be reused by other options in the future. This seems to make sense as
> "appraise_type=" has similar style (though it doesn't need to be fully
> parsed at this time) and using "|" as an alternation delimiter is
> becoming the norm in IMA policy.
>
> This series is based on commit 311aa6aafea4 ("ima: move
> APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime") in
> next-integrity.
>
> Tyler
>
> Tyler Hicks (2):
>    ima: Pre-parse the list of keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule
>    ima: Fail rule parsing when asymmetric key measurement isn't
>      supportable
>
>   security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 142 +++++++++++++++++++---------
>   1 file changed, 96 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
>

Sorry for delay in responding.

The patches look good. Feel free to add my tag

Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>

Thanks & Regards,

     - Nayna





      parent reply	other threads:[~2020-08-26 15:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-08-11 19:26 [PATCH v2 0/2] ima: Fix keyrings race condition and other key related bugs Tyler Hicks
2020-08-11 19:26 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] ima: Pre-parse the list of keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule Tyler Hicks
2020-08-11 19:26 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] ima: Fail rule parsing when asymmetric key measurement isn't supportable Tyler Hicks
2020-08-24 18:44 ` [PATCH v2 0/2] ima: Fix keyrings race condition and other key related bugs Mimi Zohar
2020-08-24 18:53   ` Tyler Hicks
2020-08-26 15:57 ` Nayna [this message]

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