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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
	stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, mic@digikod.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/6] LSM: secctx provider check on release
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2024 19:39:50 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5b6addd938c9feae0b4df8f54d56f9f0@paul-moore.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241014151450.73674-6-casey@schaufler-ca.com>

On Oct 14, 2024 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> 
> Verify that the LSM releasing the secctx is the LSM that
> allocated it. This was not necessary when only one LSM could
> create a secctx, but once there can be more than one it is.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
>  security/apparmor/secid.c | 10 ++--------
>  security/selinux/hooks.c  | 10 ++--------
>  2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
> index 5d92fc3ab8b4..974f802cbe5a 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
> @@ -122,14 +122,8 @@ int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
>  
>  void apparmor_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
>  {
> -	/*
> -	 * stacking scaffolding:
> -	 * When it is possible for more than one LSM to provide a
> -	 * release hook, do this check:
> -	 * if (cp->id == LSM_ID_APPARMOR || cp->id == LSM_ID_UNDEF)
> -	 */
> -
> -	kfree(cp->context);
> +	if (cp->id == LSM_ID_APPARMOR)
> +		kfree(cp->context);

Should we set cp->context to NULL too?  One could argue that it's an
unecessary assignment, given the cp->id checks, and they wouldn't be
wrong, but considering the potential for a BPF LSM to do things with
a lsm_context, I wonder if resetting the pointer to NULL is the
smart thing to do.

This obviously applies to the SELinux code (below) too.

>  }
>  
>  /**
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 79776a5e651d..b9286c2c5efe 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -6640,14 +6640,8 @@ static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
>  
>  static void selinux_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
>  {
> -	/*
> -	 * stacking scaffolding:
> -	 * When it is possible for more than one LSM to provide a
> -	 * release hook, do this check:
> -	 * if (cp->id == LSM_ID_SELINUX || cp->id == LSM_ID_UNDEF)
> -	 */
> -
> -	kfree(cp->context);
> +	if (cp->id == LSM_ID_SELINUX)
> +		kfree(cp->context);
>  }
>  
>  static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)

--
paul-moore.com

  reply	other threads:[~2024-10-21 23:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20241014151450.73674-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2024-10-14 15:14 ` [PATCH v2 0/6] LSM: Replace secctx/len pairs with lsm_context Casey Schaufler
2024-10-14 15:14   ` [PATCH v2 1/6] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2024-10-15  3:40     ` sergeh
2024-10-21 23:39     ` Paul Moore
2024-10-21 23:58       ` Casey Schaufler
2024-10-22 16:25         ` Paul Moore
2024-10-14 15:14   ` [PATCH v2 2/6] LSM: Replace context+len with lsm_context Casey Schaufler
2024-10-14 15:14   ` [PATCH v2 3/6] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2024-10-14 15:14   ` [PATCH v2 4/6] LSM: lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
2024-10-21 23:39     ` Paul Moore
2024-10-22  0:00       ` Casey Schaufler
2024-10-22 16:35         ` Paul Moore
2024-10-22 16:46           ` Casey Schaufler
2024-10-14 15:14   ` [PATCH v2 5/6] LSM: secctx provider check on release Casey Schaufler
2024-10-21 23:39     ` Paul Moore [this message]
2024-10-22  0:05       ` Casey Schaufler
2024-10-22 16:28         ` Paul Moore
2024-10-14 15:14   ` [PATCH v2 6/6] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_notifysecctx Casey Schaufler
2024-10-14 21:29   ` [PATCH v2 0/6] LSM: Replace secctx/len pairs with lsm_context Serge E. Hallyn
2024-10-14 21:35     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-10-14 21:54       ` Casey Schaufler
2024-10-14 21:47     ` Casey Schaufler

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