From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net,
kpsingh@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 5/8] selftests/bpf: validate new bpf_map_create_security LSM hook
Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2023 11:23:25 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6436f71e.170a0220.75de.385b@mx.google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230412043300.360803-6-andrii@kernel.org>
On Tue, Apr 11, 2023 at 09:32:57PM -0700, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> Add selftests that goes over every known map type and validates that
> a combination of privileged/unprivileged modes and allow/reject/pass-through
> LSM policy decisions behave as expected.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
> ---
> .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_map_create.c | 143 ++++++++++++++++++
> .../selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_map_create.c | 32 ++++
> tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h | 6 +
> 3 files changed, 181 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_map_create.c
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_map_create.c
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_map_create.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_map_create.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..fee78b0448c3
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_map_create.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/* Copyright (c) 2023 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
> +#include "linux/bpf.h"
> +#include <test_progs.h>
> +#include <bpf/btf.h>
> +#include "cap_helpers.h"
> +#include "lsm_map_create.skel.h"
> +
> +static int drop_priv_caps(__u64 *old_caps)
> +{
> + return cap_disable_effective((1ULL << CAP_BPF) |
> + (1ULL << CAP_PERFMON) |
> + (1ULL << CAP_NET_ADMIN) |
> + (1ULL << CAP_SYS_ADMIN), old_caps);
> +}
> +
> +static int restore_priv_caps(__u64 old_caps)
> +{
> + return cap_enable_effective(old_caps, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +void test_lsm_map_create(void)
> +{
> + struct btf *btf = NULL;
> + struct lsm_map_create *skel = NULL;
> + const struct btf_type *t;
> + const struct btf_enum *e;
> + int i, n, id, err, ret;
> +
> + skel = lsm_map_create__open_and_load();
> + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "skel_open_and_load"))
> + return;
> +
> + skel->bss->my_tid = syscall(SYS_gettid);
> + skel->bss->decision = 0;
> +
> + err = lsm_map_create__attach(skel);
> + if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "skel_attach"))
> + goto cleanup;
> +
> + btf = btf__parse("/sys/kernel/btf/vmlinux", NULL);
> + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(btf, "btf_parse"))
> + goto cleanup;
> +
> + /* find enum bpf_map_type and enumerate each value */
> + id = btf__find_by_name_kind(btf, "bpf_map_type", BTF_KIND_ENUM);
> + if (!ASSERT_GT(id, 0, "bpf_map_type_id"))
> + goto cleanup;
> +
> + t = btf__type_by_id(btf, id);
> + e = btf_enum(t);
> + n = btf_vlen(t);
> + for (i = 0; i < n; e++, i++) {
> + enum bpf_map_type map_type = (enum bpf_map_type)e->val;
> + const char *map_type_name;
> + __u64 orig_caps;
> + bool is_map_priv;
> + bool needs_btf;
> +
> + if (map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_UNSPEC)
> + continue;
> +
> + /* this will show which map type we are working with in verbose log */
> + map_type_name = btf__str_by_offset(btf, e->name_off);
> + ASSERT_OK_PTR(map_type_name, map_type_name);
> +
> + switch (map_type) {
> + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY:
> + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY:
> + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY:
> + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY:
> + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY:
> + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS:
> + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH:
> + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH:
> + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS:
> + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF:
> + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF:
> + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE:
> + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE:
> + is_map_priv = false;
> + needs_btf = false;
> + break;
> + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE:
> + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE:
> + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE:
> + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE:
> + is_map_priv = true;
> + needs_btf = true;
> + break;
> + default:
> + is_map_priv = true;
> + needs_btf = false;
> + }
> +
> + /* make sure we delegate to kernel for final decision */
> + skel->bss->decision = 0;
> +
> + /* we are normally under sudo, so all maps should succeed */
> + ret = libbpf_probe_bpf_map_type(map_type, NULL);
> + ASSERT_EQ(ret, 1, "default_priv_mode");
> +
> + /* local storage needs custom BTF to be loaded, which we
> + * currently can't do once we drop privileges, so skip few
> + * checks for such maps
> + */
> + if (needs_btf)
> + goto skip_if_needs_btf;
> +
> + /* now let's drop privileges, and chech that unpriv maps are
> + * still possible to create
> + */
> + if (!ASSERT_OK(drop_priv_caps(&orig_caps), "drop_caps"))
> + goto cleanup;
> +
> + ret = libbpf_probe_bpf_map_type(map_type, NULL);
> + ASSERT_EQ(ret, is_map_priv ? 0 : 1, "default_unpriv_mode");
> +
> + /* allow any map creation for our thread */
> + skel->bss->decision = 1;
> + ret = libbpf_probe_bpf_map_type(map_type, NULL);
> + ASSERT_EQ(ret, 1, "lsm_allow_unpriv_mode");
> +
> + /* reject any map creation for our thread */
> + skel->bss->decision = -1;
> + ret = libbpf_probe_bpf_map_type(map_type, NULL);
> + ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0, "lsm_reject_unpriv_mode");
> +
> + /* restore privileges, but keep reject LSM policy */
> + if (!ASSERT_OK(restore_priv_caps(orig_caps), "restore_caps"))
> + goto cleanup;
> +
> +skip_if_needs_btf:
> + /* even with all caps map create will fail */
> + skel->bss->decision = -1;
> + ret = libbpf_probe_bpf_map_type(map_type, NULL);
> + ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0, "lsm_reject_priv_mode");
> + }
> +
> +cleanup:
> + btf__free(btf);
> + lsm_map_create__destroy(skel);
> +}
This test looks good! One meta-comment about testing would be: are you
sure each needs to be ASSERT instead of EXPECT? (i.e. should forward
progress through this test always be aborted when a check fails?)
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_map_create.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_map_create.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..093825c68459
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_map_create.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/* Copyright (c) 2023 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
> +
> +#include "vmlinux.h"
> +#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
> +#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
> +#include <errno.h>
> +
> +char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
> +
> +int my_tid;
> +/* LSM enforcement:
> + * - 0, delegate to kernel;
> + * - 1, allow;
> + * - -1, reject.
> + */
> +int decision;
> +
> +SEC("lsm/bpf_map_create_security")
> +int BPF_PROG(allow_unpriv_maps, union bpf_attr *attr)
> +{
> + if (!my_tid || (u32)bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() != my_tid)
> + return 0; /* keep processing LSM hooks */
> +
> + if (decision == 0)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (decision > 0)
> + return 1; /* allow */
> +
> + return -EPERM;
> +}
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h
> index 10ba43250668..12f9c6652d40 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h
> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ typedef __u16 __sum16;
> #include <linux/perf_event.h>
> #include <linux/socket.h>
> #include <linux/unistd.h>
> +#include <sys/syscall.h>
>
> #include <sys/ioctl.h>
> #include <sys/wait.h>
> @@ -176,6 +177,11 @@ void test__skip(void);
> void test__fail(void);
> int test__join_cgroup(const char *path);
>
> +static inline int gettid(void)
> +{
> + return syscall(SYS_gettid);
> +}
> +
> #define PRINT_FAIL(format...) \
> ({ \
> test__fail(); \
> --
> 2.34.1
>
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-12 18:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-04-12 4:32 [PATCH bpf-next 0/8] New BPF map and BTF security LSM hooks Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/8] bpf: move unprivileged checks into map_create() and bpf_prog_load() Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 17:49 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13 0:22 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 2/8] bpf: inline map creation logic in map_create() function Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 17:53 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13 0:22 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 3/8] bpf: centralize permissions checks for all BPF map types Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 18:01 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13 0:23 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 4/8] bpf, lsm: implement bpf_map_create_security LSM hook Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 18:20 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13 0:23 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 5/8] selftests/bpf: validate new " Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 18:23 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2023-04-13 0:23 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 6/8] bpf: drop unnecessary bpf_capable() check in BPF_MAP_FREEZE command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 18:24 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13 0:17 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 7/8] bpf, lsm: implement bpf_btf_load_security LSM hook Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 16:52 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-13 1:43 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-13 2:47 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-12 4:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 8/8] selftests/bpf: enhance lsm_map_create test with BTF LSM control Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 16:49 ` [PATCH bpf-next 0/8] New BPF map and BTF security LSM hooks Paul Moore
2023-04-12 17:47 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-12 18:06 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-12 18:28 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-12 19:06 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-13 1:43 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-13 2:56 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-13 5:16 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-13 15:11 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-17 23:29 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-18 0:47 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 0:00 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-18 14:21 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-21 0:00 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-21 18:57 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13 16:54 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-17 23:31 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-13 19:03 ` Jonathan Corbet
2023-04-17 23:28 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-13 16:27 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-17 23:31 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-17 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-18 0:28 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-18 0:52 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-12 18:38 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-14 20:23 ` Dr. Greg
2023-04-17 23:31 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-19 10:53 ` Dr. Greg
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