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From: "Jan Sebastian Götte" <contact@jaseg.de>
To: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>,
	"Jan Sebastian Götte" <linux@jaseg.de>
Cc: devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] mm/secretmem: zeroize secret pages before kdump
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2026 17:18:24 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <69d508db-93c1-4dac-afe3-3e3fdfb5271f@jaseg.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8bb53d9a-8870-410c-9a41-f8b536ef0780@kernel.org>

On 8/11/26 17:14, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
> On 8/11/26 17:05, Jan Sebastian Götte wrote:
>> On 8/11/26 16:53, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
>>> On 7/31/26 18:27, Jan Sebastian Götte wrote:
>>>> Register a CRASH_ZEROIZE notifier that wipes secretmem folios. As a
>>>> result, when CONFIG_CRASH_ZEROIZE is set, secretmem areas will be
>>>> cleared before the kdump kernel is kexec'ed.
>>>
>>> Are you actually using secretmem in your use case? I heard some rumors that
>>> secretmem isn't used all that much in practice :)
>>
>> I'm aware nobody is really using secretmem. I decided to build this on top of
>> secretmem because it's an existing API that actually kind of fits the use case.
>> While I could have added a new API just for this (marking userspace memory as
>> wipe-on-crash), making it part of secretmem instead gives some additional
>> defense-in-depth protection for both users who only need wiping, and for users
>> who only want secretmem's additional protection against kernel memory read
>> primitives so I think everyone wins here.
> 
> What I was thinking when I looked at patch #3+#4: 50% of the users you add are
> irrelevant in practice.
> 
> Or are you saying that you are going to start using secretmem for your use case?

I'm in fact going to start using secretmem.

  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-11 15:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-31 16:27 [PATCH 0/4] CRASH_ZEROIZE: Wipe secrets before kdump Jan Sebastian Götte
2026-07-31 16:27 ` [PATCH 1/4] of/kexec: fix typo in comment (usable-memory-range) Jan Sebastian Götte
2026-08-11 13:43   ` Rob Herring
2026-07-31 16:27 ` [PATCH 2/4] kexec: add CRASH_ZEROIZE to wipe secrets before kdump Jan Sebastian Götte
2026-07-31 16:27 ` [PATCH 3/4] mm/secretmem: zeroize secret pages " Jan Sebastian Götte
2026-08-11 14:53   ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-08-11 15:05     ` Jan Sebastian Götte
2026-08-11 15:14       ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-08-11 15:18         ` Jan Sebastian Götte [this message]
2026-07-31 16:27 ` [PATCH 4/4] security/keys: zeroize key payloads " Jan Sebastian Götte

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