From: geokozey@mailfence.com (Geo Kozey)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v5 next 5/5] net: modules: use request_module_cap() to load 'netdev-%s' modules
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 22:51:38 +0100 (CET) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <708003731.69563.1511905898471@ichabod.co-bxl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFz0t7cCkePJQ1w44Kw_g5nns1tYJLUOL7f-c7vriqkFig@mail.gmail.com>
> From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> Sent: Tue Nov 28 21:33:22 CET 2017
> To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v5 next 5/5] net: modules: use request_module_cap() to load 'netdev-%s' modules
> Because I really am *not* interested in these security flags that are
> off by default and then get turned on by special cases. I think it's
> completely unacceptable to say "we're insecure by default but then you
> can do X and be secure". It doesn't work. It doesn't fix anything.
>
> Linus
> ----------------------------------------
What about "we're insecure by default but you can't do anything to change this"? It describes current situation. For last 20 years linux allowed for insecure behavior and tons of tools were built depending on it. It's recurring theme of kernel security development. I'll be glad if some genius propose perfect idea solving this problem but I'm afraid things go nowhere instead.
Yours sincerely
G. K.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-11-28 21:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 84+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-11-27 17:18 [PATCH v5 next 0/5] Improve Module autoloading infrastructure Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 17:18 ` [PATCH v5 next 1/5] modules:capabilities: add request_module_cap() Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 18:48 ` Randy Dunlap
2017-11-27 21:35 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-28 19:14 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-28 20:11 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 21:16 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-28 21:33 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-28 22:18 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-28 22:52 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-28 21:39 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 22:12 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-28 22:18 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 22:48 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-29 7:49 ` Michal Kubecek
2017-11-29 13:46 ` Alan Cox
2017-11-29 14:50 ` David Miller
2017-11-29 15:54 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-29 15:58 ` David Miller
2017-11-29 16:29 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-29 22:45 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-30 0:06 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-29 17:28 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-30 0:35 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-30 17:17 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-28 20:18 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 17:18 ` [PATCH v5 next 2/5] modules:capabilities: add cap_kernel_module_request() permission check Djalal Harouni
2017-11-30 2:05 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-27 17:18 ` [PATCH v5 next 3/5] modules:capabilities: automatic module loading restriction Djalal Harouni
2017-11-30 1:23 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-30 12:22 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 17:18 ` [PATCH v5 next 4/5] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules auto-load mode Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 17:18 ` [PATCH v5 next 5/5] net: modules: use request_module_cap() to load 'netdev-%s' modules Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 18:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 21:41 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 22:04 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 22:59 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-27 23:14 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 23:19 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-27 23:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-28 1:23 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 12:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Geo Kozey
2017-11-28 19:32 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-28 20:08 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 20:12 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-28 20:20 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 20:33 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-28 21:10 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-28 21:33 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 23:23 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-28 23:29 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 23:49 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-29 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-29 6:36 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-29 14:46 ` Geo Kozey
2017-12-01 15:22 ` Marcus Meissner
2017-11-28 23:53 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-28 21:51 ` Geo Kozey [this message]
2017-11-28 23:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-29 0:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-29 0:26 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-29 0:50 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-29 4:26 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-11-29 18:30 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-29 18:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-29 18:53 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-29 21:17 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-29 22:14 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-30 0:44 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-30 2:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-30 6:51 ` Daniel Micay
2017-11-30 8:50 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-30 14:16 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-30 14:51 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-12-01 6:39 ` Daniel Micay
2017-11-29 15:28 ` Geo Kozey
2017-11-27 18:41 ` [PATCH v5 next 0/5] Improve Module autoloading infrastructure Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 19:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 19:12 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 21:31 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 19:14 ` David Miller
2017-11-27 22:31 ` James Morris
2017-11-27 23:04 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-27 23:44 ` James Morris
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