Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK

[Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>]

Hi Jarkko,

> > Thank you. I'll pick these soon. Is there any objections?

No objections.
> 
> Mimi brought up that we need a MAINTAINERS update for this and also
> .platform.
> 
> We have these:
> 
> - KEYS/KEYRINGS
> - CERTIFICATE HANDLING
> 
> I would put them under KEYRINGS for now and would not consider further
> subdivision for the moment.

IMA has dependencies on the platform_certs/ and now on the new .machine
keyring.  Just adding "F: security/integrity/platform_certs/" to the
KEYS/KEYRINGS record, ignores that dependency.  The discussion wouldn't
even be on the linux-integrity mailing list.

Existing requirement:
- The keys on the .platform keyring are limited to verifying the kexec
image.

New requirements based on Eric Snowbergs' patch set:
- When IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY is enabled,
the MOK keys will not be loaded directly onto the .machine keyring or
indirectly onto the .secondary_trusted_keys keyring.

- Only when a new IMA Kconfig explicitly allows the keys on the
.machine keyrings, will the CA keys stored in MOK be loaded onto the
.machine keyring.

Unfortunately I don't think there is any choice, but to define a new
MAINTAINERS entry.  Perhaps something along the lines of:

KEYS/KEYRINGS_INTEGRITY
M:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
M:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
L:      keyrings@vger.kernel.org
L:      linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
F:      security/integrity/platform_certs

thanks,

Mimi