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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: sashiko-bot@kernel.org, "Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-usb@vger.kernel.org,
	"Heiko Carstens" <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Vasily Gorbik" <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Alexander Gordeev" <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Mark Fasheh" <mark@fasheh.com>,
	"Joel Becker" <jlbec@evilplan.org>,
	"Joseph Qi" <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v3 17/44] securityfs: use fc_init_pseudo()
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 18:34:38 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7dc91c090b4f8254f8b6fbe2ec36060f@paul-moore.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261116-work-loop-pseudo-v3-17-8cbbea1cf34f@kernel.org>

On Nov 16, 2026 sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> 
> Initialize securityfs as a pseudo filesystem. This raises SB_I_PSEUDO
> and SB_I_NOEXEC. securityfs never holds executables.
> 
> But securityfs needs device nodes. AppArmor puts a .null device node
> into securityfs. On exec it replaces file descriptors the new profile
> isn't allowed to use with that node and opens it via dentry_open() which
> doesn't care about SB_I_NODEV. Such a file descriptor can still be
> reopened through /proc/<pid>/fd/<nr> though and that's what opening
> /dev/stderr does. The node itself can also be opened by path as
> /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/.null. Both go through may_open_dev()
> which refuses device nodes with SB_I_NODEV raised. So clear SB_I_NODEV
> again in securityfs_fill_super().
> 
> Reviewed-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alex@amutable.com>
> Reviewed-by: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
> ---
>  security/inode.c | 4 ++++
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
> index 0804023676741..edaebf0f1972d 100644
> --- a/security/inode.c
> +++ b/security/inode.c
> @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
>  #include <linux/kobject.h>
>  #include <linux/fs.h>
>  #include <linux/fs_context.h>
> +#include <linux/pseudo_fs.h>
>  #include <linux/mount.h>
>  #include <linux/pagemap.h>
>  #include <linux/init.h>
> @@ -49,6 +50,8 @@ static int securityfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
>  		return error;
>  
>  	sb->s_op = &securityfs_super_operations;
> +	/* Userspace may open AppArmor's .null device node by path. */
> +	sb->s_iflags &= ~SB_I_NODEV;

AppArmor itself does a dentry_open() on its null device to effectively
block inheritence of open files if not permitted by policy.  SELinux
basically does the same thing, in fact AppArmor's aa_inherit_files()
is based on SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() according to the
comments.

Anyway, I'd suggest changing your comment to something like the
following, but it's not critical.

  /* Allow for LSM specific null device nodes */

Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

>  	return 0;
>  }
> @@ -64,6 +67,7 @@ static const struct fs_context_operations securityfs_context_ops = {
>  
>  static int securityfs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
>  {
> +	fc_init_pseudo(fc);
>  	fc->ops = &securityfs_context_ops;
>  	return 0;
>  }
> 
> -- 
> 2.53.0

--
paul-moore.com

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-17 23:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 110+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-16 11:04 [PATCH RFC v3 00/44] fs: don't use pseudo filesystem files as storage Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 01/44] loop: refuse backing files that aren't open for reading Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:24   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 02/44] nvmet: check that the file backend supports ->{read,write}_iter Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:15   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  8:25   ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 03/44] target: fileio: check that the backing file " Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:25   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  8:26   ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 04/44] fs: add SB_I_PSEUDO Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:16   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 05/44] kernfs: use fc_init_pseudo() Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:19   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 06/44] proc: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:17   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 07/44] binfmt_misc: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:16   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 08/44] mqueue: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:16   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 09/44] bpf: use fc_init_pseudo() for bpffs Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:16   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 20:03   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 10/44] nullfs: use fc_init_pseudo() Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:16   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 11/44] failfs: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:17   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  8:26   ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 12/44] rust_binderfs: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:20   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 12:00   ` Alice Ryhl
2026-11-17  8:27   ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 13/44] devpts: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:16   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 14/44] debugfs: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:15   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 15/44] tracefs: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:17   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 16/44] configfs: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:18   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 17/44] securityfs: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:20   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 23:34   ` Paul Moore [this message]
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 18/44] selinux: use fc_init_pseudo() for selinuxfs Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:20   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 23:34   ` Paul Moore
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 19/44] smack: use fc_init_pseudo() for smackfs Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:18   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 20/44] apparmor: use fc_init_pseudo() for apparmorfs Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:19   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 21/44] nfsd: use fc_init_pseudo() Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:20   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  8:28   ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 22/44] sunrpc: use fc_init_pseudo() for rpc_pipefs Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:19   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 23/44] fuse: use fc_init_pseudo() for fusectl Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:20   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 24/44] efivarfs: use fc_init_pseudo() Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:21   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 25/44] pstore: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:19   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:04 ` [PATCH RFC v3 26/44] xenfs: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:20   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  8:28   ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2026-11-16 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC v3 27/44] openpromfs: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:20   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  8:32   ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2026-11-16 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC v3 28/44] ocfs2: use fc_init_pseudo() for dlmfs Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:20   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  8:35   ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2026-11-16 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC v3 29/44] s390/hypfs: use fc_init_pseudo() Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:23   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  8:36   ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2026-11-16 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC v3 30/44] powerpc/spufs: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:28   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC v3 31/44] usb: gadget: f_fs: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:21   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC v3 32/44] usb: gadget: gadgetfs: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:21   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC v3 33/44] ovl: refuse data-only layers on pseudo filesystems Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:27   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 17:37   ` Amir Goldstein
2026-11-16 17:49     ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC v3 34/44] selftests/ovl: test " Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:28   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 17:16   ` Amir Goldstein
2026-11-16 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC v3 35/44] fs: add file_check_backing() Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:30   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 13:07   ` Jan Kara
2026-11-17  8:44   ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2026-11-16 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC v3 36/44] loop: refuse files on pseudo filesystems as backing files Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:28   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC v3 37/44] zloop: refuse zone files on pseudo filesystems Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:28   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC v3 38/44] nvmet: refuse files on pseudo filesystems as namespace backing files Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:24   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 12:00   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-16 13:20     ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC v3 39/44] target: fileio: refuse files on pseudo filesystems as " Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:23   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC v3 40/44] fuse: refuse files on pseudo filesystems as passthrough " Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:26   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC v3 41/44] usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: refuse files on pseudo filesystems Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:26   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC v3 42/44] erofs: refuse files on pseudo filesystems as backing files Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:25   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC v3 43/44] acct: refuse files on pseudo filesystems Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:27   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC v3 44/44] selftests/filesystems: add backing file tests for pseudo files Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 11:29   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 12:00   ` bot+bpf-ci

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